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ABSTRACT 
 
The diffuse runoff of agricultural nutrients, also called agricultural nonpoint 
source pollution (NPS), is a widespread threat to freshwater resources. Despite decades of 
research into the processes of eutrophication and agricultural nutrient management, 
social, economic, and political barriers have slowed progress towards improving water 
quality. A critical challenge to managing agricultural NPS pollution is motivating 
landowners to act against their individual farm production incentives in response to 
distant ecological impacts. The complexity of governing the social-ecological system 
requires improved understanding of how policy shapes farmer behavior to improve the 
state of water quality. This dissertation contributes both theoretically and empirically to 
NPS pollution governance by examining the impacts of water quality policy design on 
farmer nutrient management decision making and behavior. 
In the first study, I theoretically contextualize the issue of agricultural NPS 
pollution in the broader discussion of environmental public goods dilemmas to suggest 
that an increased focus on the link between policy and behavior can improve sustainable 
resource management. I propose two empirical approaches to study the policy-behavior 
link in environmental public goods dilemmas: 1) explicit incorporation of social 
psychological and behavioral variables and 2) utilization of actor mental models, or 
perceptions of the world that guide decision making, to identify behavioral drivers and 
outcomes. In the second and third studies, I then use these approaches to examine how 
water quality policies for agricultural NPS collectively change farmer behavior to reduce 
nutrient emissions. The second chapter uses a quantitative, survey-based approach to 
examine the relationship between mandatory policy design and behavior change in New 
Zealand. I find that a shift to mandatory policy is not immediately associated with 
increased adoption of nutrient management practices, but the mandatory policy design is 
important for potential future behavior change and long-term policy support. In the third 
study, I combine qualitative methodology with network analysis of qualitative data to 
examine a spectrum of agricultural NPS pollution policies in Vermont, USA and Taupo 
and Rotorua, New Zealand. I use farmer mental models to examine behavior change 
within each of the regions, the perceived drivers of behavior change and perceived 
outcomes of the policy. In this study, farmers across all three regions cite mandatory 
water policy as a key behavioral driver, but in each region, policy design interacts with 
the social-ecological context to produce distinct patterns of behaviors and perceived 
outcomes. Taken together, this dissertation demonstrates that agricultural NPS pollution 
policy design must consider the interactions between policy and other social-ecological 
behavioral drivers in order to achieve long term water quality improvements.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problem Description 
Diffuse runoff of the nutrients nitrogen and phosphorus in agricultural lands, 
also known as nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, is a widespread and persistent challenge 
to water quality across the globe. Agriculture is the largest source of nitrogen and 
phosphorus to freshwater systems and nutrient enrichment of rivers and lakes is one of 
the most common impairments of surface waters (Foley et al., 2005; V. H. Smith & 
Schindler, 2009). The excessive nutrient loading of surface waters has broad ranging 
social and ecological impacts. These impacts include damage to fish populations, 
decreases in biodiversity, economic hardships for businesses and threats to drinking water 
supplies (Bennett, Carpenter, & Caraco, 2001; Carpenter et al., 1998). Many of these 
impacts are expected to increase with accelerating global climate change 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2015; Zia, 2013), setting up an urgent 
societal and environmental need to find workable solutions for NPS pollution. 
While much is known about the biogeochemistry of NPS pollution, less is 
known about the social, economic, and political dynamics that contribute to the 
persistence and expansion of the problem (Carpenter et al., 1998; McDowell et al., 2015; 
Rissman & Carpenter, 2015). As with many environmental public goods, there are 
competing individual and community level incentives for the provisioning of water 
quality (Ostrom, 2005). Farmers across a watershed are incentivized to maximize 
production and nutrient emissions through many small (or not so small) emissions, over 
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time and across a large geographical area. Any one individual emission may be 
imperceptible, but scaled up the impacts can be dramatic (L. E. D. Smith & Porter, 2010).  
Since Hardin’s (1968) classic “Tragedy of the Commons,” researchers and 
practitioners have theorized and debated institutional designs to avoid this social dilemma 
of collective degradation of a resource (Agrawal, 2003; Baland & Platteau, 1996; 
Ostrom, 1990, 2005). Institutions, as used here, refer to the formal or informal rules, 
strategies or norms that constrain human interaction and behavior (North, 1990; Ostrom, 
2005). This body of literature highlights the potential for institutional design, whether 
political, market-based, or normative in nature, to align competing individual and group 
incentives to create sustainable management regimes (Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 
2004; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; Ostrom, 2005).  
Drawing from the perspective of institutional design, a breadth of potential 
options exist to align individual and community incentives for mitigating agricultural 
NPS pollution. These range from education and capacity building interventions to 
incentive payments, to market-based trading instruments, to traditional command-and-
control rule-based mechanisms (Drevno, 2016). Institutional design for managing 
agricultural NPS must also consider the complexity and uncertainty of the spatial and 
temporal dynamics of a watershed. The transport of land applied nutrients to receiving 
waters is characterized by stochastic climate events, heterogeneous land and soil 
characteristics, legacy nutrients within receiving water bodies and time lags in the system 
(Moss, 2008; Withers, Neal, Jarvie, & Doody, 2014). In addition to this biophysical 
complexity, agricultural landowners’ farm business decisions are governed by broader 
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market trends for agricultural products and individual social and cultural priorities (L. E. 
D. Smith & Porter, 2010). 
Despite the broad range of available tools to address the problem, little progress 
has been made in improving nutrient impaired waterbodies across the globe (Dowd, 
Press, & Los Huertos, 2008; Rissman & Carpenter, 2015), suggesting that we lack an 
understanding of which institutional designs will work in a given watershed context. 
Specifically, we lack an understanding of two critical institutional interactions for NPS 
pollution governance: 1) the fit of a policy intervention within its social, economic and 
environmental context, and 2) the connection between policy design and farmer decision 
making. In this dissertation I seek to examine these two institutional interactions to 
advance understanding of governing agricultural NPS pollution through combining 
theories of institutional design and analysis with social psychological theories of decision 
making. I will ground the study in watersheds in New Zealand and Vermont, USA. These 
two regions both feature high levels of farming and are facing similar environmental 
challenges, but that have distinct and different governance approaches to agricultural 
NPS pollution. In order to collectively govern individual farm nutrient emissions across a 
watershed, it is important to gain a better understanding of how institutional designs 
shape farm management behavior.  
1.2. Theoretical Background 
Numerous studies have examined governance approaches for agricultural NPS 
pollution. These approaches have mostly aligned with two theoretical angles: farmer 
decision making (Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, & Floress, 2012; Conner, Miller, Zia, Wang, 
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& Darby, 2016; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007; Prokopy, Floress, Klotthor-Weinkauf, & 
Baumgart-Getz, 2008a) and environmental policy (Drevno, 2016; Horan & Ribaudo, 
1999; Shortle & Horan, 2013). The first angle seeks to understand motivating factors for 
individual decision making. This research has relied upon behavioral theories, such as the 
diffusion of innovations (Rogers, 1962) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) 
(Ajzen, 1985; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011), or econometric studies to identify and define 
predictive factors for the adoption of water quality practices (Blackstock, Ingram, Burton, 
Brown, & Slee, 2010; Burton, 2004; Conner et al., 2016; Edwards-Jones, 2006). From 
this research we know that a wide variety of social, economic and farm system variables 
are important factors in whether or not a farmer will adopt management strategies that 
reduce negative environmental impacts, including the degradation of water quality. In a 
meta-analysis of studies examining farmers adoption of Best Management Practices, 
Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) found “access to and quality of information, financial 
capacity and being connected to an agency or local networks of farmers or watershed 
groups” to be the strongest determinants of adoption.  
The environmental policy approach to examining governance of agricultural 
NPS pollution focuses on the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of policy interventions in 
internalizing water quality deterioration negative externalities within agricultural 
production (Drevno, 2016; Pretty et al., 2001; Shortle, Abler, & Horan, 1998; Shortle & 
Horan, 2013). This microeconomic perspective models the trade-offs between different 
institutional designs based on the assumption that farmers are utility-maximizing agents 
that will change behavior given the appropriate mix of costs and benefits. In this line of 
5 
 
research, Shortle and Horan (2013) examine the current state of water quality policy 
instruments and conclude that, due to the complexity of NPS pollution, second-best 
institutional designs are required. These second-best designs feature trade-offs in 
efficiency and equity as compared to theoretically optimally-efficient policies. They do 
suggest that water quality trading and cap-and-tax institutions show promise for resolving 
some of the information and transaction cost challenges associated with NPS pollution 
(Shortle & Horan, 2013). Drevno (2016) also examines the potential for policy tools to 
address agricultural NPS pollution and concludes that effective water quality institutional 
design will require a mix of policy instruments, local participation and political will. 
While literature examining both farmer behavior and environmental policy have 
greatly expanded the water quality policy instrument tool kit and our knowledge of the 
factors farmers balance in their management decisions, there are large gaps in 
understanding how individuals respond to institutional designs in a given watershed 
context. From the behavioral and econometric approach, studies have failed to identify a 
consistent list of predictor variables for pro-environmental farm management (Baumgart-
Getz et al., 2012; Knowler & Bradshaw, 2007; Prokopy et al., 2008a). The policy 
approach appears to offer a similar lack of consensus in the best approach to designing an 
institutional intervention. Neither perspective takes into account that “farmers’ 
conservation behaviors are more than individual decisions about isolated practices; they 
are scale dependent and influenced by issues of space, institutions and time” (Reimer et 
al., 2014, p. 57A).  
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There are limited number of studies that have examined the interaction of 
environmental policy institutional design and farmer decision making. A few studies have 
focused on the differential response of individuals to voluntary and mandatory water 
quality regimes (Barnes, Toma, Willock, & Hall, 2013; Barry, King, Larson, Lennox, & 
others, 2010; Kara, Ribaudo, & Johansson, 2008). The results of these studies show no 
clear trend and there is a lack of acknowledgement for market-based alternatives. For 
policy makers to design and implement effective policy solutions, a clear understanding 
of the interaction between institutional design and behavior is critical.  
Institutional analysis provides a vehicle to examine the formal institutional rules 
of a water quality policy intervention in conjunction with the other formal and informal 
institutions that govern individual behavior within a watershed. As mentioned above, the 
nature of agricultural NPS pollution as a social dilemma sets up a scenario in which it is 
to society’s benefit to collectively shift behavior in a way that may not be beneficial at 
the individual level (Poteete, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2010). The challenge in designing an 
intentional institutional intervention for this purpose is that for the intervention to achieve 
the desired outcome (e.g. farm management change to improve water quality), it must fit 
well with the pre-existing institutions that exist to structure social interaction and 
behavior in a given setting (Goodin, 1998). As Young highlights, “institutions play a role 
in both causing and addressing problems that arise from human-environment 
interactions,” hence the fit of the institution to the biophysical context, the interplay of 
the institution with other existing institutional arrangements, and the scale at which the 
7 
 
institution is implemented for the given problem are all important elements in the success 
of the institutional intervention (Young, King, Schroeder, Galaz, & Hahn, 2008, p. xiiv).  
Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, and its 
expansion and evolution into the social-ecological systems (SES) framework provide a 
theoretical basis from which to examine the institutional governance of interactions 
between actors (Ostrom, 2009, 2011). Typically, in the application of Ostrom’s 
frameworks to understand collective action in natural resource regimes, individual 
behavior is assumed to be boundedly rational, in that individuals intend to behave 
rationally but have limited information, cognition and attention processing abilities 
(Ostrom, 2011; Poteete et al., 2010; Simon, 1972). In cases like agricultural NPS 
pollution where there are high degrees of uncertainty in resource dynamics, which makes 
measurement, monitoring and enforcement of policy institutional interventions difficult, 
there is an increased need to understand individuals’ internal decision-making processes.   
1.3. Dissertation Overview 
In this dissertation, I further the understanding of SES governance through 
examining the role and impact of institutional design on farmer nutrient management 
decision making and behavior through an integrated institutional analysis and social 
psychological approach. First, I do this theoretically in the second chapter through 
building the case for an expansion of Ostrom’s (2007, 2009) SES Framework to facilitate 
the study of environmental public goods dilemmas, like declining water quality from 
agricultural NPS pollution. Then in the third and fourth chapters I build on the theoretical 
approaches laid out in the second chapter to empirically examine farmer decision making 
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and behavior across a number of agricultural NPS pollution policy regimes. In this 
section I highlight the key topics, questions and approaches used in each chapter of the 
dissertation. 
In the second chapter I contextualize the issue of agricultural NPS pollution in the 
broader discussion of environmental public goods dilemmas and the need for greater 
analysis of these dilemmas to lead to their sustainable management. Water quality decline 
from agricultural NPS pollution is used as an example case throughout the first chapter to 
define the challenges to analyzing these types of regimes, as well as potential paths 
forward. I suggest that Ostrom’s (2007, 2009) SES framework provides a foundational 
structure for this type of analysis. However, the SES framework has yet to fill this 
analytical need for environmental public goods dilemmas. I propose that a critical gap in 
applications of the framework lies in the treatment of actor decision making, and in 
particular the lack of attention paid to how institutions shape behavior. I conclude by 
proposing two potential pathways for increasing attention paid to the institution-behavior 
link in applications of the SES framework. These analytical pathways are: 1) through 
explicitly incorporating social psychological and behavioral variables into the analysis of 
environmental public goods dilemmas and 2) by studying actor mental models to identify 
the most salient components to actor behavior and perceived outcomes.  
In my third and fourth chapters, I then pursue these two analytical pathways to 
examine how water quality policy institutions for agricultural NPS collectively change 
farmer behavior and reduce nutrient emissions in a given watershed context.  The third 
chapter takes a quantitative, survey-based approach to compare farmer decision making 
9 
 
and behavior across agricultural NPS pollution policy regimes in New Zealand. This 
study examines the relationship between policy design and behavior change to evaluate 
potential for water quality improvement in the future. Further, this study incorporates the 
social psychological Theory of Planned Behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011) to examine 
alignment between farmer decision making and their values and beliefs as a basis for 
evaluating potential for long term policy support.  
In the fourth chapter I use the SES framework as the basis to examine farmer 
mental models within a spectrum of agricultural NPS pollution regimes in Vermont, USA 
and Taupo and Rotorua, New Zealand. Here, I use farmer mental models to examine 
behavior change within each of the regions, perceived drivers of behavior change and 
perceived outcomes of the policy.  The qualitative, interview-based study allows for an 
in-depth examination of the fit of each policy within the biophysical context in terms of 
behavior change and the interplay of the policy with existing social and ecological 
dynamics in the watershed. I examine the distinct pattern of behaviors and outcomes that 
emerge in each policy context to draw conclusions for agricultural NPS pollution policy 
design. 
Finally, in the fifth chapter, I offer concluding thoughts on the results of the 
dissertation as a whole and insights to pursue for future research. Ultimately, through 
increasing our knowledge on the contextual and psychological drivers of farmer response 
to water quality policies, this dissertation seeks to reduce barriers to the management of 
agricultural NPS pollution and inform effective policy design. Furthermore, this 
dissertation aims to inspire other researchers to do likewise in the study of environmental 
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public goods dilemmas more broadly guided by an expanded SES Framework that 
incorporates a greater focus on actor decision making and behavior. 
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CHAPTER 2:  STRENGTHENING THE INSTITUTION-BEHAVIOR LINK IN 
THE SES FRAMEWORK TO FACILITATE ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PUBLIC GOODS DILEMMAS 
Author: Courtney Hammond Wagner 
2.1. Abstract 
Many environmental challenges take the form of environmental public goods 
dilemmas, including climate change, water quality deterioration and biodiversity loss. 
There is a great need for analysis of these challenges to better inform the design of 
governance institutions for sustainable resource management. The social-ecological 
systems (SES) framework provides a foundational structure for analyzing the 
sustainability of complex, multi-scale environmental challenges. However, in application, 
the SES framework has struggled to facilitate analysis of environmental challenges 
beyond common-pool resource (CPR) regimes and the emergence of community-based 
governance institutions. In this paper, I propose that one way to facilitate the application 
of the SES framework to environmental public goods dilemmas is to incorporate a greater 
focus on the link between institutions and behavior.  
After introducing the SES Framework, I examine attributes of environmental 
public goods dilemmas that differentiate them from CPR regimes. These include the lack 
of a behavior-reinforcing link, multi-actor and multi-resource system dynamics, higher 
levels of uncertainty and complexity, and lack of built-in social capital. Then I suggest 
that these attributes also increase the need to study a broader suite of potential 
governance institutions. I propose that one way to address both of these challenges is to 
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incorporate the study of the psychological drivers of individual behavior and decision-
making into the SES Framework. I link the attributes of environmental public goods with 
the need for an increased focus on actor decision making and behavior. Then I explore a 
sampling of psychological and behavioral concepts to show their potential to improve our 
understanding of system dynamics within environmental public goods dilemmas. Finally, 
I propose revisions to the SES Framework to facilitate this increased focus on the 
institution-behavior link. Incorporating psychological and behavioral theory into the SES 
framework to strengthen the institution-behavior link is a promising approach to allow for 
the study of institutional interventions for environmental public goods. Ultimately, a 
better understanding of which institutions promote behavior change within and across 
environmental public goods regimes can improve the sustainability of these systems.  
 
2.2 Introduction 
Many of the regional and global environmental challenges we face are 
environmental public goods dilemmas, including climate change, ocean acidification, 
declining water quality, and biodiversity loss (Rockström et al., 2009; Shortle & 
Uetake, 2015). Because of the scale and persistence of many environmental public 
good dilemmas, there is a critical need to improve our understanding of how 
institutions can support sustainable resource regimes in environmental public goods 
dilemmas. To improve our understanding of these systems we need analysis of 
environmental public good dilemmas to identify generalizable trends or design 
principles for robust management regimes (Ostrom, 2005). The social-ecological 
systems (SES) framework provides a foundational structure for this type of analysis, 
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specifically for analyzing and improving the sustainability of complex environmental 
dilemmas  (Ostrom, 2007, 2009). The framework acknowledges the context-specific 
nature of human decisions and behavior within environmental dilemmas, and the 
existence of influences and feedbacks between the ecological and the social (Ostrom, 
2011). However, the SES framework has yet to fill this analytical need for 
environmental public goods dilemmas. I propose that a critical gap in applications of 
the framework lies in relying on behavioral assumptions about actor decision making, 
in particular the lack of attention paid to how institutions shape decision making and 
behavior. 
 In an effort to inspire transdisciplinary analysis of environmental public goods 
dilemmas using the SES framework, I propose to improve the link between governance 
institutions and actor behavior within the framework. Thus far, applications of the SES 
framework have been limited to the study of common pool resource (CPR) regimes and 
the conditions that lead to the emergence of community-based natural resource 
management (Thiel, Adamseged, & Baake, 2015). In this paper, I will suggest that the 
attributes of environmental public goods dilemmas, in particular those that differentiate 
them from CPR dilemmas, increase the relevance of actor behavior and decision 
making for social-ecological outcomes compared to the role of actor behavior in CPR 
regimes. I identify these attributes as the lack of a behavior-reinforcing link, multi-actor 
and multi-resource system dynamics, higher levels of uncertainty and complexity, and 
lack of built-in social capital. 
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An expanded focus on the link between governance institutions and behavior 
within the SES framework will allow analysts to examine how institutions shape social-
ecological outcomes in environmental public goods dilemmas, in light of their unique 
attributes. Methodologically, the expanded SES framework that I am proposing for 
environmental public goods dilemmas includes 1) designing research questions around 
the institution-behavior link, 2) incorporating new variables into the SES framework on 
drivers, influences and psychological components of actor decision-making, and 3) 
utilizing actor mental models to identify the salient components of the social-ecological 
dilemma. The expanded SES framework allows the analyst to draw from the literature 
of social psychology, cognitive psychology and behavioral economics to investigate 
behavior under different institutions rather than rely on strong behavioral assumptions. 
This approach allows for the examination of diverse types of institutional arrangements 
in a broader range of environmental resource dilemmas, including environmental public 
goods.  
In section one, I begin by reviewing the vision behind the SES framework and 
outline its current constraints. Then, in the second section, I explore the specific 
challenges in the management of environmental public goods for implementation of the 
SES framework. In section three I build on the exploration of environmental public 
goods to suggest the need for examining diverse institutional arrangements with the 
SES framework to motivate collective action. In section four I establish the importance 
of the institutional-behavioral link to address these challenges. Finally, in section five, I 
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propose revisions to the SES framework to strengthen researchers’ ability to examine 
the institutional-behavioral link in public goods dilemmas using the framework. 
2.3. SES Framework Vision & Constraints 
The seemingly simple question of which institutions promote sustainability under 
which social-ecological contexts is hugely complex. Variation in scale, scope, resource 
attributes, community attributes, market forces, and governance regimes, among other 
factors, makes drawing concrete conclusions and proposing solutions challenging. 
Furthermore, researchers analyzing these systems from different disciplinary perspectives 
use different terminology, use different scales of analysis and focus on different 
variables, which makes drawing system-wide transdisciplinary conclusions difficult 
(Agrawal, 2003). The SES framework was proposed as a solution to this problem, 
following the success of a research program on CPR regimes (Poteete et al., 2010). The 
framework provides a theoretical basis from which to examine interactions between 
ecological resource dynamics, underlying biophysical systems, governance regimes and 
human behavior (see Figure 2-1 below) (Ostrom, 2009, 2011). These first-order 
variables, and the second- and third- order variables nested below them, are organized to 
guide research design and data collection so that analysts can communicate across cases 
and begin to form theories about how SES work (for more detailed introduction to the 
SES framework see Ostrom (2007, 2009)).  The long-term goal of the SES Framework is 
to enable research that can recognize “which combination of variables tends to lead to 
relatively sustainable and productive use of particular resources systems operating at 
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specific spatial and temporal scales and which combination tends to lead to resource 
collapses and high costs for humanity” (Ostrom, 2007, p. 15183).  
 
Figure 2-1. The SES framework with example elements of watershed agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution dilemma adapted from McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) 
Thus far, the SES framework has struggled to live up to this initial vision. 
Applications of the SES framework still lie mostly within the realm of CPR regimes 
(Thiel et al., 2015), despite the intention for the framework to branch out to different 
types of resource regimes (McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014). Additionally, the framework has 
been applied primarily in community-based natural resource management contexts, such 
as when and under what conditions will resource users self-organize to address resource 
degradation or overharvesting (Thiel et al., 2015). Yet, the framework has the potential to 
examine a much wider breadth of governance questions.  
Theoretically the SES Framework centers around individual behavior and the 
“conscious choices” made by individuals or collaborative groups (McGinnis & Ostrom, 
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2014, para. 5). The SES framework “does not dictate a particular model of decision-
making; instead it prompts the analyst to explicitly identify what participants value; what 
resources, information, and beliefs they have; what their information-processing 
capabilities are; and what internal mechanisms they use to decide on strategies” (Ostrom, 
Cox, & Schlager, 2014, p. 274). However, in application, very few studies explicitly 
identify actor perceptions that drive behavior and how actors perceive costs and benefits 
(Thiel et al., 2015). This may be in part because, as Ostrom identifies, “accurate and 
reliable measures of users’ perceived benefits and costs are difficult and costly to obtain, 
making it hard to test theories based on users’ expected net benefits” (Ostrom, 2009, p. 
420). Therefore, in applications of the SES Framework, analysts tend to overlook 
individual perceptions and values that drive decision-making, despite the fact that these 
lie theoretically at the core of the framework. This relates to a broader challenge for the 
SES Framework, which lies in the lack of a common understanding in what it means to 
apply the SES Framework (Ban & Cox, 2017).  
In the following section, drawing from the vision and constraints laid out here, I 
explore the attributes of environmental public goods dilemmas that present challenges for 
applications of the SES framework.  
2.4. Environmental Public Goods Dilemmas 
In the disciplines of economics and political science, public goods are often defined 
as non-subtractable (e.g. one person’s use of the good does not subtract from another 
person’s) and non-excludable (e.g. it is difficult or impossible to exclude others from 
accessing the resource) (Ostrom, 2005). Another related way to consider environmental 
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public goods dilemmas is that they are, at their core, environmental externalities. 
Environmental externalities occur when a behavior in a specific domain results in an 
output outside or external to the domain in question. This external output results in the 
deterioration or degradation of an environmental good shared by all. One example of an 
environmental public good dilemma, which I will draw on for illustrative purposes 
throughout this paper, is water quality deterioration from agricultural nonpoint source 
(NPS) pollution. In this dilemma, farmers spread nutrient fertilizers on their fields to 
increase agricultural yield, but as a result, these added nutrients may runoff into nearby 
waterbodies and decrease water quality of rivers and lakes.  Environmental public goods, 
such as water quality, differ from the traditionally studied common-pool resource 
regimes, such as irrigation networks, fisheries and forests, on a few important 
characteristics. These are: 1) a lack of a clear resource-behavior reinforcing link and 2) 
they typically feature larger geographic scales, greater complexity and more uncertainty.  
2.4.1. Public Goods Dilemmas Lack of Behavior-Reinforcing Link 
CPR dilemmas also feature externalities at their core, but with an important 
distinction. Within CPR dilemmas, overuse of resource results in degradation of that 
same resource for all. Therefore, an individual who overharvests, say overfishes in a 
vulnerable fishery, will ultimately see reductions in their own ability to fish because of 
aggregate overfishing. As shown in Figure 2-2 below, this can be conceptualized as a 
negative reinforcement mechanism.  Hardin described this situation in his classic Tragedy 
of the Commons paper: “each pursuing his own best interest” will bring “ruin to all” 
(Hardin, 1968, p. 1244).  
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Figure 2-2. Resource system and resource use relationships in common-pool resource and 
environmental public good. Note the lack of feedback between undesirable outcomes in public good 
example. 
This feedback link, in which the behavior in question ultimately affects the ability 
to engage in that same behavior in the future, is not present with environmental public 
goods, as show in Figure 2-2. Rather, environmental public goods dilemmas often feature 
many different types of actors using or exploiting the same resources for different 
purposes (Young, 2002). In the water quality example, farmers use nutrients to produce 
agricultural products, and citizens more broadly enjoy water quality for recreation, 
aesthetics or drinking water, as shown in Table 2-1. Importantly, the decline in water 
quality, in and of itself, will not limit a farmer’s ability to apply fertilizer on the farm. 
This is true even if a farmer is a part of the population that also enjoys water quality.  
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This lack of a behavior-reinforcement link creates challenges for characterizing 
the resource system within the SES Framework because it is unclear which resource 
system dynamics drive behavior and at which scales. Environmental public goods 
dilemmas generally do not feature the one-to-one resource system-resource unit link that 
is characteristic of most CPR regimes (e.g., Resource unit: Fish; Resource system: 
Fishery). Hinkel et al.’s (2015) diagnostic approach for identifying the resource units, 
resource system, and provisioning and/or appropriation problem using the SES 
Framework is not as clear cut for a public goods dilemma without this one-to-one link. 
Environmental public goods dilemmas typically feature at least two nested resource 
systems, and often many more.  
Table 2-1 shows the relevant action situation for the example case of declining 
water quality in agricultural watersheds. Connected to this action situation are two 
distinct levels of resource system, resource units, activities, benefits and actors. The first 
resource system is that of the focal behavior: the farm in which a farmer is applying 
fertilizer to produce agricultural products. The second resource system is the higher-level 
system that absorbs the negative externality of the behavior in the first system: the 
watershed, which receives nutrients from the land into local waterbodies.  Similarly, the 
resource units are related, but distinct.  One is units of nitrogen and phosphorus, and the 
other is the nutrient capacity of the waterbody in the watershed. Additional units of 
nitrogen and phosphorus added to farms will overwhelm the nutrient capacity of the 
waterbody but will not prevent farmers from adding additional nutrients to their farms in 
the future. 
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Table 2-1. Characterization of appropriation and provisioning action situations for agricultural 
watersheds. Structure adapted from Hinkel et al. (2015). 
Actors Benefits Activity 
Stock of 
Resource 
Units (RU) 
Subtractability 
Resource System 
(RS) 
Action 
situation (s) 
Farmers 
Sale of 
crops/ 
products 
Extracting 
nutrients from 
soil and 
adding 
nutrients 
through 
fertilizer/feed 
Nitrogen and 
Phosphorus 
No Farm system 
Addition of 
nutrients at the 
farm scale 
creates a water 
quality 
provisioning 
problem at the 
watershed 
scale 
Water 
quality 
Aesthetics, 
Recreation, 
drinking 
water, local 
economic  
Nutrient 
assimilative 
capacity of 
the 
waterbody 
Yes 
Watershed 
(biogeochemical 
processes) 
Rural 
and 
Urban 
Citizens 
 
 
Importantly, what I am characterizing here as an environmental public goods 
dilemma could also be described as a number of other types of environmental dilemmas 
depending on perspective and context. As Young (2002, p. 142) suggests, “environmental 
problems are socially constructed in the sense that there are almost always a number of 
plausible ways to think about them, and the choice of conceptualizations is likely to have 
significant consequences for the interests of one or more members of the relevant group.” 
For example, the issue of declining water quality in agricultural watersheds also bears 
elements of a CPR regime: the nutrient capacity of the waterbody can be viewed as a 
CPR that farmers and other landowners use (and overuse) for disposing of wastes (e.g., 
excess nutrients applied to fields or sewage). Here again, Young (2002, p. 142) suggests 
that “the extent to which any given environmental concern is properly construed as a 
CPR problem is likely to be more a matter of how we look at it than a fact of life.” 
2.4.2. Complexity and Uncertainty in Public Goods Dilemmas 
Environmental public goods dilemmas tend to be larger scale, featuring greater 
levels of complexity and uncertainty than small-scale CPR regimes. All SES share 
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elements of complex systems, including feedbacks, nonlinear dynamics and emergent 
system properties (Meadows & Wright, 2008). Yet, in larger scale systems, with multiple 
interacting resource systems and multiple user groups, greater levels of complexity can 
further complicate the search for sustainable resource management regimes, by 
complicating our ability to understand system dynamics and measure system outcomes.  
To illustrate the complexity and uncertainty typical of public goods dilemmas, I 
return to the example case of water quality deterioration in agricultural watersheds. The 
biogeophysical movement of NPS nutrient pollution throughout a watershed is dependent 
on both deterministic factors, such as land use and soil composition, and random, 
weather-related processes. Phosphorus and nitrogen molecules, whether originating from 
agricultural, urban storm water, or streambank erosion, are extremely difficult to 
differentiate at the watershed scale (Moss, 2008). Because of this, it is very difficult and 
costly to attribute nutrient pollution to a source (Horan & Ribaudo, 1999). The 
measurement of pollution is generally done at the watershed scale as farm scale models 
and measurements have high degrees of uncertainty (Moss, 2008). Yet, even at the 
watershed scale, modeling of diffuse nutrient pollution involves combining hydrological, 
geological, meteorological, land cover classification and other data sources across a 
complex, heterogeneous landscape, with trade-offs in specificity and uncertainty.  
Typically, at the watershed scale, government agencies and researchers use a variety 
of modeling techniques to estimate and attribute NPS pollution contributions to 
individual sectors, such as agriculture.  Management strategies within or across polluting 
sectors then rely on proxy measurements such as ambient water quality, or production-
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related measures, such as input-use or practice implementation (Horan & Ribaudo, 1999). 
Furthermore, at the watershed scale, the transport of nutrients from farms to waterbodies 
may face significant time lags in the system, again resulting in a high degree of 
uncertainty and unpredictability (Meals, Dressing, & Davenport, 2010). These attributes 
of the agricultural NPS pollution, while unique to this specific problem, are 
representative of the broader challenges of uncertainty and complexity that make many 
environmental public good dilemmas more difficult to address than small-scale CPR 
regimes. 
The challenges outlined here, namely the multi-resource, multi-actor, highly 
complex and uncertain nature of public good dilemmas, make them difficult to 
characterize within the SES Framework. In particular, it is difficult to identify which 
elements of the system are important to examine for motivating collective action, and 
how to portray these systems given multiple potential ways to conceive of them. Here I 
suggest, and will further describe in the fourth section below, the importance of focusing 
on the actors within the system, drawing on their perceptions of the system to define the 
relevant elements driving behavior and collective action.  Before describing this proposal, 
I first need to consider another important and related gap within the applications of the 
SES Framework: the need to apply the SES Framework to examine a broader range of 
institutional interventions for SES. 
2.5. Examining Diverse Institutions to Motivate Collective Action 
Many, if not most, SES issues are collective action problems. In collective action 
problems individuals’ pursuit of their own self-interested welfare leads to collective 
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suffering. In other words, all individuals would be better off if they worked together. The 
collective action problem in agricultural nonpoint source pollution can be defined as: 
each farmer’s individual pursuit of a maximum yield, realized through excessive nutrient 
inputs, results in poor water quality that is shared by all farmers (and other residents of 
the watershed). Overcoming collective action problems requires motivating individuals to 
pursue the collective welfare (Olson, 1971; Ostrom, 1990). In the literature on 
community-based natural resource management, collective action is often linked with 
self-organized community management. This body of work, led by Ostrom and others, 
aimed to suggest that community-based, self-organized governance systems are a viable, 
potentially sustainable form of natural resource management. More broadly, community-
based natural resource management, or self-organized management of resource systems, 
is just one type of institutional arrangement that can motivate collective action. Other 
institutional arrangements for addressing collective action problems in SES include 
market-based strategies, state-based strategies, or any combination of these options with 
community-based strategies. According to Ostrom, institutional arrangements should be 
context specific, hence the formation of the SES framework to guide analysis of which 
institutions promote sustainable system outcomes under specific conditions (Ostrom, 
Janssen, & Anderies, 2007).  
The focus thus far on the emergence of community-based management using the 
SES framework is just a narrow slice of the potential institutional arrangements that 
could effectively manage resource systems. More broadly, there is a need to examine a 
diversity of potential institutional arrangements in environmental dilemmas. This is 
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especially the case within the study of environmental public goods dilemmas, where 
community-based management strategies may not be the most effective or the most 
efficient means to address the issue. Indeed, the traditional economics perspective 
dictates that the state should intervene in the provision public goods because individuals 
face incentives to freeride off the contributions of others (Singh et al., 2013). 
Characterizing environmental public goods as dual- or multi-resource system dilemmas, 
as I do above, illustrates an additional reason for this need: when compared to small-scale 
CPR regimes, the structure of environmental public good dilemmas does not lend itself to 
the emergence of social capital.  
Small-scale CPR regimes typically consist of “individuals who observe on a daily 
basis each other’s behavior and the impact of their actions on the resource” and, 
furthermore, “the resource users and the public infrastructure providers are the same 
individuals” (Anderies et al., 2004, para. 43). In environmental public goods dilemmas, 
by contrast, these conditions that lead naturally to the building of social capital, such as 
norms and trust, are not necessarily present. Social capital refers to the “idea that social 
bonds and norms are important for people and communities” (Pretty, 2003, p. 1913). In 
public goods dilemmas, resource users are not often the same as the public infrastructure 
providers. Resource users may not be observing each other’s behavior on a daily basis. 
Finally, it may be impossible to see the impact of each other’s behavior on the broader 
resource system. Therefore, reciprocity, trust, norm creation, and repeated interactions 
may not be feasible mechanisms to create sustainable resource management regimes.  
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Take, again, the example of water quality declines in agricultural watersheds: a 
farmer’s fertilizer use and nutrient management behavior takes place on her farm in 
isolation. It is difficult for other farmers to observe her nutrient management actions. 
Additionally, public infrastructure providers, such as employees of government water 
resources agencies, are typically not farmers and do not interact with farmers on a regular 
basis. It may be difficult for farmers to make the connection between regular nutrient 
applications on their farm and broader water quality issues at the watershed-scale because 
of the complexity challenges outlined in the previous section. Furthermore, water quality 
issues may be less salient to those farmers who farm higher up in a watershed when they 
don’t experience or witness water quality issues firsthand. Therefore, the rule and norm 
creation, trust, reciprocity, and shared understanding may not exist amongst the farming 
community, making self-organized collective action on water quality very difficult. This 
suggests that there may be a place for other types of institutional interventions, such as 
regulatory or market-based policies, to encourage or require collective farmer behavior 
change to improve water quality. I propose that to investigate diverse institutional 
arrangements using the SES framework, it is important to more closely examine this 
institution-behavior link. This focus on how and why institutions shape behavior and 
decision-making is what is needed to improve our understanding and management of 
environmental public goods.   
2.6. Expanding the Institutional-Behavior Link  
An increased focus on actor decision making within the SES Framework, and in 
particular, on the link between institutions and behavior, can facilitate its application to 
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both environmental public good dilemmas and a broader diversity of institutional 
arrangements. As described in the previous two sections, environmental public goods 
dilemmas differ from CPR regimes, the archetypal application of the SES Framework, by 
a number of factors, including the lack of a behavior-reinforcing feedback, multiple 
resource systems and actor groups, complex and uncertain biophysical dynamics, and a 
lack of key interactions that build social capital. These elements of environmental public 
goods dilemmas increase the importance of understanding actor decision making and 
behavior. In this section, I will first describe how an increased focus on decision-making 
can improve the applicability of the SES Framework to environmental public goods 
dilemmas and diverse institutional arrangements. Then I will describe a sampling of 
social-psychological and behavioral theories of decision-making to demonstrate how 
pulling from theory and models in these fields can improve our understanding of SES 
system outcomes through incorporation into the SES Framework. In the last section of 
this paper, I outline how to incorporate these theories and models into the SES 
Framework. 
2.6.1. The Critical Role of Actor Decision Making in SES 
The SES Framework is designed around actor decision-making, but the decision-
making processes, or at least actors perceptions of costs and benefits, themselves are 
typically not empirically analyzed (Thiel et al., 2015).  Actor decision-making and 
behavior are important components of any SES because ultimately, actor behavior is a 
key driver of both social and ecological outcomes, and moreover, one of the major 
leverage points that humans have to intervene in SES. However, I propose that the 
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attributes of environmental public goods dilemmas, as compared to CPR dilemmas, make 
actor decision-making and behavior even more relevant for SES system outcomes.  
As described above, public goods dilemmas lack the behavior-reinforcing link 
present in CPR dilemmas as illustrated in Figure 2-2. This link in CPR dilemmas serves 
as leverage to change self-interested actors’ behaviors. It is possible to design incentives 
around this self-interest to motivate a behavior shift towards long-term individual (and 
social) payoffs. This is, of course, not a simple shift, and much research has been 
dedicated to designing incentives to solve this difficult problem (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom 
et al., 2002; Poteete et al., 2010). However, the shift to sustainable resource management 
for public goods dilemmas, which lack this behavior-reinforcing link, can be even more 
difficult. Without this self-interested mechanism to motivate behavior change, there must 
be another value-based motivator. A few possibilities include altruism, stewardship, and 
deterrence from fees or penalties. Drawing again from the example of water quality and 
agriculture, when water quality declines, there is nothing physically preventing farmers 
from applying nutrients to their farms. It is possible that informing a farmer of the impact 
of nutrient applications on the lake could inspire behavior change due to a farmer 
identifying with stewardship values. Whether or not this is the case would have 
implications for designing effective policy. Identifying and understanding what motivates 
collective behavior in context-specific environmental public goods dilemmas is important 
for the design of institutional interventions to change behavior.  
The difficulty in defining behavioral motivation and incentives is further 
exacerbated by the multi-resource, multi-actor nature of many environmental public 
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goods dilemmas. With different actors, using a resource, or multiple-related resources 
systems for different purposes, it is hard to decipher what the breadth of motivators are 
for distinct actor groups/resource uses. Moreover, individual actors understanding of the 
SES is likely to vary actor to actor. The way in which an actor perceives the SES and 
their role in it is likely to influence their decision-making process and behavior. Ostrom 
highlighted the importance of actors’ mental models and knowledge of the SES on 
system outcomes by designating these as variables in the framework (McGinnis & 
Ostrom, 2014). These variables are likely to be of increased importance in environmental 
public goods dilemmas. Here again, understanding the drivers, perspectives and values 
that comprise actors’ mental models and knowledge of the SES that underlie the 
decision-making process can help with identifying behavioral interventions.  
In environmental public goods dilemmas, SES are often larger scale, more 
complex, and more uncertain. This poses a challenge for designing sustainable 
governance solutions because often it is impossible to accurately measure ecological 
system outcomes. With water quality decline in agricultural watersheds, due to time lags 
in the movement of nutrients from farms to waterbodies, it may take decades for 
collective behavior change to result in water quality improvement (Meals et al., 2010). In 
these cases, we often use models to project future ecological outcomes based on land use 
behavior. Therefore, behavior change itself becomes the proxy for ecological outcomes. 
The central focus on behavior change in these systems suggests that understanding the 
drivers of behavior to then change behavior is the most direct pathway to improve 
ecological outcomes.  
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Finally, in environmental public goods dilemmas the lack of built-in processes for 
building social capital amongst actors calls for greater attention to how specific 
institutional interventions influence decision-making. The lack of built-in processes for 
building social capital suggest that there is less likelihood for the emergence of 
community-based collective action (Pretty, 2003). This is not to say that trust, reciprocity, 
norms, and shared rules do not play a role in shaping behavior, but it does suggest that 
greater emphasis is required to understand where and how they play a role.  
In making the case for the relevance of decision-making and behavior in the 
analysis of environmental public goods dilemmas, it is important to note that the SES 
framework is compatible with a wide range of decision-making and behavioral theories. 
Within the SES framework, McGinnis and Ostrom (2014, para. 5) suggest that “choice 
processes are not required to comport to any specific model of decision-making or 
policymaking, nor are all outcomes observed required to have been intended by 
participants in the process.” This flexibility means that we can use a variety of decision-
making and behavioral theories to better understand SES actor behavior and outcomes. 
However, so far, this flexibility has been underutilized.  
Ostrom and her colleagues were aware of the importance of incorporating a 
broader understanding of human behavior into the study of SES. Poteete et al. (2010), in 
their book on methods for studying collective action, identify this as one of the key next 
steps for the field. Rather than using a single model to describe behavior, such as 
bounded rationality, Poteete et al. (2010, p. 222) suggest that it “is more productive to 
posit broad theoretical attributes of human behavior that can help explain why individuals 
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act in particular ways in one situation versus another.” To do this, I suggest, requires 
drawing on a broad range of psychological and behavioral theories to empirically 
examine the conditions and contexts that drive decision making and behavior with SES.  
Next, I will highlight a few psychological and behavioral concepts that may be 
particularly relevant for the study of environmental public goods dilemmas. This is not 
meant to be an exhaustive list, but rather a sampling to suggest the utility of this approach 
(see Singh et al. (2013) and Schlüter et al. (2017) for additional reviews of decision-
making theories of relevance to understanding environmental dilemmas). 
2.6.2. Promising Decision-making Concepts and Theories for Environmental Public 
Goods Dilemmas 
A number of decision-making and behavioral models exist that could prove useful 
for incorporation within the SES framework for the study of environmental public goods 
and beyond. The body of research on collective action and common pool resource 
dilemmas, including SES Framework applications, has typically relied upon the 
behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality to explain individual behavior, as 
suggested in Section 2 above (Ostrom, 2005). This approach models decision-making as 
dependent upon limited information, cognitive processing, and attention in shifting 
individual cost-benefit analysis of potential actions (Poteete et al., 2010). Bounded 
rationality offers insight into the heuristics and biases that shape individual behavior, 
such as a greater aversion to losses than gains, anchoring on a given value rather than 
intrinsic values, or habit-formation (Gsottbauer & van den Bergh, 2011). Within the SES 
Framework, these aspects of decision-making may have important implication for 
36 
 
institutional design, such as whether to design incentives to motivate behavior or 
sanctions, or what level to set a baseline incentive offer. 
Social psychology also offers a number of decision-making models and theories, 
which are not mutually exclusive with bounded rationality. Theories such as the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011), the Value-belief-norm theory (Stern, 
Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999), and the Norm-Activation theory (Schwartz, 
1977) model individual behavior as embedded in individual’s beliefs and perceptions of 
the world. As a complement to bounded rationality, individuals’ beliefs and perceptions 
are grounded in an individual’s worldview and experience, as opposed to full information 
about any given decision-making situation. These social psychological theories suggest 
that constructs such as an individual’s attitudes toward a behavior, subjective and 
personal norms surrounding the behavior, and perceived behavioral control, or self-
efficacy in engaging in a behavior are important predictors of how an individual will 
behave (Bandura, 2000; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011; Stern et al., 1999). Klöckner’s (2013) 
comprehensive action determination model combines elements of the theory of planned 
behavior, norm-activation theory and bounded rationality in an integrated decision-
making model and has shown strong predictive power across a number of domains of 
environmental behavior.  
In environmental public goods dilemmas, where individuals are faced with high 
levels of uncertainty and ambiguity, social psychological decision-making theories can 
help identify the way in which individuals are making decisions in these highly variable 
conditions (e.g. based on other’s actions, their own level of understanding, what they 
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think is right, etc.). Furthermore, these theories can help to identify types or typologies of 
actors that value different types of information and assistance. This stands in stark 
contrast to an institutional rational choice model which assumes individuals to be self-
interested and motivated by utility maximization (in practice mainly profit 
maximization).   
As a proof of concept, I will suggest a few psychological and decision-making 
concepts that may be particularly helpful in examining actor behavior in environmental 
public goods dilemmas and describe their potential contribution. These are: self-efficacy 
and perceived behavioral control, experience and personal norms, and attitudes.  
 
2.6.3 Self-Efficacy and Perceived Behavioral Control 
When considering actor behavior in collective action dilemmas, autonomy, or an 
individual’s capacity to make their own decisions, is an important concept. Autonomy is 
closely aligned with the concept of self-efficacy, for motivating behavior change.  
According to Bandura, “unless people believe that they can produce desired effects and 
forestall undesired ones by their actions, they have little incentive to act” (Bandura, 1986, 
2000, p. 75). Another closely related psychological concept is perceived behavioral 
control, which is an element of the psychological Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 
1985). Perceived behavioral control refers to “a general sense of personal competence or 
perceived ability to influence events” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011, p. 153). Beliefs of self-
efficacy strongly inform an individual’s confidence in their ability to perform a behavior 
and it is predicted that those with higher levels of perceived behavioral control with 
respect to a specific behavior or action would be more likely to adopt the behavior 
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(Ajzen, 1991). There is a strong link between individual self-efficacy, individual action 
and collective action. Individual’s hold beliefs about collective efficacy within 
themselves, as opposed to some external representative. Therefore examining 
individual’s beliefs about perceived behavioral control may be an important component 
of actor decision making and behavior in SES (Bandura, 2000). Furthermore, different 
institutional arrangements intended to motivate collective behavior change in SES may 
impact actor self-efficacy and perceived behavioral control in different ways. This could 
have important consequences for overall SES system outcomes. 
2.6.4. Experience and Personal Norms 
Exposure or experience with a policy can be through participation in town hall 
meetings, planning committees, or public hearings, as well as measurement, monitoring 
or enforcement exercises can shape individual decision-making. Edward-Jones (2006, p. 
788) highlighted this as an important area for future research, in the light that engaging in 
a behavior due to policy requirements could “have a positive feedback on behavior such 
that the policy aims would continue to be met after the formal end of the policy”. This is 
further in line with Krosnick et al.’s (2006) Attitude, Certainty and Existence (ACE) 
model which includes personal experience and informant’s messages as predictors of 
general public support for a policy agenda. Throughout a policy process and through 
engaging in target behaviors, individuals may be exposed to information that updates 
belief sets and norms to reinforce the target behavior. It is possible that exposure to a 
policy process activates personal pro-environmental norms. Personal norms are a 
component of the Norm-Activation theory (Schwartz, 1977) and Value-Belief-Norm 
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theory (Stern, 2000) which suggest that given awareness of a behaviors consequences and 
personal ascription of responsibility for a given outcome, personal norms for a behavior 
will be activated and increase the likelihood that an individual will engage in the 
behavior.   
2.6.5. Attitudes 
Attitudes are a central concept to many psychological models of decision-making, 
including the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991). According to Fishbein and 
Ajzen, attitudes are the “latent disposition or tendency to respond with some degree of 
favorableness or unfavorableness to a psychological object” (2011, p. 76). Attitudes can 
be seen as an evaluation, on a scale from negative to positive, of a given action or 
behavior.  In the context of actor behavior in environmental public goods dilemmas, 
actors may hold attitudes toward specific behaviors of interest that may influence whether 
or not they engage in the behavior.  According to the Theory of Planned Behavior, one 
would expect an individual with positive attitudes towards an action to be more likely to 
engage in that action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). 
I propose that incorporating the study of actors’ attitudes, experience and personal 
norms, and self-efficacy and perceived behavioral control, along with other psychological 
theories, into the study of environmental public goods dilemmas using the SES can 
improve our ability to design institutions to promote sustainability in these systems.  
2.7. Incorporating the Institutional-Behavior Link into the SES 
What would it look like to expand the institutional-behavior link in the SES 
Framework to apply it to environmental public goods dilemmas and to examine diverse 
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institutional arrangements? Given the flexibility of the SES framework towards decision-
making and behavioral theories, the incorporation can take many different forms. Here I 
recommend two potential approaches to strengthen the institution-behavior link in the 
SES framework. The first approach is to add social-psychological variables to the suite of 
actor attribute variables to test and explore the role of relevant psychological and 
behavioral theories in driving outcomes in SES. The second is to examine actor mental 
models within environmental public goods dilemmas to redefine SES framework 
categories to capture the relevant actor motivations and drivers of behavior. These 
recommendations complement each other and ultimately, a mixed methods approach 
combining both recommendations would be the most beneficial to improving our ability 
to identify elements of institutional design that lead to robust environmental public good 
regimes. 
The first recommendation, to add social-psychological variables to the SES 
Framework, methodologically begins with framing research questions around the 
connection between institutions and actor behavior. For example, in the context of 
declining water quality due to agricultural activities, a potential set of institution-behavior 
questions could be: Are farmers more likely to adopt water quality best management 
practices in mandatory or voluntary policy regimes? Do farmer feelings of self-efficacy 
explain the difference in behavioral response to these policies? These questions would 
then drive the application of the SES Framework to a series of cases to be compared. In 
Table 2-2, I demonstrate the application of the SES Framework to these example 
questions by listing the variables that could be used in defining and testing the 
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relationship of interest. First, one would define the independent variables of interest, 
shown as red variables in Table 2-2. The first independent variable is the institutional 
variable: GS6 Rules-in-use, which is defined in this example as being either mandatory or 
voluntary.  Then the second independent variable, “A10 Actor(s) values and 
motivations,” is a new second tier variable that I am proposing to add to the framework 
under the first tier Actor category. This new variable is where theories from psychology 
and behavioral economics, such as those reviewed above, can be incorporated into the 
framework as shown in Table 2-2 below. Drawing from the sampling of theories 
reviewed in the previous section, some potential third tier variables under “A10 Actor(s) 
values and motivations” are personal norms, attitudes and self-efficacy. In the example 
case, self-efficacy can be included as an actor attribute, falling on a spectrum from high 
to low.  
The relationship of interest is the interaction of these two variables, and their effect 
on the dependent variable “I1* Resource use levels of diverse users,” defined here as 
adoption of water quality best management practices.  In order to better accommodate 
environmental public goods dilemmas, I also propose including this revised label 
category for I1 (“Resource use”) as opposed to the previous label for the category 
“Harvesting levels of diverse users”, since not all resource use behavior within an SES is 
harvesting behavior. Furthermore, I suggest explicitly adding a variable to examine 
public good provisioning behavior: “I9* Public good provisioning levels.” This variable 
could be another dependent variable of interest in the example case, defined as ambient 
water quality levels.   
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Table 2-2. Example application of a revised SES framework to the case of declining water quality due 
to agriculture. Additions or revised categories are marked with an asterisk (*). Highlighted 
variables: red are the example independent variables, gold are example dependent variables, blue are 
covariates and bold black are held constant. Adapted from McGinnis & Ostrom (2014) 
Social, economic and political settings (S): S1 Economic development, S2 Demographic trends, S3 Political 
stability, S4 Government resource policies, S5 Market incentives, S6 Media organization 
Resource systems (RS) Governance systems(GS) 
RS1 Sector: watershed GS1 Policy area 
RS2 Clarity of system boundaries 
GS2 Geographic scale of governance system: 
state/region 
RS3 Size of resource system: large GS3 Population 
RS4 Human-constructed facilities GS4 Regime type 
RS5 Productivity of system GS5 Rule-making organizations: state/regional 
RS6 Equilibrium properties: declining water 
quality GS6 Rules-in-use: voluntary or mandatory 
RS7 Predictability of system dynamics GS7 Property-rights systems: private 
RS8 Storage characteristics GS8 Repertoire of norms and strategies 
RS9 Location GS9 Network structure 
 GS10 Historical continuity 
Resource units (RU) Actors (A) 
RU1 Resource unit mobility A1 Number of relevant actors: few to many farmers 
RU2 Growth or replacement rate: continued 
nutrient applications A2 Socioeconomic attributes: small to large farms 
RU3 Interaction among resource units A3 History or past experiences 
RU4 Economic value A4 Location 
RU5 Number of units A5 Leadership/entrepreneurship 
RU6 Distinctive markings 
A6 Norms (trust-reciprocity)/social capital: existence of 
farmer group 
RU7 Spatial and temporal distribution: history of 
nutrient enrichment A7 Knowledge of SES/mental models 
 A8 Importance of resource (dependence) 
 A9 Technologies available 
 
A10* Actor(s) values and motivations: high or low self-
efficacy 
Interactions (I) ->  Outcomes (O) 
I1* Resource use levels of diverse users: adoption of 
practices O1 Social performance measures 
I2 Information sharing among users O2 Ecological performance measures 
I3 Deliberation processes O3 Externalities to other SESs 
I4 Conflicts among users  
I5 Investment activities  
I6 Lobbying activities  
I7 Self-organizing activities  
I8 Networking activities  
I9* Public good provisioning levels: ambient water 
quality   
Related ecosystems (ECO): ECO1 Climate patterns; ECO3 Flows into and out of focal SES; ECO2 Pollution 
patterns 
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With the independent and dependent variables of interest defined, the framework can 
then be used to guide case selection, by selecting cases that have similar resource 
systems, resource units, governance systems and actors. This is demonstrated by the 
resource system, resource unit and governance system variables in bold black text in 
Table 2-2. These variables would define the criteria that all cases must meet to be 
included in the analysis. Alternatively, or within the same analysis, some variables could 
be allowed to vary to examine covariates of the institution-behavior link of interest. An 
example for these is given by the variables in blue text, including farm size for 
socioeconomic attributes (A2) and existence of a farmer group for social capital (A6). 
This approach, as defined here, lends itself to a quantitative analysis in which the 
relationship between the dependent variable (e.g. behavior or system outcomes) and the 
independent variables (e.g. policy type and covariates) is measured using a regression 
model. Agent-based modeling also offers an promising complementary approach for 
exploring the institution-behavior link in environmental dilemmas, as described in 
Schlüter et al.(2017). 
The key element to incorporating this new social-psychological second tier variable 
(A10) is data collection, as well as agreement on standardized constructs and validated 
questions. Data will need to be collected from actors within the system of interest, either 
from surveys, interviews, experimental games or any other number of methods (see 
Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom (2010) for a review of methods for studying collective 
action problems). In doing so, it is important that a core set of psychological constructs 
are include and questions are asked in the same way to provide internally valid 
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comparisons. One potential example that can be informative for this is the New 
Ecological Paradigm, a standardized, broadly used, internally valid questionnaire to 
measure environmental concern (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, 
& Jones, 2000; Stern, Dietz, & Guagnano, 1995). This quantitative approach is one way 
that we can begin to better understand trends in how institutional design shapes decision 
making, behavior and ecological outcomes in environmental public goods dilemmas.  
The second recommendation for strengthening the institution-behavior link within 
the SES Framework is to draw upon actor mental models to define the relevant system 
attributes in environmental public goods dilemmas. Mental models of actors are 
acknowledged to play an important role in SES outcomes and are included in the 
framework (see variable A7 in Table 2-2) and in many applications of the framework 
(Thiel et al., 2015). Mental models are individuals’ “internal representations” of the 
world and are made up of concepts linked together, and it is these relationships between 
concepts that are used to make meaning of the world (Carley & Palmquist, 1992, p. 602). 
In environmental public goods dilemmas it is important to look to actors to define the 
concepts/variables that they perceive to be important influences on their behavior. Again, 
actor behavior is important because ultimately it is actor behavior that policy-makers and 
society in general are looking to change to improve social-ecological outcomes.  
Examining actor mental models lends itself to a qualitative methodologies, much like 
the in-depth case studies Ostrom and others pursued in the early work on CPR regimes 
(Ostrom, 1990). Interviews, focus group, and other ethnographic approaches can be used 
to elicit actors’ perceived motivations, interactions and system outcomes within an 
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environmental public good dilemma. The analyst can then using qualitative coding 
techniques such as grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1994) or other forms of content 
analysis (Saldaña, 2015) to identify the salient or relevant aspects of the system according 
to actors. These elements can then be merged with the SES framework, either falling 
under existing second tier variables, or adding new ones as needed to better define the 
environmental public goods dilemma context. Working up from actor perceptions of their 
own behavior and experience to the system level will allow analysts to identify 
institutions and contextual variables shaping system outcomes in environmental public 
goods dilemmas.  
Ultimately these two recommended approaches to strengthening the institution-
behavior link can be used in conjunction, or iteratively to improve our understanding of 
institutional design in environmental public goods dilemmas. 
2.8. Conclusion 
The study of environmental public goods dilemmas and of diverse institutional 
arrangements can help us to identify design principles to improve the sustainability of 
these regimes. The SES framework was designed with the ambition to fill this need and 
facilitate the study of all types of SES. However, in application, the SES Framework has 
struggled to facilitate the study of SES beyond CPR regimes and community-based 
natural resource management institutions. The same attributes of environmental public 
goods dilemmas that differentiate them from CPR regimes, namely the lack of a 
behavior-reinforcing link, the multi-actor and multi-resource system dynamics, higher 
levels of uncertainty and complexity, and lack of built-in social capital, also increase the 
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need to understand how a broader suite of institutions govern these systems. I have 
proposed that one way to address these linked challenges within the SES Framework and 
facilitate the application of the SES to these types of systems is to expand the 
framework’s focus on the institution-behavior link. I suggest that this can be done 
through incorporating decision-making and behavioral models from psychology and 
behavioral economics into the SES framework and through examining actor mental 
models to define relevant system attributes. Both of these recommendations will improve 
the ability of the SES framework to accommodate the analysis of more diverse resource 
regimes and facilitate the design of context-specific institutional interventions to support 
sustainable resource management. 
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CHAPTER 3: FROM WATERSHED LIMITS TO FARM-SCALE DECISIONS: 
THE IMPACT OF MANDATORY WATER QUALITY POLICY ON FARM 
MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR AND DECISION MAKING 
Authors: Courtney Hammond Wagner, Asim Zia, Suzie Greenhalgh, Pike Brown, 
Meredith T. Niles 
3.1. Abstract 
Nutrient runoff from agricultural lands is a challenge for agricultural watersheds 
across the globe. As decades of voluntary programs to address nonpoint source (NPS) 
pollution have failed to improve water quality, regional governments are turning to 
mandatory policies in an effort to achieve water quality goals. This recent policy shift 
highlights a need for insight on the effectiveness of mandatory water quality policy 
design to limit agricultural NPS pollution. We analyze a national survey of 1,917 New 
Zealand farmers to compare farmer nutrient management behavior and decision making 
under three different policy types: mandatory practice-based policy, which requires 
farmers to adopt specific practices; mandatory performance-based policy, which requires 
farmers meet a modeled farm nutrient limit; and no current mandatory policy. To 
compare the success of policy types, we examine behavior change as a proxy for future 
water quality improvements, and we use the social psychological Theory of Planned 
Behavior to evaluate potential for farmers’ long-term policy support. We run logistic and 
Poisson mixed effects models to examine differences in the presence and extent (e.g. 
number of related practices or strategies) of nutrient management plan (NMP) adoption, 
and for non-adopters, intention to adopt an NMP between policy groups. In our series of 
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models, farmers in performance-based policies are almost four times more likely to 
intend to adopt an NMP than the no policy group, which is not the case for farmers in the 
practice-based group. However, we find that policy type is not predictive of actual NMP 
adoption or extent of adoption, suggesting that neither type of mandatory policy is 
associated with increased nutrient management behavior when compared to the no policy 
group. On the policy support side when we compare predictors of extent of adoption and 
intention to adopt NMPs, we see perceived behavior control and attitudes are significant 
predictors of nutrient management behavior in the performance-based policy group and 
the no policy group, but not the practice-based policy group. Combined, these results 
suggest that performance-based mandatory policies send a stronger policy signal to 
farmers in that they are associated with greater intended adoption of NMPs, as well as 
increased potential long-term policy support.  
3.2. Introduction 
Globally, declining water quality from the agricultural runoff of nitrogen and 
phosphorus is an increasing challenge for local, regional and national governments. This 
diffuse form of pollution, also known as agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, 
has broad ranging social, ecological and economic impacts (Bennett et al., 2001; 
Carpenter et al., 1998). Managing agricultural NPS pollution is challenging due to the 
difficulty of attributing the diffuse pollution to a source. Management is further 
confounded by variation in nutrient loss rates due to ecological and climatological 
characteristics (Carpenter et al., 1998; Ghebremichael, Veith, & Watzin, 2010), the 
contribution of legacy nutrient loads in the watershed (Sharpley, 2016; Wironen, Bennett, 
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& Erickson, 2018) and potential decades-long time lags between agricultural 
management changes and resulting water quality improvements (Meals, 1996; Meals et 
al., 2010). Agricultural NPS pollution has traditionally been approached through 
voluntary programs and policies, such as funding for conservation practice adoption 
through the United States Department of Agriculture and New Zealand’s former 
emphasis on non-regulatory approaches such as education, advice and incentives (Quinn, 
Wilcock, Monaghan, McDowell, & Journeaux, 2009; Shortle, Ribaudo, Horan, & 
Blandford, 2012). To date, voluntary programs have made little progress in improving 
nutrient impaired waterbodies across the globe (Dowd et al., 2008; Rissman & Carpenter, 
2015). Governments are beginning to implement mandatory, rules-based approaches to 
achieve water quality improvements (McDowell et al., 2015). This recent policy shift 
highlights a need for insight on the effectiveness of mandatory water quality policy 
design in addressing agricultural NPS pollution. 
With mandatory approaches to agricultural NPS pollution, policy makers must 
make difficult decisions about who bears the burden of paying for water quality 
improvements, and how to measure and monitor rule compliance (Drevno, 2016). These 
policy decisions can be controversial, which may impact the ability of the policy to 
achieve its overall goal of water quality improvement by instigating resistance, non-
compliance or policy rejection. Two major rules-based approaches have emerged for 
regulating nutrient exports from farms that are the focus of this study: practice-based and 
performance-based policies. Both mandatory practice-based and performance-based 
policies regulate nutrients flowing off the farm, as opposed to more upstream policies that 
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regulate farm inputs through quotas or taxes (Drevno, 2016). The two approaches, 
practice and performance, differ in terms of what farmer behavior is allowed or required 
under the policy, and therefore the farmer experience and behavior under each policy 
may vary significantly. 
 Practice-based rules require farmers to adopt a specific practice or set of 
practices to reduce nutrient exports from the farm. This approach is based on the 
assumption that various practices are “proven” to reduce nutrient emissions from the 
farm, although in reality there is wide variety of practice effectiveness (e.g. Zhang et al. 
(2010) and Dodd and Sharpley (2016)). In a mandatory practice-based policy regime a 
farm is in compliance if the practices are in place. Conversely, in a mandatory 
performance-based policy, rules specify a numeric limit for units of nitrogen or 
phosphorus that leave the farm system. The numeric limit for the farm system can be set 
through a number of different allocation strategies, including allocation based on 
historical levels of nutrient use, farm type, physical quality of the land or nutrient 
vulnerability (Daigneault, Greenhalgh, & Samarasinghe, 2017). Then, performance-based 
policies typically use a farm system model to calculate whole farm nutrient balances and 
compare these to the numeric limit to demonstrate compliance. A popular farm system 
model used in performance-based policies in New Zealand is Overseer®, which 
calculates nitrogen and phosphorus exports from a farm based on the geographical and 
ecological characteristics of the farm as well as the farm system type, including the 
management practices and infrastructure on the farm (Wheeler et al., 2003). To comply 
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with the mandatory performance-based policy, farmers can employ any practice or 
strategy they choose to achieve their numeric limit and be in compliance.  
To improve water quality in an impaired watershed, both practice- and 
performance-based mandatory NPS pollution policies require patience and prolonged 
policy support. First patience is required to see results: due to time lags in the movements 
of nutrients from land to water, the results of management changes on the land today will 
most likely not be seen for decades (Meals et al., 2010; Morgenstern et al., 2015), though 
this varies by soil type and landscape. Additionally, internal nutrient cycling in lakes can 
impede the alleviation of eutrophication symptoms once external nutrient loads are 
reduced (Carpenter et al., 1998; Roy, Martin, Irwin, Conroy, & Culver, 2010). Second, 
prolonged support is required to ensure that behavior changes endure to provide sustained 
improvements in water quality in the future. This suggests that two different elements of 
policy success are particularly important for the long-term success of agricultural NPS 
pollution policy: achievement and maintenance of the desired outcome and attracting 
support for the goals of the policy and means of achieving them to ensure long-term 
viability (McConnell, 2010).  
Given the difficulty in measuring NPS pollution, the best proxy for measuring 
whether policy is achieving the desired goal (i.e. improvements in water quality in the 
long term) is changes in farmer behavior. However, if changes in behavior are achieved 
at the expense of support for the policy and means of achieving them, it is possible that 
long term water quality improvements will not materialize if adoption is short-term or 
sporadic. This second aspect of policy success calls for examination of the social 
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psychological impacts of policy on land management decision making. Research has 
shown that past policy experiences can have lingering negative impacts on farmers’ 
environmental beliefs (Niles, Lubell, & Haden, 2013) and theories of the policy process 
and social movements suggest that value alignment is a key component of policy support 
(Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Sabatier, 2014; Stern et al., 1999). Therefore, it is 
probable that a policy that allows for decision making that aligns with farmer values and 
beliefs, is more likely to be associated with sustained policy support from farmers.  
While much social science research has attempted to understand farmer’s 
voluntary adoption of conservation behaviors, including nutrient management behavior 
related to water quality (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Conner et al., 2016; Knowler & 
Bradshaw, 2007; Pannell et al., 2006; Prokopy et al., 2008a; Ranjan et al., 2019), much 
less work has examined farmer behavior within mandatory policy setting regimes. A few 
studies have focused on the differential response of individuals to voluntary and 
mandatory water quality regimes, but the results of these studies show no clear trends. 
There is evidence for higher levels of adoption of nitrogen testing within mandatory 
regimes (Bosch, Cook, & Fuglie, 1995), evidence for higher levels of adoption of water 
quality management techniques in voluntary regimes (Barnes et al., 2013), and evidence 
for mixed effects of regulation on adoption of different conservation practices (Kara et 
al., 2008). One relevant case study-based paper examined two types of water quality 
regulation in Tomales Bay, California and Lake Taupo, New Zealand (Barry et al. 2010). 
The authors found that farmers in Lake Taupo’s performance-based cap-and-trade policy 
faced more negative economic and social impacts to farm sustainability than Tomales 
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Bay’s practice-based policy, in large part due to the availability of financial assistance in 
Tomales Bay for on farm practice changes (Barry et al., 2010). For policy makers to 
design and implement effective policy solutions, a clear understanding of the interaction 
between policy design and behavior is critical.  
In this study, we draw on a natural water quality policy experiment across New 
Zealand to examine the success of mandatory practice- and performance-based 
agricultural NPS pollution policy in comparison to regions without mandatory water 
quality policies. Our focal behavior is adoption of nutrient management plans (NMP), 
which entails creating and following a plan to manage and control nutrient dynamics on 
the farm. In practice this means adopting strategies or building farm structures to control 
nutrient runoff and nutrient applications beyond land and crop requirements. In New 
Zealand some of these strategies and structures include applying fertilizer at agronomic 
rates, precision irrigation, fencing permanent waterways, and adjusting the number of 
livestock units on the farm to match nutrient capacity. Theoretically, engaging in nutrient 
management planning and adopting an NMP allows a farm to maximize economic 
benefits (if cost savings are possible through reduced input use) and minimize 
environmental harm (Beegle, Carton, & Bailey, 2000). Regardless of type of policy, 
nutrient management planning serves as an important gateway to improving nutrient 
dynamics on the farm.  
We address the following three core research questions to examine the role and 
impact of mandatory NPS pollution policies: 
1. Are mandatory policies associated with higher levels of adoption of NMPs? 
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2. For those that have adopted NMPs, is policy type related to the extent of adoption 
of nutrient management practices?  
3. For those that have not adopted NMPs, is policy type related to intention to adopt 
NMPs? 
3.3. Material and Methods 
3.3.1 Study location 
To address our three research questions, we utilize a cross-sectional sample of 
farmers in a diversity of water quality policy regimes across New Zealand. New Zealand 
is an ideal study location because there is a high level of variation in regional policy 
approaches for agricultural NPS pollution, including practice-based, performance-based 
and no policy regions. The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management of 
2011 & 2014 requires all regional governments to put in place water quality limits for all 
watersheds across the country by 2025 (NPSFM, 2014). Moreover the National Policy 
Statement requires regions to create policy to achieve reductions to meet water quality 
limits where they are unmet, and importantly, these limits can be met through any policy 
approach. As a result, there is great variation in water quality policies across the country, 
including a number of regions without policy yet in place (see Appendix 1 Table 5-1 for 
policy descriptions by region). In essence, the National Policy Statement, prior to 2025, 
has enabled a natural experiment to examine the impact of water quality policy on farmer 
behaviors related to NMPs and nutrient management practices.  
3.3.2 Policy support and the Theory of Planned Behavior 
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To evaluate the potential for prolonged policy support, we employ the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011) to examine the predictors of nutrient 
management behavior amongst farmers both within and outside of mandatory practice- 
and performance-based water quality policy regimes in New Zealand, as shown in Figure 
3-1. We use the TPB to examine evidence for value alignment between theorized social 
psychological predictors of behavior change and drivers of reported behavior change 
within a policy context. Existence of value alignment suggests greater potential for 
prolonged policy support (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; Stern et al., 1999).  
The TPB predicts that intention to engage in a behavior is explained by an 
individual’s attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control beliefs 
regarding the behavior in question (Ajzen, 1985). In the TPB, attitudes are defined as the 
tendency for an individual to respond with a degree of favorableness towards a behavior 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). Subjective norms are the degree to which an individual 
perceives social pressure to behave in a certain way regarding the behavior of interest. 
Finally, perceived behavioral control is a “general sense of personal competence or 
perceived ability to influence events” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011, p. 153). It has also been 
suggested that a fourth component, a moral norm, can improve the predictive validity 
associated with the TPB for certain behaviors that have a moral dimension (Beck & 
Ajzen, 1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011). Since nutrient management behavior may have an 
environmental moral component, we include a variable for environmental stewardship in 
our application of the TPB. The TPB is one of the most widely researched psychological 
theories of behavior and has been shown to have consistent predictive power of 
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individual behavior across behavioral domains, including health, political and 
environmental behavior (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011).  
 
Figure 3-1. Adaptation of Ajzen’s (1985) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to test the influence of 
variation in institutional choice rules on intention and actual adoption of nutrient management 
strategies by farmers. The dashed arrows represent the hypothesized existence of a relationship 
between policy choice rules and components of the TPB in a farmer’s decision making process on 
nutrient management planning adoption. 
As described above, farmers under practice- and performance-based regulations 
may have different experiences under each policy type due to differences in rule 
structure. It is possible that policy design could interact with all four of the TPB 
psychological pathways for nutrient management plan adoption decisions. For practice-
based policies, the clear designation of nutrient management practices that need to be in 
place may shape social norms within the farming community, attitudes towards practices, 
control beliefs regarding the practices or moral norms to adopt nutrient management 
planning. Likewise, in performance-based policies, the requirement to measure and 
monitor nutrient export from the farm may shape norms, attitudes and perceived 
behavioral control. However, without the clear regulatory signal for specific practices, 
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performance-based policies may shape norms, attitudes and control beliefs through a 
farmers’ learning, exposure and experience of meeting a nutrient limit for their particular 
farm system. In the case that any of the TPB predictors are found to be positive and 
significant predictors of NMP adoption, extent of NMP adoption or intention to adopt 
NMP, we take this as evidence for value alignment between decision making and a 
policy. This value alignment suggests that farmers are making decisions about NMPs 
within a policy context that align with their internal values and beliefs. 
3.3.3 Survey and sample description 
The data for this study are drawn from a national survey of New Zealand 
farmers, the Survey of Rural Decision Makers (SRDM) undertaken by Maanaki Whenua 
– Landcare Research. The SRDM was fielded between July and December 2015 (Brown, 
2015). The SRDM is a national, internet-based survey of commercial farm owners and 
managers. The SRDM sampling strategy consisted of contacting farmers via email 
through farmer industry lists and databases, circulating invitations to participate through 
industry and sector groups, and sending mail invitations to farmers in the Statistics New 
Zealand business frame (for a full description of the sampling strategy, see Brown 
(2015)).  
The SRDM featured 288 questions covering ownership, farm structure, land use, 
livestock, land management, technology adoption, values, norms, preferences, farming 
objectives, profitability, demographics, and education (Brown, 2015). Also included in 
the survey are questions reflecting the TPB that address farmers’ attitudes, subjective 
norms, perceived behavioral control and environmental stewardship related to NMP (see 
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Appendix 1 Table 5-2 for description of TPB related questions). The focus of the present 
work is farmers’ behavior toward managing nutrients, which is addressed through three 
questions: 1) has the farmer adopted a nutrient management plan (NMP), 2) if yes, what 
nutrient management practices has the farmer adopted (e.g. extent of adoption) and 3) if 
no, does the farmer intend to adopt an NMP in the next 2 years? Extent of NMP adoption 
is a count of seven NMP-related practices that a farmer has adopted, including reduced 
stocking rates, changed cropping patterns, changed timing of fertilizer applications, 
constructed/maintained wetlands, reduced fertilizer applications, fenced waterways and 
an optional “other” category defined by the respondent. It is important to note that there 
was a skip pattern built into the survey such that farmers who answered yes to question 1 
(i.e. have adopted an NMP), only received question 2 and not question 3. The opposite 
was also true, such that farmers who answered no to question 1 (i.e. have not adopted an 
NMP), only received question 3 and not question 2 (See Appendix 1 Figure 5-1 for 
survey skip pattern structure). Our analytical approach to these questions, as discussed 
below, reflects the structure of the survey. 
The 2015 survey featured a sample of 2,342 commercial farmers which 
represents 3.90% of the farming population (according to the NZ Ag Census 2012 farm 
totals). Survey representation varies across territorial authorities in New Zealand (New 
Zealand’s sub-regional geographic unit), from representing 0.60% of the farming 
population in Tauranga to 16.67% of the Kawerau district farming population (for survey 
sample by territorial authority see Appendix 1 Table 5-1). Due to missing data, we 
dropped 425 commercial farmers from the sample, leaving us with a subset of 1,917 
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farmers to use in analyses. The descriptive statistics of participants are shown in Table 
3-1 and represent the subset of 1,917 farmers used in the analyses (for descriptive 
statistics broken down by policy group, see Appendix 1 Table 5-3). With regard to the 
key behavioral and decision making variables of interest in our study, adoption of 
nutrient management planning, we see that 40.53% of the full sample of farmers has 
adopted an NMP (NMP adoption). Of those 777 farmers that have adopted an NMP, they 
have adopted on average 2.64 nutrient management strategies (NMP extent adoption). 
Alternatively, of those 1,139 farmers who have not adopted an NMP, we see that 21.51% 
state that they intend to adopt an NMP in the next two years.  
Table 3-1 also lists mean response and percentages for the TPB variables 
included in the study. Two of the TPB constructs, subjective norms and attitudes, are 
index variables built from aggregating multiple survey questions relating to the construct, 
as shown in Appendix 1 Table 5-2. Subjective norms questions asked farmers about the 
expectations from family, the farming community and the New Zealand public for 
running the farm in an environmentally friendly way. Similarly, attitudes questions asked 
farmers about how they perceive adopting an NMP has or would impact financial, 
environmental and farming lifestyle performance of the farm. Cronbach’s alpha were 
used to assess the internal reliability of the attitude and subjective norm latent constructs 
amongst the measured variables. Both measures were found to have high internal 
reliability with an alpha of 0.74 for both attitude and subjective norms, which is above 
the generally accepted 0.70 cutoff for internal reliability (Nunnally, 1978).  
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The third TPB construct, perceived behavioral control is a count variable of the 
number of perceived behavioral control-related constructs selected as factors that led to, 
or kept a farmer from, implementing an NMP. The perceived behavioral control related 
constructs include successful demonstration, trialing, reversible in nature, having the 
necessary skills, receiving advice, and availability of financial resources. Respondents 
could tick up to three of factors. We examine perceived behavioral control as four distinct 
levels from 0 to 3, reflecting increased perceived behavioral control as more items were 
selected. We include perceived behavioral control as a categorical variable in our 
analysis, comparing each level to the base level of “0” or no reported perceived 
behavioral control. To capture an environmental moral norm, we separated out one of the 
potential factors included with the perceived behavioral control constructs, 
“environmental stewardship,” to include separately as a binary variable. It is also 
important to note that some of the TPB questions, specifically the perceived behavioral 
control and stewardship, were framed differently for NMP adopters and non-adopters. 
Therefore, we keep these separate and designate the difference using a “_no” for those 
variables that were asked of non-adopters. 
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Table 3-1. Farmer sample descriptive statistics 
  All   
  (n = 1917)   
Continuous variables mean sd   
farm size (thousand hectares) 0.37 1.24  
age 56.47 11.60  
attitude (n = 1018) 6.41 1.31  
norms (n = 1830) 21.32 4.79  
nmp_adopt_extent (n = 773) 2.64 1.34  
    
Categorical variables count %   
NMP (yes) 777 40.53  
NMP intention to adopt (yes, n = 
1139) 245 21.51  
profitable (yes) 935 48.77  
farm type    
farm type: other 457 23.84  
farm type: dairy 425 22.17  
farm type: sheep & beef 920 47.99  
farm type: grazing support 115 6.00  
education    
education: secondary school or less 700 36.52  
education: certificate/diploma 544 28.38  
education: bachelor's degree 367 19.14  
education: advanced degree 287 14.97  
education: other 19 0.99  
    
N (nmp extent adoption model only) 423 100  
0. perceived behavioral control 128 30.26  
1. perceived behavioral control 163 38.53  
2. perceived behavioral control 106 25.06  
3. perceived behavioral control 26 6.15  
stewardship (yes) 220 52.01  
    
N (nmp intention model only) 596 100  
0. perceived behavioral control_no 239 40.10  
1. perceived behavioral control_no 207 34.73  
2. perceived behavioral control_no 108 18.12  
3. perceived behavioral control_no 42 7.05  
stewardship_no (yes) 94 16.93   
 
3.4 Policy coding 
 The regional policy context of farmer survey respondents was used to explore 
farmer behavior across different policy contexts, including mandatory practice-based (n = 
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268), mandatory performance-based (n = 583), or no current mandatory policy (n = 
1048). We utilized farmers’ reported territorial authority to match farmers to water 
management zones and identify the existing water quality rules for each territorial 
authority (NPSFM, 2014). In most cases territorial authority and water management 
zones overlap significantly or are the same. To categorize territorial authorities as 
mandatory performance-based policy, mandatory practice-based policy, or no current 
mandatory policy, we referenced regional environmental policy documents and policy 
reviews (Greenhalgh & Murphy, 2017), consulted with officials in regional policy 
offices, and relied on the expertise of co-author S. Greenhalgh in water quality processes 
throughout New Zealand. The map in Figure 3-2 shows the application of the policy 
codes by territorial authority across New Zealand. 
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Figure 3-2. Water quality policy types as of 2015 by territorial authority across New Zealand 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2015). 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
We use three mixed effects regression models to investigate the relationship between 
mandatory water quality policy and farmer behavior for each of the three behavioral 
outcomes (i.e. adoption, extent of adoption, and intention to adopt). We run logistic 
mixed effects regression models for NMP adoption and intention to adopt NMPs and a 
Poisson mixed effects regression model for the extent of NMP adoption. In each of the 
models we include a random effect at the level of territorial authority to control for 
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unobserved heterogeneity at the district level (Albright & Marinova, 2015). We would 
expect farms within a region to experience similar trends, both social, market and 
ecological, and we use the random effect term to control for this in our comparison of 
behavioral predictors. 
Additionally, for each of the three models, we run one full sample and then three 
group-wise runs by policy type, breaking the sample into no policy, mandatory practice-
based policy and mandatory performance-based policy groups to examine intergroup 
differences in predictors of nutrient management plan behavior. We would like to note a 
limitation of these policy group sub-models in that they vary in terms of sample size. The 
practice-based sub-model in particular has relatively low sample sizes for extent of 
adoption (n=52) and intention to adopt (n=76). In each of the mixed effects models we 
include farm size, farm type, farmer age, farmer educational attainment and farm 
profitability as controls. These variables have been found to be important in farmer 
decision making and conservation behavior (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Conner et al., 
2016; Prokopy et al., 2008a). To determine model structure we compared the results of 
many different model types, including simple single level regressions, single level 
regression with clustered errors, and mixed effects with and without survey weights. We 
decided upon the mixed effects models without survey weights as they were the most 
conservative, although the variation between models did not result in major changes. 
Statistical analysis was performed in Stata 15 (StataCorp, 2017). 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. NMP adoption 
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The results of the mixed effects logistic regression model examining the 
predictors of NMP adoption are shown in Figure 3-3 below with the model coefficients 
represented with odds ratios (for table of odds ratios and standard errors see Appendix 1 
Table 5-4). There is no statistically significant effect of policy type (either practice or 
performance) on rate of NMP adoption. Dairy farms were nine times more likely to have 
adopted an NMP compared to the other farm type category, which includes deer, pig, 
poultry, vegetable and horticultural farms. Sheep and beef farms and grazing support 
were each about half as likely as the other farm type category to have adopted an NMP. A 
shift from not profitable or breakeven to profitable farms was associated with a 1.35 
times increased likelihood of adopting an NMP. Farm size, education and age were not 
significant predictors of NMP adoption. The Likelihood Ratio Test (LR) for the 
significance of the random effect of territorial authority on NMP adoption was non-
significant (χ2 (1) = 0.72, p = 0.20). 
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Figure 3-3. Coefficient plot of NMP Adoption mixed effects logit model (n=1917). Coefficients are 
presented as odds ratios. For table of odds ratios and standard errors see Appendix 1 Table 5-4. 
 
3.4.2 Extent of NMP adoption 
Figure 3-4 shows the results of the Poisson model predicting farmer extent of 
NMP adoption. The betas associated with significant predictors can be interpreted as the 
number of nutrient management practices associated with a one unit increase in the 
predictor variable. For extent of NMP adoption we again see no effect of policy type on 
rate of adoption. With regard to the TPB variables, perceived behavioral control does 
significantly, and positively, predict adoption at two levels: the second level of perceived 
behavioral control (β= 0.21, p < 0.05) and the third level of perceived behavioral control 
(β= 0.31, p < 0.05), as compared to the lowest (base) level of perceived behavioral 
control, but attitudes and norms do not. The second and third levels of perceived 
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behavioral control represent the second highest and highest belief strength, respectively, 
of perceived ability to engage in nutrient management planning. Of the TPB constructs, 
environmental stewardship (β= 0.21, p < 0.01) does significantly predict extent of NMP 
adoption. In addition, farm size (β= 0.06, p < 0.05) and operating a dairy farm (β= 0.48, p 
< 0.000) compared to other farm types both significantly and positively predict extent of 
NMP adoption. The random effect for territorial authority on extent of NMP adoption for 
the model was estimated to have a coefficient of zero. 
 
Figure 3-4. Coefficient plot of NMP Extent of Adoption mixed effects Poisson model (n=401). 
Coefficients are presented as Beta coefficients. For table of coefficients and standard errors see 
Appendix 1 Table 5-5. 
Broken down by policy type we see that the three policy types are associated 
with different factors related to extent of NMP adoption. The no policy group, shown in 
Figure 3-5, results align closely with the full model: perceived behavioral control of 3 (β= 
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0.44, p < 0.05), environmental stewardship (β= 0.22, p < 0.05), farm size (β= 0.17, p < 
0.05) and operating a dairy farm (β= 0.47, p < 0.000) all significantly and positively 
predict NMP extent adoption. In the practice-based model, shown in Figure 3-6, only 
operating a dairy farm (β= 0.68, p < 0.05) is a significant predictor of extent of NMP 
adoption. Although, we would like to reiterate here the low sample size (n=52) for the 
practice-based model, which may limit the ability to interpret these results. In the 
performance group, shown in Figure 3-7, only the second level of perceived behavioral 
control (β= 0.33, p < 0.05) is a significant predictor of NMP extent adoption. The random 
effects for territorial authority on extent of NMP adoption in all three policy sub-group 
models were estimated to have a coefficient of zero 
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Figure 3-5. Coefficient plot for no policy group (n = 230) NMP Extent of Adoption mixed effects 
Poisson model. Coefficients are presented as Beta coefficients. For table of coefficients and standard 
errors see Appendix 1 Table 5-5. 
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Figure 3-6. Coefficient plot for practice-based group (n = 52) NMP Extent of Adoption mixed effects 
Poisson model. Coefficients are presented as Beta coefficients. For table of coefficients and standard 
errors see Appendix 1 Table 5-5. 
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Figure 3-7. Coefficient plot for performance-based group (n = 119) NMP Extent of Adoption mixed 
effects Poisson model. Coefficients are presented as Beta coefficients. Note that we present a 
truncated left hand confidence interval for other education in this plot. For table of coefficients and 
standard errors see Appendix 1 Table 5-5. 
 
3.4.3 Intention to adopt nutrient management plan 
The results of the logistic mixed effects model examining predictors of the 
intention of non-adopters to adopt an NMP, with coefficients presented as odds ratios, are 
shown in Figure 3-8. In the full model, farmers in a performance-based policy are almost 
four times more likely to intend to adopt an NMP than farmers in the no policy group 
(OR = 3.96, p < 0.001). Amongst the TPB variables, attitudes (OR = 1.56, p < 0.000) and 
norms (OR = 1.08, p < 0.01) both significantly and positively predict intention to adopt 
an NMP, but perceived behavioral control is not statistically distinguishable from zero. In 
addition, operating a sheep and beef farm (OR = 2.212, p < 0.01), operating a grazing 
support farm (OR = 3.042, p < 0.05) and having a bachelor’s degree (OR = 2.19, p < 
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0.05) are all positive and significant predictors of intention to adopt an NMP. Age (OR = 
0.97 p < 0.01) is a significant negative predictor of intention to adopt an NMP, meaning 
older farmers are less likely to adopt a NMP. The LR test for the significance of the 
random effect of territorial authority on intention to adopt NMP was non-significant (χ2 
(1) = 0.05, p = 0.41). 
 
 
Figure 3-8. Coefficient plot of Intention to Adopt NMP mixed effects logit model (n=536). 
Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Note that we present a truncated right hand confidence 
interval for other education in this plot. For table of odds ratios and standard errors see Appendix 1  
 
Table 5-6. 
Comparing policy group models, again we see the policy types are associated 
with different factors related to intention to adopt NMP. In the no policy group model, 
shown in Figure 3-9, attitudes (OR = 1.98, p < 0.01), norms (OR = 1.14, p < 0.05) and 
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operating a sheep and beef (OR = 5.23, p < 0.05) significantly and positively predict 
intention to adopt. For the practice-based group model, shown in Figure 3-10, farm size 
(OR = 114.5, p < 0.01) is associated with a very large increased likelihood of NMP 
intention to adopt, whereas sheep and beef farms (OR = 0.0134, p < 0.05) and age (OR = 
0.899, p < 0.05) are associated with a very low likelihood of NMP intention to adopt.  
Amongst the performance group, shown in Figure 3-11, attitudes (OR = 1.35, p < 0.05) is 
a positive and significant predictor of NMP intention to adopt and so is operating a 
grazing support farm type (OR = 4.40, p < 0.05). The LR test for the significance of the 
random effect of territorial authority on intention to adopt NMP was non-significant for 
the no policy group (χ2 (1) = 0.40, p = 0.26) and the coefficient was estimated as zero for 
the practice-based and performance-based groups.  
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Figure 3-9. Coefficient plot for no policy group (n=271) Intention to Adopt NMP mixed effects logit 
model. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. For table of odds ratios and standard errors see 
Appendix 1  
 
Table 5-6. 
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Figure 3-10. Coefficient plot for practice-based group (n=76) Intention to Adopt NMP mixed effects 
logit model. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Note that we present a truncated right hand 
confidence interval for farm size and model constant in this plot. For table of odds ratios and 
standard errors see Appendix 1  
 
Table 5-6. 
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Figure 3-11. Coefficient plot for performance-based group (n=186) Intention to Adopt NMP mixed 
effects logit model. Coefficients are presented as odds ratios. Note that we present a truncated right 
hand confidence interval for dairy and other education in this plot. For table of odds ratios and 
standard errors see Appendix 1  
 
Table 5-6. 
 
3.5. Discussion 
3.5.1. Do mandatory policy choice rules matter for behavior change? 
According to our first two models in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4, mandatory water 
quality policy is not associated with an increase in NMP adoption or extent of adoption. 
This suggests that, at least in the time period captured by the SRDM survey, mandatory 
policy is not (yet) changing behavior. There are a couple potential reasons for this no 
effect. The first is that in 2015, of the 29 territorial authorities with mandatory policies, 
12 territorial authorities had policies that were not yet operational. This means that rules 
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had been defined, but in 2015 farmers were not yet required to meet practice or 
performance standards. For those policies that were not yet operation, the policy process 
provided a policy signal that alerted farmers to near future rules, which would require 
forward planning and action. Importantly, this differs from the “no policy” regions where 
no rule-making was occurring or if it had begun, no decisions had been made towards the 
structure of future water quality rules (i.e. practice-based or performance-based). 
However, despite these distinctions, it may be too early in the policy process to detect 
differential levels of adoption. It is possible that in five years we may see a difference in 
nutrient management behavior between policy groups.  
 Another potential explanation for the lack of higher NMP adoption rates under 
mandatory policy is that overall adoption of NMP is high across the country (e.g. in 
mandatory policy and no policy groups) possibly due to a combination of public pressure 
and regulatory pressure. Public pressure on farmers to clean up their impact on New 
Zealand’s waters may be driving adoption of NMP across all policy types in the country. 
For example a 2015 newspaper article in the New Zealand newspaper Scoop written by 
dairy industry group DairyNZ said that New Zealand farms “need to evolve new farming 
systems” in response to the challenge of nutrient limits (DairyNZ, 2015). In addition, 
national level policy signal from the National Policy Statement for Freshwater 
Management that requires that, eventually, all regions must implement water quality 
limits and rules (NPSFM, 2014). Therefore, even farmers in the no policy regions may 
see adoption of NMP as an inevitable regulatory requirement.  The final potential rational 
for the lack of nutrient management behavior differences between policy groups is that 
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mandatory policy does not change farmer NMP behavior. If this is the case, water quality 
improvements will likely not be realized in the future. Given the potential implications of 
a lack of behavior change, future research should continue to monitor farmer nutrient 
management behavior across policy regimes. 
Turning to other predictors of NMP adoption, the positive relationship between 
farm profitability and adoption of NMPs suggests that profitability can drive 
environmental stewardship. NMPs are often framed as a win-win for farming in that they 
can save farmers money by allowing them to maximize the economic benefits from 
nutrient inputs and reduce environmental impacts (Beegle et al., 2000). This result could 
suggest two things: profitable farms could be drawn to NMPs as a strategy to increase 
farm economic efficiency or farms that have adopted NMPs are able to maximize their 
economic returns and are therefore more profitable. Given the correlational nature of our 
study, we are unable to discern whether one or both of these are occurring. However, the 
positive relationship between profitability and NMP adoption does suggest that framing 
NMP benefits in economic terms is a good strategy to promote adoption, even within 
regulatory contexts. This result aligns with much of the literature on voluntary farm 
conservation practice adoption (Baumgart-Getz et al., 2012; Conner et al., 2016; 
Prokopy, Floress, Klotthor-Weinkauf, & Baumgart-Getz, 2008b). In their meta-analysis 
on farmer adoption of conservation practices, including nutrient management practices, 
Baumgart-Getz et al. (2012) found a farm’s financial capital, or investment into the farm, 
as having one of the largest impacts on adoption. This suggests that with regard to the 
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practice of nutrient management planning, regardless of differing regulatory 
environments, farm financials relate to behavior change.   
The role of farm type in driving NMP adoption may have more to do with 
increased industry support and initiatives in New Zealand for dairy farms versus other 
farm systems (grazing support, sheep and beef and other categories) than the particulars 
of the farm system, as we see dairy farms show a strong likelihood to adopt NMP, 
whereas other farm types show a decreased likelihood. However, in the intention to adopt 
models, sheep and beef farms and grazing support farms are more likely to intend to 
adopt than dairy. This is likely due to the fact that most dairy farms have already adopted 
NMPs, over 80% in the sample, compared to much fewer sheep and beef farms and 
grazing support farms, 23% and 24% respectively. It is likely that industry pressure and 
support for dairy has led to dairy NMP adoption, whereas the relatively lower pressure on 
sheep and beef and grazing support farms has resulted in less motivation for sheep and 
beef and grazing support farms actually adopt NMP. 
The dairy industry in New Zealand had been under heightened public pressure to 
clean up its impact on water quality following the “Dirty Dairying Campaign” led by an 
environmental NGO in the early 2000s (Edgar, 2008; Holland, 2015). Dairy farming has 
a greater nutrient impact per unit of production on the land compared to other pasture-
based farm types (Monaghan, Hedley, et al., 2007; Monaghan, Wilcock, et al., 2007), and 
so it has been targeted the New Zealand public as a polluter of the country’s waterways 
(Holland, 2015). As a result, Fonterra, the dominant dairy cooperative in New Zealand 
and DairyNZ, the dairy industry research and support group, have promoted the adoption 
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of NMPs as a way to budget farm nutrients to reduce water quality impacts (Quinn et al., 
2009). Thus far there has not been the same public pressure on other farm types 
throughout the country, which suggests that industry and public pressure play an 
important role in motivating behavior change.  
While our results show no evidence of differences in reported levels of nutrient 
management behavior between groups, we do see that performance-based policy is 
associated with an increased intention to adopt NMP. If indeed the lack of behavior 
change is due to policy phase-in periods as suggested above, the increased intention to 
adopt NMP in performance-based policies suggests promise for future behavior change in 
performance-based policies. However, we know that intention to change can be quite 
distinct from actual behavior change. For example, Niles et al. study of New Zealand 
farmers intended versus actual adoption of climate change mitigation and adaptation 
strategies showed that intended adoption did not correlate well with actual behavior 
change (2016). In order to encourage this shift from intention to actual behavior change 
we can look to the results of our first model again to suggest that profitability, public 
pressure and industry support may help motivate farmers who intend to adopt an NMP to 
follow through with actual adoption. Additionally, in mandatory policies, enforcement of 
the policies may also help shift intention to actual adoption. Regardless, the increased 
intention to adopt NMP in performance-based policies suggest that they are more likely 
to be associated increased levels of behavior change in the future, relative to mandatory 
practice-based policies and no policy regions. 
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3.5.2 Do policy choice rules impact decision making and does this have implications for 
policy support? 
Across the full sample, in the extent of adoption model (Figure 3-4) and the 
intention to adopt model (Figure 3-8), we see evidence that all four TPB variables, 
attitudes, subjective norms, moral norms (i.e. environmental stewardship) and perceived 
behavioral control are significant, positive predictors of NMP behavior. This suggests, as 
would be expected by the literature, that values and beliefs are an important component 
of NMP behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011; Stern et al., 1999). When the sample is 
broken down into policy sub-groups, for both extent of adoption and intention to adopt, 
there is greater evidence for value alignment in the no policy group than both of the 
mandatory groups, suggesting that values and beliefs may play lesser roles in adoption of 
NMP in regulatory contexts than in non-regulatory contexts. Environmental stewardship 
and subjective norms are only significant predictors of extent of adoption and intention to 
adopt, respectively, in the no policy sub-group model. This suggests that, subjective 
norms and stewardship moral norms may only be relevant to behavior outside of 
regulatory environments.  
However, perceived behavior control and attitudes are both positive and 
significant predictors of adoption behavior in both the no policy group and performance-
based group’s extent of NMP adoption and intention to adopt NMP models respectively. 
According to Fishbein & Ajzen, the role of perceived behavioral control  is expected to 
both moderate the impact of social norms and attitude on intention and the impact of 
intention on actual behavior (2011, p. 181). Logically, one would assume that once a 
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farmer has already adopted NMPs as a practice then attitudes and norms would play less 
of a role in determining which nutrient management strategies or structures are 
implemented. Instead, as we see here, we would expect the farmers’ capabilities and their 
farm system dynamics to drive adoption. However, this result is not observed amongst 
farmers in the practice-based policy group. In the practice-based group, operating a dairy 
farm was the only significant predictor of extent of nutrient management plan adoption.  
The significance of attitudes and norms in the full sample intention to adopt 
NMP model is also in line with what one would expect from the TPB, as Fishbein and 
Ajzen suggest, it is not anticipated that one would see a strong relationship between 
perceived behavioral control and intention because “the fact that I am capable of 
performing a behavior does not necessarily imply that I will intend to do so” (2011, p. 
181).  
For both extent of NMP adoption and intention to adopt an NMP, when broken 
down by policy group, we see that no TPB variables are correlated with farmers’ 
adoption or intention decisions in a practice-based policy. Instead, in practice-based 
policies, farm and farmer characteristics appear to drive adoption and intention. However, 
for farmers in performance-based policies, we see perceived behavioral control and 
attitudes play a role in adoption extent and intention to adopt (respectively). In practice-
based policies, were farmers are required to adopt specific practices, it appears that an 
individual farmer’s level of perceived behavioral control doesn’t matter. However, in 
performance-based policies, where farmers’ have the autonomy to determine how to 
achieve a benchmark, perceived behavioral control is important. This indicates that 
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fostering perceived behavioral control amongst farmers in performance-based policies 
can help to capitalize on their increased likelihood to intend to adopt NMP and motivate 
actual NMP adoption. 
Furthermore, this seems to imply that there is more room in performance-based 
policies for farmers to make adoption decisions that align with their internal values and 
beliefs. Additional evidence for this lies in the fact that farmers in performance-based 
policies TPB drivers align with the TPB drivers for farmers in the no policy group. We 
interpret this in terms of policy success to say that farmers in performance-based regimes 
show greater potential for prolonged policy support. According to social movement and 
public policy theory, value alignment between a policy and on farm management is more 
likely to result in policy support than value misalignment (Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014; 
Stern et al., 1999).  
3.6. Limitations 
Before concluding, we would like to acknowledge a few limitations of the study. 
First, the practice-based versus performance-based categorization system for water 
quality policies employed in the policy coding for this paper is a simplification of the 
nuances of each unique policy. For example, not all farms under a policy may be subject 
to the practice or performance standards of the policy and there are often farms that 
because of size (e.g. small commercial farms) or type (e.g. forms of low input agriculture 
such as some varieties of horticulture and vegetable farms). However, this is likely to be 
a small number of our commercial farm sample and these farms would have most likely 
been exposed to the policy discussion and policy signal. 
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We would also like to acknowledge some limitations in the application of the 
TPB in the study. Other implementations of the TPB often use sets of paired questions to 
compute the attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control components 
which includes both the participant’s evaluation of the impact of the element on the 
behavior and the participant’s assessment of the importance of the element to themselves 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2011; Willcox, Giuliano, & Monroe, 2012). Due to question 
restrictions, we were unable to ask participants to evaluate the strength of importance of 
the TPB elements and therefore our measures may be seen as partial representations of 
the constructs. Additionally, we use a proxy behavior for nutrient management planning 
for the subjective norms question in this study (i.e. environmentally friendly farming), on 
the survey to represent subjective norms towards NMP. As NMPs are a tool to farm at 
agronomic rates and described by both industry and regulations to reduce the 
environmental impact of a farm system, we see this as an appropriate proxy. However, it 
would be preferable for this question to have been asked explicitly about NMP (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 2011). Finally, it is likely that the stringency (e.g. amount of reduction required 
and/or precision of monitoring and compliance) of each of the water quality policies 
plays a role in driving behavior change. Analyzing the stringency of each policies was 
out of the scope of this study, but future research should investigate how stringency 
interacts with values and beliefs and behavior change.  
3.7. Conclusion 
Agricultural NPS pollution is a challenging environmental issue to manage and 
a growing concern for watersheds across the globe. As regions seek certainty in attaining 
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long term water quality improvements, it is likely that more will turn to mandatory, rules-
based policies. The results of this study suggest that a switch to mandatory policies is not 
assured to increase nutrient management behavior change. However, our results do 
suggest that mandatory performance-based policies are associated with an increased 
likelihood of future behavior change compared to mandatory practice-based policies and 
no mandatory policy. Furthermore, performance-based policies show greater potential for 
prolonged policy support from farmers due to better alignment with farmer decision 
making values and norms compared to practice-based policies. Given the complexity of 
agricultural NPS, achieving water quality goals requires both behavior change on the 
landscape and sustained policy support to maintain behavior change over a long period of 
time. It is likely that any form of mandatory policy will incur a degree of cost and 
resistance amongst the farming community as compared to a voluntary policy. However, 
if mandatory policy is necessary to achieve water quality results, our results suggest that 
performance-based policy increases the likelihood of attaining water quality goals and 
may be more palatable to farmers in that it allows them autonomy and flexibility in 
running their farm system. Long term monitoring of farmer nutrient management 
behavior is needed to better understand whether mandatory policies will result in 
increased nutrient management behavior and therefore increased water quality 
improvements. 
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CHAPTER 4: A SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL SYSTEMS APPROACH TO 
UNDERSTANDING FARMER NUTRIENT MANAGEMENT BEHAVIOR IN A 
SPECTRUM OF MANDATORY WATER QUALITY POLICIES 
Authors: Courtney Hammond Wagner, Suzie Greenhalgh, Meredith T. Niles, Asim Zia, 
William Bowden  
4.1. Abstract 
Water quality policy for agricultural lands strives to improve water quality 
through changing farmer behavior across the landscape. Understanding what farmers are 
doing on their land and the drivers that influence these behaviors are signals of whether 
water quality will improve and if behavior is changing in the intended direction. This 
study utilizes farmer behavior and mental models to qualitatively examine the fit of water 
policy within its social-ecological context and the interplay of the water quality policy 
within existing institutional dynamics, each of which contribute to the ability of the 
policy to achieve the overall goal of increased water quality. We investigate farmer 
behavior in three mandatory agricultural NPS pollution regimes in similar contexts in 
Vermont, USA and Taupo and Rotorua, New Zealand that vary by policy design and 
degrees of implementation. Vermont, USA has implemented mandatory practice-based 
rules that require farmers to enact a specific set of practices to improve water quality. 
Whereas Taupo and Rotorua both have mandatory-performance based policies that 
require farms to stay below a nutrient leaching limit, but give farms the flexibility to 
achieve the limit how they see fit. Vermont and Taupo’s policies are operational and 
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Rotorua’s policy had been formalized by the Bay of Plenty Regional Council (i.e. the 
formal rules had been written and released to the public) but not yet operational.  
We interviewed 38 farmers across the three regions to examine farmers reported 
behavior change, perceptions of the drivers causing those behaviors and perceived 
individual and watershed outcomes. We then used the social-ecological systems (SES) 
framework to inform content analysis of each interview. Coding was aggregated by 
region to produce group mental model networks, consisting of farmers reported links 
between drivers, behaviors and outcomes. Each region’s mental model network was 
analyzed using simple network analysis techniques to identify influential elements in 
each network. Our results show that farmers report behavior change across the three 
regions, with Vermont farmers reporting the highest number of changes per farmer, 
followed by Taupo and then Rotorua. We also see different patterns in types of behavior 
changes with dominance of structural changes in Vermont (e.g. fencing or buffers) and 
system changes in Taupo (e.g. switch from dairy to cattle farm system), and no 
dominance in Rotorua. Farmers report that the water quality policy is a key driver of 
behavior change across all three regions, but we see the interplay between the water 
quality policy and existing institutional dynamics contributes to the different behavioral 
patterns, as well as perceived outcomes. Farmers in Vermont’s practice-based policy 
reported greater behavior change and practice adoption, but farmers in Taupo’s 
performance-based policy reported greater levels of system change which ultimately may 
be associated with higher nutrient reductions. We conclude by suggesting that driver-
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behavior-outcome dynamics should be considered carefully in future policy design to 
achieve the desired water quality outcomes. 
 4.2. Introduction 
Water quality policy targeting agricultural nonpoint source (NPS) pollution 
strives to improve water quality through changing farmer behavior across the landscape. 
Despite the pervasive impact of agricultural NPS pollution to freshwater systems around 
the globe, little is known about the social, economic, and political dynamics that 
contribute to the persistence  of the problem, including the role of mandatory NPS 
pollution policy in changing farmer behavior (Carpenter et al., 1998; McDowell et al., 
2015; Rissman & Carpenter, 2015). What farmers are doing on their land and the drivers 
that influence these behaviors are signals of whether water quality will improve and if 
behavior is changing as intended. The mental models farmers hold with respect to the 
motives for their nutrient management behavior can help identify underlying mechanisms 
driving behavior (Saldaña, 2015).  Mental models are “internal representation of external 
reality that people use to interact with the world around them”(Jones, Ross, Lynam, 
Perez, & Leitch, 2011, para. 1). Understanding farmers’ mental models can in turn shed 
light on the interplay between a water quality policy, the broader watershed context, and 
social, economic and ecological outcomes.  
History is littered with examples of policy interventions gone wrong, in which 
the intended behavior is not achieved, or worse yet, the opposite of the social objective of 
the policy is realized (Goodin, 1998). For water quality policy to achieve the desired 
outcome (e.g. farm management change to improve water quality), it must fit well with 
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the pre-existing institutions that structure social interaction and behavior in a given 
setting (Goodin, 1998). As Young highlights, “institutions play a role in both causing and 
addressing problems that arise from human-environment interactions,” hence the fit of 
the institution to the biophysical context and the interplay of the institution with other 
existing institutional arrangements are important elements in the success of the 
institutional intervention (Young et al., 2008, p. xiiv). Institutions, as used here, refer to 
the formal or informal rules, strategies or norms that constrain human interaction and 
behavior  (North, 1990; Ostrom, 2005). Due to challenges in measuring and monitoring 
agricultural NPS pollution (Meals et al., 2010), it is important to look for other avenues to 
understand what is driving NPS pollution trends. Farmer behavior and mental models are 
a promising alternative that can be used to qualitatively assess the fit and functioning of 
an agricultural NPS policy regime.  
This study utilizes interviews and network analysis to examine farmer nutrient 
management behavior in a water quality policy context, thereby integrating farmers’ 
individual decision-making processes and the influence of the broader watershed social, 
economic, political and ecological context. We investigate farmer behavior in three 
agricultural NPS pollution policies in similar contexts in Vermont, USA and New 
Zealand that vary by policy choice rules and degrees of implementation. 
Within these policy frameworks, farmers have a set of “choice rules”, which 
specify what a farmer “must, must not, or may do” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 200). The 
mandatory policy regimes under consideration represent two different types of choice 
rules: practice-based and performance-based. Under a practice-based policy, as is the 
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case in Vermont, farmers must implement a series of practices or structures to be in 
compliance. In a performance-based regime, as is the case in both New Zealand regions, 
farms are required to stay under a performance limit for modeled nutrient leaching from 
the farm, but they can choose any suite of strategies to achieve the standard. The Lake 
Taupo policy has been operation since 2011, Vermont since 2016 and the Rotorua 
process is yet to be implemented and therefore represents a policy signal, i.e. 
requirements for policy known but no enforcement. 
Through examining farmer perceptions and behavior in a spectrum of 
agricultural NPS pollution policy regimes, this study will contribute to an understanding 
of how policy influences and interacts with nutrient management behavior. We address 
three key research questions to explore policy performance, policy fit and policy 
interplay across the three policy contexts: 1) what types of nutrient management behavior 
changes do farmers report making, if any? 2) What do farmers perceive as the drivers of 
their nutrient management changes? And 3) what are the perceived individual and 
watershed outcomes of behavior changes and the NPS pollution policy? 
4.3. Theoretical Framework 
Elinor Ostrom’s social-ecological systems (SES) framework provides a 
theoretical basis from which to examine the institutional governance of interactions 
between actors within natural resource regimes (Ostrom, 2009, 2011). Typically, in the 
application of Ostrom’s framework to understand collective action, individual behavior is 
assumed to be boundedly rational, in that individuals intend to behave rationally but have 
limited information, cognition and attention processing abilities (Ostrom, 2011; Poteete et 
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al., 2010; Simon, 1972). In cases like agricultural NPS pollution where there are high 
degrees of uncertainty in resource dynamics which makes measurement, monitoring and 
enforcement of policy institutional interventions difficult, there is an increased need to 
understand individuals’ mental models and internal decision making processes (see 
chapter 2). 
This study seeks to build on the literature in applying the SES framework to 
explore the institutional drivers of nutrient management behavior within a policy context 
through farmers’ mental models. Ostrom’s SES framework (2009) considers the 
interactions between governance systems (e.g. water quality policy), users (e.g. 
individual farmer decision making processes), resource systems (e.g. farm systems), 
resource units (e.g. nutrient dynamics) and system outcomes (e.g. water quality) as shown 
in Figure 4-1. The SES framework focuses on the way in which these interactions exist 
within broader social, economic, political and ecological dynamics. The framework in 
particular, building on Ostrom’s work with the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework, seeks to understand the workings of “action arenas,” in which actors interact 
in the context of the broader system to produce outcomes, e.g. improved water quality 
(Ostrom, 2005). The focus of this study is on nutrient management decision making and 
behavior, in which the agricultural NPS pollution water quality policy rules interacts with 
individual behavior, the community and the biophysical world (Ostrom, 2005).  
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Figure 4-1. Adaptation of the SES Framework to Agricultural NPS pollution, adapted from Ostrom 
(2009) and revised from Hammond Wagner et al. (forthcoming) (chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
Typically in applications of the SES framework researchers use a diversity of 
metrics and indices (Cox, 2014; Leslie et al., 2015; McGinnis & Ostrom, 2014), but 
rarely include perspectives of individuals within the system. Here we present a novel 
application of the framework, drawing on farmers’ internal perceptions of dynamics in 
the SES (i.e. mental models) to identify the most salient aspects of the system to 
individual farmers’ behavior and decision making. Each farmer in the watershed is 
operating based on their own understanding of their situation and the broader context. 
Farmers, like all people, filter and store information through their mental models and, as 
Jones et al. (2011, para. 4) suggest, mental models  are “limited and unique to each 
individual…context-dependent and may change according to the situation in which they 
are used.” Therefore, exploring farmer mental models within the context of a water 
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quality policy can provide important insight into how farmers are evaluating alternatives, 
framing discussions and making decisions that ultimately impact water quality (Carley & 
Palmquist, 1992).  
A mental modeling approach, i.e. eliciting actor mental models, has been 
employed to understand a broad range of environmental behavior and decision making, 
including irrigator water-use decisions in a water stressed basin (Douglas et al., 2016), 
farmer definitions of sustainable agriculture (Hoffman, Lubell, & Hillis, 2014), organic 
farmers’ weed management decisions (Jabbour et al., 2014), and the public’s climate 
change beliefs (Zia & Todd, 2010). Furthermore, mental models can be aggregated or 
grouped to examine “collective knowledge and understanding of a particular domain held 
by a specific population of individuals” (Hoffman et al., 2014, p. 36). These group mental 
models are the focus of this study, in that we group individual farmer mental models 
within each of the three water quality policy regions to examine and compare collective 
understanding of nutrient management in each social-ecological context. 
4.4. Methods 
We employ qualitative interviews and network analysis to examine farmer 
mental models in three water quality SES’s that have mandatory policy to curtail 
agricultural NPS pollution.  
4.4.1 Study Site Descriptions 
The three focal agricultural NPS pollution policy contexts of this study are: 
Rotorua, Bay of Plenty region and Taupo, Waikato region, both in New Zealand, and 
Vermont, USA. As noted above, these regions differ in terms of policy choice rules, i.e. 
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practice-based versus performance-based, and degree of implementation. These regions 
have each implemented agricultural NPS pollution policy that regulates nutrients coming 
off of farms, as opposed to more upstream regulation that targets nutrient import to the 
farm. The three regions are all agriculturally dominated landscapes that have seen 
agricultural intensification in the last few decades which has been associated with 
decreases in water quality (Mcdowell, Larned, & Houlbrooke, 2009; Quinn et al., 2009; 
Rutherford, Pridmore, & White, 1989; Smeltzer, 2015; Smeltzer, Shambaugh, & Stangel, 
2012). Table 4-1 gives a description of each of the three case study regions using the high 
level SES categories shown in Figure 4-1. 
Before describing the specifics of each region, it is important to note some 
general differences between the New Zealand and Vermont social, economic and political 
settings. Agriculture in the United States is highly subsidized (Kirwan, 2009), which 
includes millions of dollars in cost-share for farmers to adopt conservation agricultural 
practices (Baylis, Peplow, Rausser, & Simon, 2008). In sharp contrast, New Zealand 
abolished all agricultural subsidies in 1984 and is export-based, meaning that farmers are 
exposed to international market dynamics (Quinn et al., 2009).  While Vermont exports 
most of its agricultural products outside of the state (Wironen et al., 2018), it is partially 
protected from market exposure due to national subsidies. Another important difference 
is the dominance of pastoral agriculture across New Zealand, compared to the semi- and 
full-confinement systems for animal agriculture in Vermont. 
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Table 4-1. SES description of the three case study regions 
Case study 
policy regions 
Taupo, Waikato Region, 
New Zealand 
Rotorua, Bay of Plenty 
Region, New Zealand 
Vermont, United States 
Resource units Nitrogen Nitrogen Phosphorus 
Resource system Mostly extensive pasture-
based beef and sheep farms 
with some dairy operations 
Mixture of pasture-based 
dairy operations and sheep 
and beef operations 
Mixture of full and semi-
confinement dairy, semi-
confinement cattle, 
vegetable and other 
diversified farm systems 
Governance 
System 
Variation 5: performance-
based cap-and-trade 
Rule 11 and Proposed Plan 
Change 10: performance-
based cap-and-trade 
Act 64 and the Required 
Agricultural Practices: 
practice-based regulation 
Users Farmers Farmers Farmers 
Social, 
economic, 
political setting 
*No subsidies for 
agriculture (Quinn et al., 
2009) 
*International export-based 
market (Quinn et al., 2009) 
*Public pressure on 
agriculture, and dairy in 
particular, to reduce water 
quality impacts (Holland, 
2015) 
*National policy focus on 
improving water quality 
across New Zealand 
(NPSFM, 2014) 
*Taupo first in country to 
take a stringent regulatory 
approach (Yerex, 2009) 
*No subsidies for agriculture 
(Quinn et al., 2009) 
*International export-based 
market (Quinn et al., 2009) 
* Public pressure on 
agriculture, and dairy in 
particular, to reduce water 
quality impacts (Holland, 
2015) 
*National policy statement 
for freshwater in 2011/2014 
mandates water quality 
limits across country by 
2025 (NPSFM, 2014) 
*Rotorua early adopter of 
water quality regulation 
(behind Taupo and some 
other regions) 
*Lots of subsidies for 
agriculture, including 
incentives and programs 
to adopt conservation 
practices (McDowell et 
al., 2015)  
*Most agricultural 
products are sold out of 
state, but less exposure to 
international markets 
than NZ farmers 
(Wironen et al., 2018) 
*Public finger pointing at 
dairy as the problem for 
water quality in Lake 
Champlain and other 
waterbodies throughout 
the state (Flagg, 2015; J. 
M. Smith, Parsons, Van 
Dis, & Matiru, 2008) 
 
 
Taupo, New Zealand 
The Lake Taupo watershed is located in the center of the North Island of New 
Zealand and is the country’s largest lake. The watershed is dominated by pastoral 
agriculture consisting of approximately 120 farms, mainly extensive sheep and cattle 
farms, with a few dairies. With evidence for declining water quality and algal blooms in 
the early 2000s, the Waikato Regional Council proposed “Variation No. 5 – Lake Taupo 
Catchment” in 2005 to clean up Lake Taupo (Waikato Regional Council, 2011), which 
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became operational in 2011. The policy is a performance-based cap-and-trade for 
nitrogen, the main nutrient of concern in the lake, and features three core aspects. First, 
farm nitrogen leaching was capped at current levels (i.e. prior to the proposed policy) and 
each farm was given a “nitrogen discharge allowance” based on historical levels of 
nitrogen use (Waikato Regional Council, 2011). Second, a trust was endowed with 80 
million New Zealand dollars of government funds to reduce 20% of the nitrogen in the 
catchment to align the nitrogen load with estimates of the catchment’s sustainable 
nitrogen load. Third, the policy set up a nitrogen market to allow farmers to trade 
nitrogen discharge allowances between each other to allow for increases or decreases in 
individual farms’ nitrogen leaching, while maintaining the overall basin level. Farms are 
monitored through annual modeling of the farm system to ensure compliance with their 
nitrogen discharge allowance and are required to pay an annual fee (Waikato Regional 
Council, 2011). 
Rotorua, New Zealand 
Lake Rotorua watershed is also located in central North Island, New Zealand 
and is about 80 km northeast of Lake Taupo. Similar to the Lake Taupo, the Lake 
Rotorua watershed is dominated by pastoral agriculture, with a similar number of farms 
to Taupo, but including a stronger presence of dairy farms. As a result of declining water 
quality in the Rotorua Lakes region, the Bay of Plenty regional council passed Rule 11 in 
2005 which, similar to Taupo’s Variation 5, capped farm nitrogen emissions at their 
current levels. This policy was meant to stop agricultural intensification in the region. 
Further rules, Proposed Plan Change 10, were proposed to reduce the overall amount of 
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nitrogen leaching in the watershed.  Proposed Plan Change 10 was notified in February, 
2016 (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2016). Proposed Plan Change 10 is also a 
performance-based cap-and-trade for nitrogen, including a nitrogen discharge allowance 
for each farm. Similar to Taupo, the policy features an incentives board with 40 million 
New Zealand dollars of government funding to remove nitrogen from the catchment and 
the potential for farm-to-farm trading of nitrogen. Unlike Taupo, Rotorua farmers must 
make mandatory reductions in their nitrogen leaching rates to achieve the required 42% 
reduction in the watershed’s nitrogen load. Farms must reach their required load 
reductions before they can trade nitrogen. Once operational, farmers will need to pay an 
annual fee and be monitored annually for compliance with their nitrogen discharge 
allowance (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2016). 
Vermont, United States 
The state of Vermont is located in the northeastern United States on the border 
with Canada. While Vermont’s policy is state-wide, it was motivated by the need to 
address the phosphorus-driven eutrophication of Lake Champlain, a watershed shared by 
Vermont, New York State, and the province of Quebec, Canada. Similar to the New 
Zealand watersheds, the Lake Champlain Basin has seen declining water quality for 
decades due primarily to agricultural intensification and urban development (USEPA, 
2016). Vermont’s agricultural industry includes dairy, cattle, and vegetable farms, with 
dairy dominating agricultural land use and economic output (Vermont Dairy Promotion 
Council, 2015). In 2015, the Vermont legislature passed Act 64 to enact new regulations 
for managing phosphorus on farms, as well as rules for other sources of phosphorus (Act 
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64: An Act Relating to Improving the Quality of State Waters, 2015). Under Act 64, 
farms are required to comply with the Required Agricultural Practices (RAPs) which 
include mandatory practices, such as writing nutrient management plans, requirements 
for cover cropping on highly erodible soils, winter manure and flood plain spreading 
bans, and 25 foot (7.5 meter) buffers between farm fields and surface waters (Vermont 
Agency of Agriculture, Food & Markets, 2018). It should be noted that some of these 
practices were already required for medium and large farms before Act 64. Under the 
new rules, farms must register with the state, pay an annual fee and are monitored for 
compliance with the RAPs at a rate dependent on farm size: every year for large farms (> 
700 dairy cows or equivalent, e.g. 1000 beef cattle), every three years for medium size 
farms (<700 and >200 dairy cows or equivalent) and every seven years for small farms 
(<200 dairy cows or equivalent).  
Phosphorus and Nitrogen Dynamics 
 As shown in Table 4-1, the case study sites differ in their focal nutrient of 
concern: Vermont’s rules are written to reduce phosphorus runoff from farms and 
Taupo’s and Rotorua’s rules target reductions in nitrogen leaching from farms.  
In freshwater systems phosphorus tends to be the limiting nutrient for cyanobacteria or 
algal blooms because the phosphorus cycle lacks external atmospheric inputs, unlike 
nitrogen (Schindler, 1977). However, in the Lake Taupo and Lake Rotorua watersheds 
there are naturally high occurring levels of phosphorus, so the limiting nutrient for 
cyanobacteria in these lakes is considered to be nitrogen (Edgar, 1999; Rutherford et al., 
1989). There is debate as to whether a nitrogen-only management strategy is appropriate 
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(see Morgenstern et al. (2015), Abell et al. (2016) and Smith et al. (2015) for 
commentary on this debate), but the current policies are written only to address nitrogen 
leaching from farms. It should be noted, however, that Rotorua’s Proposed Plan Change 
10 does address phosphorus mitigation in the watershed, but not as a part of the rules for 
farmers (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 2016, p. 10). 
The differences in the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles do have implications for 
nutrient management behavior on farms that should be taken into account when 
comparing the impact of policy on behavior between these three regions. The primary 
difference, from a management perspective, is that phosphorus’ main transport pathway 
off the farm is through soil erosion and overland water flow, whereas nitrogen’s primary 
transport pathway off the farm is through sub-surface flow, such as leaching into 
groundwater (Carpenter et al., 1998; Mcdowell et al., 2009). In both cases, managing 
fertilizer inputs and timing is an important mechanism for managing nutrient loses form 
the farm system. However, nutrient management behaviors that target transport factors 
from farm systems will have differential impacts on nitrogen leaching and phosphorus 
runoff.  
4.4.2 Data Collection 
We completed a total of 38 semi-structured interviews with farmers as shown in Table 
4-2. New Zealand interviews were completed between June and August, 2016 and 
Vermont, USA interviews were completed between February, 2017 and September, 2018. 
It is important to note that while the number of interviews between each region is fairly 
balanced, the number of farmers interviewed in Vermont represents a much smaller 
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proportion of the farming population in Vermont compared to the proportion represented 
by our sample in Taupo and Rotorua. An interview protocol was used as a basis for the 
semi-structured interviews. Farmers were asked about their farm system, any changes 
they have made to managing nutrients on their farm in the last 5-10 years, the drivers of 
those changes, and their perceptions of the broader water quality and policy context in the 
watershed (see Appendix 2 Table 5-7 for interview protocol). Interview duration ranged 
between 30 minutes and 3 hours and were conducted by the lead author. Each transcript 
was recorded and transcribed. Prior to conducting interviews, we received an exempt 
certification for the research from the University of Vermont’s Institutional Review 
Board.  
Table 4-2. Interview sample across regional policy contexts 
    Region 
Farmers interviewed All Vermont Taupo Rotorua 
Total  38 16 11 11 
By farm type         
Dairy 23 11 3 9 
Beef, cattle or deer 15 5 8 2 
Vegetable 1 1 0 0 
By farm size         
Small  11 11 0 0 
Medium  12 4 4 4 
Large 15 1 7 7 
 
Farmer participants were selected using maximum variation sampling to 
purposely interview participants that represented a diversity of farm systems types (e.g. 
dairy, beef cattle, sheep, vegetable) and farm sizes (e.g. small, medium, large following 
Vermont’s farm size categories referenced above) in an effort to capture the breadth of 
experiences (Morse, 2010). To recruit participants, we worked with key individuals in 
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each region, including agricultural extension agents and regional government employees 
to identify an initial list of potential participants. Following this initial contact list, we 
used snowball sampling to recruit additional participants and, in Vermont only, reached 
out to the agricultural community to recruit participants through the Vermont Agency of 
Agriculture, Food and Market’s monthly newsletter and the Vermont Farm Bureau.  
4.4.3 Data Analysis 
Interview Coding 
Interview transcripts were analyzed using directed (i.e. theory-driven) 
qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) in NVivo 12 (QSR International 
Pty Ltd, 2018), followed by network analysis of codes and their relationships to identify 
themes (Pokorny et al., 2018). We use the SES Framework (Ostrom, 2009) to examine 
the interactions between nutrient management drivers, including governance dynamics, 
farmer attributes, farm system dynamics and nutrient dynamics, as shown above in Figure 
4-1. The interaction of interest for this study is the farmers’ nutrient management 
behavior. We also examined how drivers and behaviors relate to farmers’ perception of 
individual and watershed level outcomes.  
We used del Mar Delgado-Serrano and Ramos’ (2015) definition of variables in 
the SES Framework as a starting point for the content analysis. From there the content 
analysis proceeded as an inductive and deductive process, identifying behaviors, drivers 
and outcomes and the relationships between them for each interview. We also allowed for 
sub-categories to emerge in the coding process that were not present in del Mar Delgado-
Serrano and Ramos’ (2015) articulation of the SES framework to capture the full range of 
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relevant drivers, behaviors and outcomes. For example, we differentiated between 
individual-level and watershed-level outcomes, a distinction not made in Ostrom (2009) 
or del Mar Delgado-Serrano and Ramos’ (2015) use of the SES framework. 
Differentiating between levels of outcomes allowed us to capture variation in individual’s 
own personal experience of the policy and their perception of community outcomes. 
Following the SES Framework, we differentiate between social, economic and ecological 
outcomes. We also coded outcomes according to the farmer’s stated or implied valence of 
the outcome. See Appendix 2 Table 5-8 for the full codebook used in the analysis, 
description of codes, and representative quotes. 
To capture farmers’ nutrient management behavior we coded any self-reported 
change in nutrient management behavior in the last 5-10 years or concrete, planned 
changes to occur in the next two years. We categorized nutrient management behavior 
change into one of three categories: management changes, structural changes, or system 
changes, as defined in Table 4-3. Our constructed categories reflect a spectrum in capital 
expense and time commitment required to make the changes, as well as the reversibility 
of the changes (e.g. management changes are generally less capital/time intensive and 
more reversible compared to structural, and structural are generally less so than system). 
The spectrum also captures variation in the potential change in nutrient loss that one 
would expect to see from a nutrient management change.  
Management changes can be very impactful in achieving nutrient reductions as 
they can represent a direct reduction in the amount of nutrients mobilized in a watershed, 
for example through reducing nutrient inputs in fertilizer amounts. However, 
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management changes are likely to hit a limit in potential nutrient reductions without 
changing other farm dynamics due to farm production needs. Structural changes, such as 
riparian buffers, water detainment berms, or new manure pits reduce nutrient inputs 
mainly through mitigating nutrient runoff or leaching. For example, riparian bank buffers 
work by capturing phosphorus before it enters the stream ecosystem. However, research 
has shown that it is possible for buffers over time to become saturated with phosphorus 
and actually transition to a source of phosphorus entering streams (Dodd & Sharpley, 
2016). In most cases, structural changes adjust nutrient pathways on the farm and not the 
overall amount of nutrients used. System changes, conversely, usually impact the overall 
quantity of nutrients used on the farm through changing the amount required for farm 
production needs and therefore represent the highest potential for nutrient reduction. 
Table 4-3. Categories of nutrient management behavior changes on farms 
Category  Definition  Examples of changes in category 
Management  Changes that effect crop or animal 
types, plus anything else related to 
soil and animal management 
Includes changes in timing and amount of 
fertilizer application, timing and types of 
cropping, stocking rate of animals, type and 
amount of feed, and wintering animals on or off 
Structural Physical or infrastructure changes 
to farm 
Includes installation of buffers on the side of 
fields, fencing out animals, new milking parlor, 
new effluent system, water retention bunds, and 
animal stand-off pad 
System Change in overall farm system 
dynamics, including type of 
animal/product and expansion or 
contraction of land base 
Includes transition in farm type between dairy, 
beef and sheep, sheep milking, forestry, other 
types, transition to organic or grass-based 
system, land retirement, purchase of new land, 
and sale of land 
 
As discussed above, the distinction between managing nitrogen and phosphorus is 
important in that it suggests a different set of management or structural practices will be 
relevant for each nutrient. However, the categorization of behaviors used here should 
capture a range of behaviors appropriate for both nitrogen and phosphorus management. 
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In other words, managing options for nitrogen and phosphorus on farms both include 
management, structural and system changes, and we’d expect the trends of capital 
intensity, reversibility and potential nutrient reduction associated with the different 
categories of nutrient management changes to hold true regardless of nutrient.  
Network Analysis 
We grouped coded interviews by region (Taupo, Rotorua and Vermont) and 
used NVivo 12’s matrix query tool to export aggregate, weighted, nondirectional 
(symmetrical) adjacency matrices for each region. Following methods adapted from 
Hoffman et al. (2014) and Pokorny et al. (2018), adjacency matrices for each region were 
imported into R version 3.5.1 (R Core Team, 2018) and analyzed as group mental model 
network graphs using the igraph package (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006).  
The adjacency matrices report the co-occurrence of drivers, behaviors and 
outcomes in the grouped interviews for a region.  To co-occur, two or more codes must 
have been assigned to the same portion of text. In the aggregate matrices for each region, 
the weight of the relationship between codes represents the number of farmers in that 
region that reported a connection between two concepts. When translated into a network 
graph, each node represents a concept (i.e. SES driver, behavior or outcome), the link 
between them represents a connection between those concepts and the weight of the link 
represents the number of participants in a region who made the connection between the 
two concepts.  
Regional group mental model networks were analyzed using simple network 
node statistics, again following Hoffman et al. (2014) and Pokorny et al. (2018). Each 
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node in the network graph is evaluated by occurrence probability and strength. The 
occurrence probability of a node represents the likelihood that a node is included in the 
network. It is calculated, following Hoffman et al. (2014) as the ratio of farmers that 
mentioned the node to the total number of farmers in a region’s sample. In our analysis, 
this represents the extent to which a node resonates across a regional sample. Strength 
represents a combination of the occurrence probability of a node and the number of nodes 
that a node is connected to (i.e. the “degree” in network statistics). Strength represents 
both the breadth and prominence of influence of a node. It is the sum of the weights of 
links for all links connected to a node (Csardi & Nepusz, 2006). We analyzed each of the 
regions’ group mental models separately and below interpret themes and results using 
representative quotes from interviews. Further, to examine which SES subcategories were 
most influential in driving nutrient management behavior, we analyzed a subset graph 
with only drivers and behaviors (i.e. no outcomes) to isolate the connections between 
drivers and behaviors. In this subset graph, we then ranked drivers in each region by node 
strength and report on driver rankings. The network visualizations for each of the three 
regions, including a network with just high-level SES categories and a more detailed 
network with SES subcategories are in Appendix 2 Figure 5-2 to Figure 5-7. 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Behavior Changes 
Farmers across all regions reported making a number of behavior changes 
relevant to nutrient dynamics on their farms. As shown in Table 4-4, on average, farmers 
in Vermont made 5.81 behavior changes each, farmers in Taupo made 4.55 behavior 
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changes each and farmers in Rotorua made 3.64 behavior changes each. Farmers across 
all three regions made management changes, but Taupo farmers also favored system 
changes (versus structural changes), whereas Vermont farmers favored structural 
changes. Rotorua farmers do not show a preference for structural versus system changes. 
Table 4-4. Count of nutrient management changes and average number of behavior changes per 
person by Region 
  Taupo (n = 11)   Vermont (n = 16)   Rotorua (n = 11) 
Behavior change Count Average   Count Average   Count Average 
Management changes 33 3.00  46 2.88  19 1.73 
Structural changes 4 0.36  40 2.50  14 1.27 
System changes 19 1.73  10 0.63  11 1.00 
Total changes 50 4.55   93 5.81   40 3.64 
 
 We examined counts of specific changes by behavior category as described 
below. Some behaviors are specific to each region and agricultural systems. These 
practices include soil sampling (VT), no-till (VT), manure spreading (VT), putting in a 
new barn or updating barn structures to mitigate runoff (VT), and grazing animals off of 
pasture or farm for a period time to reduce nutrient leaching (NZ). 
Management Changes 
The top two management categories for all three regions are seeding varieties/ 
cropping changes and fertilizer changes as shown in Figure 4-2. Reduced animal stocking 
rate was a relatively common management change in Taupo and Rotorua, but no farmers 
in Vermont reduced animal numbers on their farm. Only Vermont farmers and one 
Rotorua farmer started nutrient management planning and soil sampling. Across all three 
regions we see a small number of farmers engaging in learning or pursuing nutrient 
management knowledge. All of the behaviors noted thus far would be considered 
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behaviors in the intended direction, i.e. leading to reductions in nutrient use or intensity. 
We do, however, see two categories of management behavior change with increased 
nutrient use: increased fertilizer use and increased stocking rate. In Taupo and Vermont, 
one and two farms respectively increased fertilizer use, and just two farms in Vermont 
also increased the stocking rate, i.e. the number of animal units on their farm. 
 
Figure 4-2. Number of Management changes by region 
 
Structural Changes 
As shown in Figure 4-3, Vermont farmers made the most structural changes. 
The structural changes in common across the three regions are fencing and purchasing 
new equipment (e.g. more efficient irrigator). The top structural changes for Vermont 
were buffers and setbacks, manure pit or pad upgrades, leachate systems and water flow 
control structures. In Rotorua, manure pits or pad upgrades was the top structural change. 
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In Taupo, relatively few structural changes were made. Those that were made included 
milking parlor upgrades (one farmer), equipment upgrade (one farmer) and fencing (two 
farmers). 
 
Figure 4-3. Number of Structural Changes by Region 
 
System Changes 
The top system changes across all three regions were switching to a lower 
intensity farm system and the purchase or lease of new land. In Vermont, three farmers 
transitioned to lower intensity, i.e. lower nutrient input, grass-fed and organic dairies. In 
Rotorua, four farms retired land into forestry or transitioned to sheep and cattle from 
dairy grazing. Finally, in Taupo, six farms retired land into pine plantation or native 
plantings or transitioned to beef finishing systems from dairy support or cattle breeding 
operations. Figure 4-4 shows the counts of system changes reported by farmers in each of 
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the three regions in the study. Taupo and Rotorua farmers report the sale and ceasing of 
leasing land, but Vermont farmers do not. Although it should be noted that two of the 
farmers that sold land in Taupo also purchased land in the watershed, so they do not 
represent an exit from farming in the watershed. Importantly, there are three instances 
where farmers shifted to a higher intensity farm system in Rotorua and Taupo including 
transitions to dairy, sheep milking and cattle breeding operations. Similarly, in Vermont 
there were two cases in which a farmer transitioned land from forestry into agricultural 
production. These transitions represent an increase in potential negative water quality 
impacts via nutrient runoff and leaching. 
 
Figure 4-4. Number of Systems Changes by Region 
 
4.5.2. Behavioral Drivers 
Overall, Taupo and Vermont farmers referenced 19 different SES sub-categories as 
behavioral drivers, whereas Rotorua farmers referenced 16 (see Appendix 2 Table 5-9 for 
full list of driver nodes by region and Appendix 2 Table 5-10 for a list of ranked driver 
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nodes by region). As such, not all SES subcategory drivers were present in each of the 
regions. However, in general, farmers in each region referenced many of the same 
drivers. Table 4-5 lists the key SES drivers across all three regions and their node 
statistics in each region. We define key drivers as those drivers that ranked in the top five 
drivers by strength in at least one region.   
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Table 4-5. Key behavioral driver node statistics. Key drivers are those that are ranked by strength in 
the top five of drivers in at least one of the three regions. Strength captures both the number of other 
nodes a node is connected to in the network and the number of individuals that mentioned each 
connection. Occurrence probability represents the proportion of individuals in a region that 
mentioned a node. Lack of statistics for a node in a region means that a node was not mentioned in 
the region.  
 
 
Node description Node statistics Taupo Vermont Rotorua 
Water quality 
policy 
(governance) 
The specific water quality policy in 
each region (i.e. Taupo's Variation 
5, Vermont's Act 64 and the RAPs 
and Rotorua's Rule 11 and 
Proposed Plan Change 10) 
Rank 1 2 1 
Strength 88 58 42 
Occurrence 
probability 
100% 94% 100% 
Government 
assistance 
(governance) 
Technical or financial assistance 
from a government agency/entity 
Rank 10 1 4 
Strength 9 74 14 
Occurrence 
probability 
18% 88% 45% 
Economics (actor) 
Any considerations tied to a farm 
or farmer’s economic situation, 
e.g. income, debt and economic 
efficiency of farm 
Rank 2 5 2 
Strength 49 21 2 
Occurrence 
probability 
91% 50% 64% 
Ecological 
(resource system) 
Existence, mitigation or prevention 
of erosion, runoff, drought, 
flooding etc. 
Rank 5 4 3 
Strength 31 31 17 
Occurrence 
probability 
45% 44% 55% 
Nitrogen market 
(social, economic, 
political setting) 
Purchase or sale of nitrogen in 
Taupo's  nitrogen market or future 
purchase or sale in Rotorua's 
nitrogen market 
Rank 3 - 10 
Strength 42 - 2 
Occurrence 
probability 
82% - 9% 
NGOs or other 
organizations 
(governance) 
Interactions with non-
governmental entities including 
extension, watershed programs, 
land trusts, and research 
organizations and universities  
Rank 11 3 6 
Strength 7 48 6 
Occurrence 
probability 
9% 75% 36% 
Economics and 
markets (social, 
economic, political 
setting) 
 Broader market and economic 
dynamics including prices, market 
access and competition 
Rank 4 8 8 
Strength 40 9 5 
Occurrence 
probability 
82% 44% 9% 
Nitrogen and 
phosphorus 
attributes (resource 
units) 
Attributes of nitrogen and 
phosphorus and the movement of 
these nutrients in the landscape and 
farm system 
Rank 8 12 5 
Strength 16 2 11 
Occurrence 
probability 
27% 6% 27% 
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Governance Drivers 
Water quality policy is the top ranked behavior driver in Taupo and Rotorua, and 
the second in Vermont. In both Taupo and Rotorua, the occurrence probability is 100%, 
which means that every farmer interviewed referenced water quality policy as a driver of 
behavior. In Vermont, similarly, we see a very high occurrence probability of 94%. The 
following three quotes, one from each region, demonstrate the influence of each region’s 
water quality policy on behavior: 
 
“Some of my land, I’m on the early spreading ban. Due to the new RAPs I 
got to hit [by] them in the midsummer, so we’re changing the way we got 
to do things, a little bit. We’ll see in a few years. Hopefully, it’ll benefit.” 
– Vermont Farmer 
 
“But when Rule 11 came in… we [got rid of] 230 cows and 2 full time 
jobs. That was a result of [the water quality policy]. Because we were 
leasing land. We were leasing land and then with the [the water quality 
policy] we needed to get out of the catchment, which we’ve done.” – 
Rotorua Farmer 
 
“We bought the farm and farmed it for a couple of years and through 
consultation process, it was pretty obvious that it was going to be capped, 
and it might be worse than that, we weren't sure what was going to come 
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out of that…So we decided after a lot of soul-searching that we would 
sell.” – Taupo Farmer 
 
In Vermont, instead of water quality policy, government agency assistance has the 
highest driver strength rating for nutrient management behavior change in the group 
mental model and an occurrence probability of 88%. In Rotorua, government agency 
assistance is also relatively influential, ranked 4th amongst behavior drivers with an 
occurrence probability of 45%, however, in Taupo, it is ranked 10th, with an occurrence 
probability of only 18%. Farmers in Vermont reported government agency assistance 
mainly from the US Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Natural Resources and 
Conservation Service (NRCS) programs that give financial assistance for adopting, 
upgrading or installing new practices/structures on the farm, as well as technical 
assistance and advice form NRCS agents. In Rotorua, farmers referenced some financial 
assistance from the Bay of Plenty Regional Council to install physical structures on their 
farms such as fencing or water detainment berms, as well as funding to write farm 
management plans. The following quote represents the strong influence that NRCS 
played in driving behavior change for many Vermont farmers in the sample:  
 
“So, [NRCS agent] just stopped in one day and they’re non-regulatory. It 
was just a total social visit and I said, “Well, I’ve got some concerns”…. 
So, we sat down and he said, “Well, let’s go around and just look at things 
if you want. No commitment.” …So, when I started explaining the 
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concerns of the stream bank erosion and stuff and you know he had 
always been a supporter of conservation stuff anyway. So, he really 
listened to me and said, “Yeah, let’s go for it. Let’s do it.” So, [the USDA 
NRCS’ Environmental Quality Incentives Program] project is maxed out 
at $250,000.00 at the time. Well, we maxed it out.” – Vermont Farmer 
 
NGOs and other organizations ranked third amongst behavioral drivers in Vermont, 
sixth in Rotorua and eleventh in Taupo. Seventy five percent of farmers in Vermont 
referenced technical assistance from the University of Vermont (UVM) agricultural 
extension and organic certification programs, or financial assistance from watershed 
programs and land trusts as drivers of their nutrient management behavior changes. One 
Vermont farmer noted a sentiment about UVM extension, that was shared by many in the 
Vermont farmer sample, in regard to beginning to take soil samples: “I went to Extension 
yesterday…They’re really, really helpful.” In Rotorua, only 27% of farmers cited NGO 
and other organizations as behavior change drivers, but they included similar categories of 
organizations, such as land trusts, research organizations like AgResearch and industry 
extension like DairyNZ. The other two governance nodes - other government policies and 
participation in a farmer group - were not listed in the top five of behavioral drivers in any 
region. 
Actor Drivers 
 Actor economics was an important driver across all three regions. This node 
encompasses any considerations tied to a farm or farmer’s economic situation as opposed 
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to broader market considerations like price. Other actor sub-category behavior drivers, 
representing different attributes of the individual farmers interviewed, were not listed 
amongst the top five behavioral drivers in each region, although some still varied quite 
considerably in their influence between regions. These other actor drivers include ethic, 
flexibility, leadership or entrepreneur, lifestyle, past experience, social attributes and 
technology. 
Actor economics, in terms of node strength, ranked second in Taupo, second in 
Rotorua, and fifth in Vermont. However, occurrence probability did vary quite 
significantly between the regions, with 91% of the farmer sample in Taupo citing actor 
economic drivers compared with only 64% and 50% of the farmer samples in Rotorua 
and Vermont. Actor economic drivers were phrased in similar language across all three 
regions. For example, in Vermont, one farmer noted in reference to transitioning forested 
land into agricultural land, “really, for me the biggest driver is getting the most out of 
every dollar.”  Similarly, in Rotorua, when explaining the reason for reducing the use of 
nitrogen fertilizer, a farmer stated, “I mean, it was just around maximizing profit.” 
Finally, in Taupo, one farmer described their reason for leasing out their land as “three 
things, money, money and money.” 
Resource System and Resource Unit Drivers 
Ecological drivers, such as drought, flooding and erosion, were in the top five of 
behavioral drives across all three regions. In Rotorua ecological drivers were ranked 3rd, 
including protecting native species, minimizing runoff, and reducing erosion. In 
Vermont, ecological drivers were ranked 4th including soil health, minimizing runoff, 
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stabilizing streambanks, concerns over water quality and controlling erodible soils. 
Lastly, In Taupo, ecological drivers were ranked 5th, with many farmers noting multiple 
years of drought as driving behavior. Farm production needs were not listed as a key 
behavioral driver in any of the three regions. 
 Nitrogen and phosphorus attributes were ranked relatively higher in Rotorua (5th) 
and Taupo (8th) than Vermont (12th). Only one farmer interviewed in Vermont referenced 
attributes of nitrogen and phosphorus as driving behavior (i.e. not the policies treatment 
of nitrogen and phosphorus, but the specifics of the nutrients cycling), corresponding to a 
6% probability of occurrence in the sample. Whereas, a small subset of farmers in 
Rotorua and Taupo demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of nitrogen or 
phosphorus dynamics and cited this as a driver of behavior change. For example, one 
Taupo farmer said: “we have also learned that we stop leaching here below the root zone 
about the middle of October. So we put no fertilizer on until after that date.  We do not 
use any nitrogen fertilizer.  We fertilize to grow clover, and clover is fixing according to 
scientists and according to overseer modeling, we are fixing between 250 and 300 kg of 
nitrogen per hectare per annum.”  
 
Social, Economic, and Political Setting Drivers 
The nitrogen market sub-category is very influential as a behavioral driver in 
Taupo, but practically non-existent as a driver in Rotorua and not present as a driver for 
Vermont. This code was specific to the existing nitrogen market in Taupo that existed as 
a part of the water quality policy as a voluntary nitrogen trading market. The nitrogen 
market is ranked 3rd as a behavioral driver in Taupo, with an occurrence probability of 
124 
 
82%. One farmer in Rotorua referenced concrete plans to sell nitrogen to the newly 
formed nitrogen market in Rotorua, and there is no current market in Vermont.  
Broader economic and market drivers, such as price, market access and 
competition were ranked 4th as a behavioral driver in the Taupo region and 8th in both 
Vermont and Rotorua. The ranking, however, doesn’t quite capture the variance in 
probability occurrence, which was 82% in Taupo, 44% in Vermont and only 9% in 
Rotorua. The other four social, economic and political setting drivers were ranked 
relatively low across the three regions in terms of behavioral influence. These include 
social context, industry or consultant advice, demographic shifts and carbon market.  
4.5.3. Outcomes 
Farmers across all three regions reported individual- and watershed-level social, 
economic and ecological outcomes related to behavioral changes and the policy process 
across the spectrum from negative to neutral to positive.  
Individual Outcomes 
At the individual level, Taupo farmers reported both more negative and positive 
economic outcomes on average than Rotorua and Vermont farmers in the sample. 
Negative economic outcome sub-categories at the individual level included compliance 
costs, farm viability, financial impacts, and impacts to farm economic flexibility. For 
example, one Vermont farmer referenced a negative financial impact related to 
requirements under the water quality policy, when they said: “The biggest problem I have 
is we have to put a leachate system in. Ugh. It’s an $81,000.00 project, which I don’t 
think is even needed,” but later clarified that they wouldn’t pay the full cost of the project. 
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Similarly, positive economic outcomes for individuals include the sub-categories of 
positive farm viability, positive financial impacts, positive farm economic flexibility and 
access to new markets. In terms of positive individual financial outcomes, one Taupo 
farmer said in terms of the impact of the water quality policy on their farm business: “To 
me it’s been a windfall. We bought land cheaper. We made some very clever smart 
moves, so it’s opened up huge opportunities for me as a person.” A number of farmers in 
Vermont and Rotorua mentioned that the water quality policy has not had a significant 
impact in terms of costs of compliance on their farm economically, represented by the 
neutral economic category. Very few Taupo farmers referenced neutral economic 
impacts. 
In terms of individual social outcomes, Vermont farmers on average reported 
more positive individual outcomes than Taupo and Rotorua and less negative social 
outcomes than Taupo and Rotorua. In terms of positive individual social outcomes, 
farmers reported increased knowledge and awareness, non-financial benefits such as 
pride, and recognition for environmental stewardship. For negative individual social 
outcomes, farmers mentioned distrust in regulation, non-financial costs like time, stress 
and mental health impacts, uncertainty in the future of their farming livelihoods and a 
few farmers in Rotorua mentioned feeling like they were unfairly impacted by the water 
quality policy at a personal level.  
At the individual level, no farmers across any of the regions reported negative 
ecological outcomes on their farm as a result of their behavior changes or the water 
quality policy, however, a few farmers in Vermont and Rotorua, but not Taupo, 
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referenced positive ecological change on their farms in terms of pasture or soil quality, 
and water quality.  
Watershed Outcomes 
Similar to individual level outcomes, farmers across all three regions reported 
social, economic and ecological watershed-level outcomes. As shown in Figure 4-5, there 
appears to be much greater variation in perceptions of watershed-level outcomes across 
the three regions.  
 
 
Figure 4-5. Number of watershed outcomes by region. Note for Taupo and Rotorua n = 11 and for Vermont 
n = 16. 
 
Vermont Watershed Outcomes 
In Vermont, relative to Taupo and Rotorua, farmers generally noted more 
perceptions of positive and neutral watershed level outcomes than negative. Vermont 
farmers mentioned increased community awareness, community well-being and fairness 
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as positive social outcomes, and a few reported negative community well-being. One 
farmer described the difficulty a neighbor was facing with the new water quality policy 
regulations: “And, I think it’s too bad. He gets really upset about it. He’s done a really 
good job farming all his life…So, they’re basically forcing him out of business.” In terms 
of watershed economic impacts, only a few Vermont farmers noted negative or positive 
impacts. On the negative side farmers cited challenges to the agricultural community 
operating with low product prices and regulation, while on the positive side farmers cited 
financial viability with cost share assistance and flexibility in the water quality policy 
regulations.  
Eight Vermont farmers perceived positive watershed ecological outcomes, seven 
perceived neutral ecological outcomes and no farmers perceived negative ecological 
outcomes. Most of Vermont farmers’ ecological outcome perceptions related to existence 
or lack of farming management changes on the landscape and not on broader land use 
changes. Vermont farmers in the sample appeared split as to whether management 
changes were being made, with some farmers reflecting that don’t see changes, like one 
Vermont farmer who said, “I go by some of the other farms that do some of the things 
they do, I go, “What the heck? How do they get away with that?” Other farmers were 
optimistic in their outlook for water quality from land use changes, like this Vermont 
farmer who said, “I see the bigger farms – a lot of them are doing cover crops where they 
never did before.” 
Taupo Watershed Outcomes 
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 In the Lake Taupo watershed, similar to the individual level outcomes, farmers’ 
perceptions were polarized, with high numbers of positive and negative outcomes. In 
many cases these were the same farmers. Socially, we see that every farmer mentioned at 
least one negative outcome of the water quality policy, either along the lines of fairness 
of the policy or community well-being. One Taupo farmer reflected on the policy process 
by remembering that the “uncertainty emotionally and mentally [was] shocking. It 
demotivated farmers, a lot of farmers were depressed because they didn't see a lot of 
hope.” Many farmers mentioned other farmers selling their farm and leaving the 
catchment during the policy process. For the large number of relatively low intensity 
Maori farms in the catchment, farmers expressed that the policy was unfair, as one farmer 
reflected, “And being a lot of Maori owned land they went overly heavy about it because 
it sort of hindered what they could do with their land further down the track.” 
Conversely, a number of farmers reported neutral and positive social outcomes, seven 
and four farmers respectively. Neutral watershed social perceptions included acceptance 
of the policy, a desire to “just get on with it.” Positive Taupo social watershed outcomes 
included flexibility from nitrogen trading and the ability to sell nitrogen to the trust, 
which was seen as a positive outcome for Maori farms to allow them to liquidate capital 
without selling property. Except for freehold land purchased by Māori individuals, Māori 
cannot sell land. 
  Perceptions of watershed economic impacts in Taupo varied greatly amongst the 
farmer sample, with 6 farmers each reflecting on positive and negative economic impacts, 
with two reflecting neutral impacts. One farmer explained how the policy negatively 
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limits their farm’s economic potential: “Essentially, under this process we can't grow any 
more meat per hectare, our livestock numbers are capped at 2004 levels, and cost 
inexorably keep growing.” On the positive side, one farmer reflected on farm viability in 
Taupo when they mentioned that “the beauty about farming in here is that you've got a 
resource that comes in for 25 years. Now, I'd argue that there is nowhere in New Zealand 
that you’ve got a license to farm for 25 years.”  
 Ecologically, perceptions of watershed outcomes in Taupo also varied greatly, 
with farmers again split equal between negative and positive perceptions of ecological 
outcomes. On the positive side, farmers perceived of the policy technically as a success, 
purchasing nitrogen out of the catchment, changing land use to reduce nitrogen leaching, 
and capping nitrogen in the watershed and in some cases farmers thought the lake was 
clearing up. There appeared to be some disagreement amongst farmers as to whether the 
policy achieved its ecological goals. One farmer said that the best thing the policy “did 
[was] stop intensification of dairy farming coming close to the lake,” while another 
farmer reflected that the policy didn’t do “what they were hoping it would do which was 
halt dairy farming.” Some farmers reflected negatively upon the fact that new dairy 
farmers were able to come into the watershed under the policy and intensify through 
purchasing nitrogen credits from other farmers. Additionally, many farmers reflected 
negatively upon the transition of much of the landscape from pastoral agricultural to pine 
planation, a lower nitrogen leaching land use, under the water quality policy. As one 
Taupo farmer reflected: “All that now is getting developed…That should never ever be 
put into trees, and it is going to end up having trees. That is wrong.”  
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Rotorua Watershed Outcomes 
 In Rotorua, farmers in the sample in general perceived more positive ecological 
watershed outcomes, more negative social impacts and only negative economic impacts 
of the water quality policy process. Economically, seven farmers reported that the policy 
process has resulted in a steep decline in investment in farming in the watershed and the 
perception that for farming “financially, it’s not doable” to achieve future nutrient 
reductions required under the policy. In terms of social impact, nine farmers perceived 
negative social impacts at the watershed scale including impacts on community well-
being and perceived fairness of the policy. According to one Rotorua Farmer, the policy 
process has been emotionally difficult: “So, I think – but it’s like grievance; this – this 
phase is the angry phase, and then acceptance might come because that’s what 
happened…in the Taupo catchment like I say.” Rotorua farmers reported that the policy 
is unfair towards farms and that the urban share of the burden is being overlooked. 
Furthermore Rotorua farmers expressed frustration that previous actions to reduce 
phosphorus runoff that they have undertaken voluntarily have not been given enough 
credit under the new policy. A few farmers, four each, noted positive and neutral social 
outcomes. One farmer noted that as a result of the policy community awareness and well-
being has risen: “Well, farmers have become aware of the environmental impacts that 
farming has on the waterways and the lakes. So, yeah. Actually, I think that probably the 
biggest plus out of it is actually talking to your neighbor, and working with your 
neighbor, and seeing what they’re doing.” 
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In terms of ecological outcomes, seven Rotorua farmers perceived positive 
ecological outcomes, with two perceptions of neutral outcomes and just one negative. 
One the positive side, one farmer suggested that the policy has halted land use 
intensification: “I think possibly there might have been a few more farms convert to 
dairy, or in that time period, had [the water quality policy] not been there.” In some 
cases farmers reported that “most farmers have done small changes to improve areas” 
whereas others perceived that “the land use, land use change, in the catchment, has been 
minor.” While a number of Rotorua farmers noted positive ecological outcomes, similar 
to Vermont, the outcomes were mostly around management changes, not land use 
change.  
4.6. Discussion 
4.6.1. Differential Behavior Outcomes 
From the perspective of fit and functioning of the mandatory water quality policy in the 
three focal regions, farmers in the sample reported changing nutrient management 
behavior mostly in the intended direction (i.e. reduced nutrient loading). The actions of 
these farmers should improve water quality over time in line with the goals of the policy. 
The first clear take-away on behavior is that management changes are the low-hanging 
fruit and farmers interviewed across all three regions have made on average 2-3 types of 
management changes. Management changes, as defined in Table 4-3 are relatively 
inexpensive compared to structural and system changes, more reversible if they fail to 
work and do not necessarily require major time or financial investments. 
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  The difference in structural and system changes between the regions, and in 
particular the dominance of structural changes in Vermont compared to the dominance of 
system changes in Taupo amongst our sample, may have long term implications for water 
quality impacts. As described above, system change are likely to be associated with a 
larger range of potential nutrient change because it is likely that system changes to lower 
intensity systems will change nutrient dynamics more significantly than structural 
changes. This suggests that although Vermont shows the highest reported behavior 
change per person in our sample, the high levels of system change reported by farmers in 
our sample may ultimately be associated with greater water quality improvements. 
 
4.6.2. Water Quality Policy Interplay with SES Context 
The reason for the dominance of structural versus system changes in Vermont 
and Taupo in our sample is likely due to the design of each of the policies, as well as the 
broader SES context represented by the drivers. There are major differences in how the 
policy appears to interplay with the SES context according to each of the regions’ group 
mental models.  
In Vermont the top three behavioral drivers are government agency assistance, 
the water quality policy and NGOs or other organizations. It is notable that Vermont is 
the only region in which the water quality policy is not reported as the main driver of 
behavior. In essence, Vermont farmers described an incentive-based SES context that 
supports farmers with financial and technical assistance to adopt new management and 
structural nutrient management practices with a regulatory backstop. This aligns broadly 
with the United States’ strong financial support for farmers through subsidies and cost 
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share programs. The design of the practice-based policy, requiring specific practices on 
farms, also aligns with the program structure of NRCS and other pre-existing programs to 
pay farmers a cost share to adopt similar practices. As a result, there are very little system 
change happening in Vermont, at least among those that we interviewed. Further, the 
heavy role of incentives in the SES context shapes the outcomes for farmers with a lack 
of negative social and economic impacts. Relative to Taupo and Rotorua, actor 
economics is ranked lower in Vermont suggesting that farmers have the financial ability 
to make management and structural changes with the existing financial assistance. In 
terms of ecological and long-term water quality outcomes, we see mixed perceptions 
about whether the policy is actually having an effect. Farmers interviewed were split 
between positive and neutral perceptions of land management changes, and there was not 
any discussion of big, landscape scale changes.  
In Taupo, the water quality policy is reported as the main behavioral driver, 
coupled with farmer economics and the voluntary nitrogen market component of the 
policy amongst our farmer sample group mental model. The voluntary nitrogen market 
appears to promote system changes as opposed to structural changes and with the 
performance-based policy, structures do not “count” in the policy in the way they do in 
Vermont. Furthermore, there are not programs to assist farmers in purchasing or 
upgrading infrastructure due to the lack of agricultural subsidies. To adapt to the 
performance cap, famers in our sample sold nitrogen and used the capital to restructure 
their farm system. In Taupo, both actor economics and broader economics and markets 
are important drivers. This reflects two polarized experiences: first, many farmers are at 
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the margin economically and do not have access to financial assistance to offset new risks 
and exposures and second, some farmers benefitted greatly under the new policy regime 
and were able to take advantage of the opportunity to further their economic situation. 
For many farmers in the first situation in our sample, we see that the new policy has 
fostered entrepreneurship and innovation in a way that was not seen in the other two 
regions. In Taupo, farmers are experimenting with new farm system types, such as sheep 
milking and new branding/marketing strategies to make up for their inability to intensify. 
Similarly, Taupo farmers report polarized impacts from the policy with farmers who 
gained significantly, farmers who struggled and very few in-between.  
Finally, in Rotorua, our study captured a time of high uncertainty with a strong 
policy signal. Rotorua’s farmers cited fewer drivers than the other two regions and fewer 
behavior changes. However, the water quality policy was reported as the top driver of 
behavior change in the region, suggesting that even though just a policy signal (i.e. not 
operation), the proposed rules were perceived as changing behavior. The high role of 
actor economics reflects that farms are pursuing changes that are low hanging fruit, while 
evaluating the potential economic impact of future changes. It is possible that once the 
policy is operational, Rotorua will look more like Taupo, with the nitrogen market 
playing a central role and more system changes as a result. Unlike Taupo, the regional 
council in Rotorua has played a role in giving cost share and technical assistance to farms 
to install some structures, mainly fencing and detainment berms on farms in the past ten 
years. However, there is not cost share available for practice adoption under the new 
policy. As a result, we see highly negative perceptions of social and economic outcomes 
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in Rotorua amongst our sample. Interestingly, some farmers reported positive ecological 
outcomes as a result of land management changes, but again like Vermont, these were not 
perceived as broad landscape changes. 
4.6.3. Opportunities for Water Quality Policy Fit and Interplay 
Comparing across the three regions, a key takeaway is that in one way or 
another, farmers needed financial access or assistance to achieve structural or system 
changes. In Vermont, farmers used financial assistance and cost share to make changes, 
in Taupo farmers sold nitrogen to enable system change, and in Rotorua, without a 
functioning nitrogen market or extensive financial assistance options, there were much 
lower levels of structural and system change.  
Resource system and resource unit drivers represent interesting opportunities for 
policy. Ecological drivers across the three regions played a role in nutrient management 
decisions under water quality policy. Aligning nutrient management changes with 
ecological functioning on farm, such as drought tolerance or reducing erosion, appears to 
be an important component of behavior change. Further, the role of nitrogen and 
phosphorus attributes, was a relatively low ranked driver across all three regions, but 
particularly low in Vermont. This is surprising given that farmers in Vermont reported 
high levels of nutrient management plan adoption, which is intended to improve 
efficiency in nutrient use and improve farmers understanding of nutrients in their farm 
system (Beegle et al., 2000). In Taupo and Rotorua, the requirement to model the farm 
system and staying under a nutrient cap appears to have, in at least a few cases improved 
farmer understanding of nutrient dynamics in a way that has changed behavior. Some 
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Taupo farmers reported a change in mentality on their farm system to evaluating 
efficiency as “dollars profit per kilogram of nitrogen leached.” 
Finally, we’d like to end with a point raised by a Taupo farmer when asked about 
benefits of the water quality policy: 
 “I'm nervous about the question, because a lot of research is predicated 
on the assumption that you can continue to improve and you can continue 
to reduce your environmental impact and continue to increase your 
production. No. The lesson from this is that you can't. We shut down 30% 
of the farmland in the catchment, those trees that you drove past.  We 
spent $80 million shutting down those farms.  There is nothing on the 
science horizon that will allow those farms to continue, and to look after 
the lake. So we have to get real with these conversations” – Taupo Farmer 
As this Taupo Farmer suggests, conversations around agriculture and water 
quality need to acknowledge the true environmental costs of agricultural production. 
When agricultural production is brought in line with ecological limits, as was the case in 
Taupo, there will most likely be a dramatic social and economic adjustment period for 
farm businesses. While we see relatively lower reports of social and economic impacts in 
Vermont, we also see less certainty in achieving the ecological goals of the policy. This is 
evidenced both by Vermont farmers reliance on structural changes in the region and the 
lack of perceived broad landscape changes. Whereas in Taupo, we see social, economic 
and ecological changes that have caused deep pain, as well as great opportunity and 
innovation. It is likely that Rotorua as reflected here was similar to the Taupo catchment 
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5-8 years prior. Moving forward, policy should acknowledge that win-win solutions may 
not always be possible. To achieve long term water quality goals, policies may require 
significant adjustments to farm systems that align farm production in a watershed with its 
ecological capacity, particularly in highly impaired systems. In these cases, policy design 
should focus on assisting the farming community through a dramatic adjustment period.  
4.7. Conclusion 
Farmer behavior change is a critical element of improving water quality and reducing 
agricultural NPS pollution. In this study we have looked to farmers experience and 
perceptions in three regions facing mandatory rules to curb agricultural NPS pollution.  
Water quality policy, and any policy for that matter, exists within a broader social-
ecological context and the fit and interplay of a policy in that context ultimately 
determines the success of the policy. Farmer mental models, as used here in this study, 
can provide important insight into how behavior is changing across the landscape and 
what combinations of factors are driving it. Our results suggest that policy design 
interacts with the social-ecological context to produce differential patterns of behaviors 
and outcomes, which ultimately may mean differential improvements in water quality. 
Throughout the policy process, attention should be paid to the types of behaviors that are 
important for water quality improvements and the degree of adjustment required by 
farmers to achieve behavior change. Farmers will likely need support to adjust, and it is 
important that support is given for behaviors that will have long term water quality 
impacts, or else there is risk of further regulation down the line. More explicit focus on 
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farmer behavior and experience within water quality policy can allow for improved 
policy design for achieving the ecological goals of the policy. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1. Synthesis of Results 
In this dissertation, I have examined the interaction between water quality policy 
for agricultural NPS pollution and farmer behavior and decision making to improve our 
understanding of if and how policy will improve water quality in agricultural watersheds. 
After defining the problem and my approach in the first chapter, in the second chapter I use 
declining water quality from agricultural NPS pollution as an example case to explore 
ways to improve our analytical study of environmental public goods dilemmas. This 
chapter laid the theoretical foundation for the rest of the dissertation by calling for the need 
to focus greater attention on the link between institutions and behavior in environmental 
public goods dilemmas.  
In the third chapter I built on the theoretical foundation in chapter two to explore 
the impact of new institutional interventions for agricultural NPS pollution (i.e. mandatory 
practice-based and performance-based policies) on farmer nutrient management behavior 
and decision making. The key insights from this chapter are that, in the sample of New 
Zealand farmers in 2015, there was no evidence that mandatory regimes were driving 
increased behavior change amongst farmers when compared to regions without mandatory 
policy. If the key role of these policies are to change behavior, this implies two things: 1) 
we need to keep monitoring behavior to see if it does change over time and 2) we may 
need to consider additional avenues to change behavior within policy regimes. Another key 
insight, however, is that we did see a potential for increased behavior change in the future 
in performance-based regimes and greater alignment between farmer decision making in 
performance-based regimes and their values and beliefs. Therefore, our results suggest that 
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mandatory practice-based policies may not be as effective as performance-based policies in 
achieving long term water quality improvements.  
In the fourth chapter, we analyzed grouped farmer mental models in three 
mandatory water quality policy regimes to evaluate the fit and interplay these policies in 
each context. Here we used the SES Framework as proposed in chapter two to examine 
farmer’s reported behavior change, behavioral drivers and perceived outcomes of the 
policy process. We find in comparing these three regions that policy is reported as a key 
driver of behavior change in each of the regions, but it interacts with other SES dynamics 
to produce different patterns of behavior change and outcomes. In Vermont, USA the 
practice-based mandatory policy interacts with multiple sources of financial and technical 
assistance to drive management behavior changes (e.g. timing and amount of fertilizer 
applications) and structural behavior changes (e.g. upgrade manure pit). Whereas in Taupo, 
New Zealand the performance-based policy combines with a voluntary nitrogen market to 
drive management and system changes (e.g. transition from dairy system to cattle system). 
In Rotorua, New Zealand, we see that despite not having an operational policy yet, the 
signal of the future policy does drive behavior change. However, behavior change is not to 
the same extent as the other two regions, with more management changes than structural 
than system. Based on my analysis of these three regions, I suggest that paying attention to 
the types of behavior change, whether management, structural or system across a landscape 
has implications for water quality improvement. Additionally, we suggest that to achieve 
structural or system change, farmers need financial assistance or access to capital.  
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5.2. Broader Implications 
Taking into account the theoretical and empirical analysis of chapters two, three 
and four, I can make some general conclusions for the study of agricultural NPS pollution. 
First, the social and ecological context of a policy is a critical component driving patterns 
of behavior change and perceived outcomes. Policy design must be tailored to its particular 
social and ecological context and the potential interactions between policy design and other 
behavioral drivers should be accounted for in order to achieve long term water quality 
improvements.  
 Second, the design of a water quality policy impacts farmers’ experience of the 
policy and the potential for long term policy success. Incorporating the social 
psychological aspects of farmer decision making on nutrient management behavior enables 
better understanding of how we can design policy to allow farmers more flexibility and 
autonomy in running their farm systems.  In terms of policy design and behavior change, 
the results from chapter three and four are somewhat contradictory. In chapter three our 
results suggest that policy design does not appear to drive behavior change relative to 
contexts without mandatory policy, but in chapter four farmers strongly perceive water 
quality policy to be a major driver of their changes in behavior. I will return to this 
discrepancy in the next section when I discuss future research directions.  
Finally, acknowledging the links between agricultural NPS pollution policy and 
farmer behavior and decision making allows for deeper and more realistic conversations 
about the tradeoffs between ecological and agricultural productions goals. If we are to 
improve water quality and support farmers, these are the types of frank conversation that 
are required to achieve a fair, socially acceptable and ecologically successful policy. 
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5.3. Future Directions 
The results of this dissertation suggest interesting avenues for future research on 
agricultural NPS pollution policy and environmental public goods dilemmas more broadly. 
As referenced in the previous section, we see different results in chapters three and four on 
the role of water quality policy in driving farmer behavior change. This discrepancy could 
be due, in part, to the different time scales at which the data were collected. The data for 
chapter 3 was collected in 2015, whereas the data for chapter 4 was collected in 2017-
2019. Regardless, this discrepancy calls for a mixed methods approach, combining 
qualitative and quantitative data from the same time period in order to dig deeper into 
farmer decision making and behavior change across policy contexts. This might provide 
new insights in terms of policy design, behavior change, and survey design/qualitative 
approach. 
 Considering the study of environmental public goods dilemmas more broadly, 
including climate change, biodiversity loss and other types of water quality issues, this 
dissertation suggests that an SES framework-based study focusing on the links between 
policy institutions and actor decision making could provide new insights to inform 
sustainable resource management regimes. A related frontier is the governance of 
overlapping ecological issues, such as agricultural NPS pollution and climate change. The 
approach defined and implemented in this dissertation holds great potential for improving 
our understanding of how policy design for overlapping ecological issues impacts 
behavior, experience and policy support.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Table 5-1. New Zealand Regional water quality policy descriptions 
Territorial Authority Sample Representative- 
ness (compared 
to 2012 NZ 
agricultural 
census) 
Region Policy Type Policy Notes Sources 
Taupo District 17 3.61% Waikato Performance Variation 5 to the Waikato 
Regional Plan (chapter 3.10 of the 
Waikato Regional Plan) 
operational as of 2011, lays out a 
cap and trade performance-based 
policy to control nitrogen leaching 
from agricultural land in the 
catchment. 
Waikato Regional Council. (2012). 
Waikato Regional Plan (online 
version). Retrieved from 
https://www.waikatoregion.govt.nz/
council/policy-and-plans/rules-and-
regulation/regional-plan/waikato-
regional-plan/ 
Thames-Coromandel 
District 
8 1.75% Waikato  No policy As of 2015 there were no other 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Waikato.  
Waikato Regional Council. (2012). 
Waikato Regional Plan (online 
version). Retrieved from 
https://www.waikatoregion.govt.nz/
council/policy-and-plans/rules-and-
regulation/regional-plan/waikato-
regional-plan/; Greenhalgh, S., & 
Murphy, L. (2017). Freshwater 
contaminant limit assessment of the 
regions. Motu Economic and Public 
Policy Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
Matamata-Piako 
District 
39 2.46% 
Hamilton District 1 1.45% 
Hauraki District 20 2.50% 
Otorohanga District 23 3.02% 
Waipa District 44 2.78% 
South Waikato 
District 
17 2.95% 
Waikato District 63 2.41% 
Waitomo District 19 2.96%  
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Rotorua District 22 2.80% Bay of Plenty Performance Rule 11 of the form Regional 
Water and Land Plan (now RL R1 
in the Regional Natural Resources 
Plan) is operational as of 2005 and 
limits property's leaching rates at 
their nutrient benchmark, assessed 
between 2001 and 2004. Rule 11 
will be supplemented by Proposed 
Plan Change 10 of the Regional 
Natural Resources Plan (formerly 
the Regional Water and Land 
Plan), notified in 2016, which lays 
out a cap and trade performance-
based policy to control nitrogen 
leaching from agricultural land in 
the catchment, including a 
reducing in farm-scale leaching 
limits by 2032.  
Bay of Plenty Regional Council. 
(2012). Lake facts Rotorua Lakes: 
What is Rule 11? Retrieved from 
http://www.rotorualakes.co.nz/vdb/d
ocument/136; Bay of Plenty 
Regional Council, Rotorua Lakes 
Council and Te Arawa Lakes Trust. 
(2016). A Guide for Landowners: 
Lake Rotorua Nutrient Managment. 
Plan Change 10 to the Bay of Plenty 
Regional Water and Land Plan, Bay 
of Plenty Regional Council. (2018). 
Operative Bay of Plenty Regional 
Natural Resources Plan. Ta Mahere 
Rawa Taiao a-Rohe. Retrieved from 
https://www.boprc.govt.nz/your-
council/plans-and-
policies/plans/regional/regional-
natural-resources-plan/ 
Kawerau District 1 16.67% Bay of Plenty No policy As of 2015 there were no other 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Bay of Plenty 
Region.  
Bay of Plenty Regional Council. 
(2018). Operative Bay of Plenty 
Regional Natural Resources Plan. 
Ta Mahere Rawa Taiao a-Rohe. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.boprc.govt.nz/your-
council/plans-and-
policies/plans/regional/regional-
natural-resources-plan/; Greenhalgh, 
S., & Murphy, L. (2017). Freshwater 
contaminant limit assessment of the 
regions. Motu Economic and Public 
Policy Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
Opotiki District 8 2.08% 
Tauranga City 1 0.62% 
Western Bay of 
Plenty District 
77 2.60% 
Whakatane Districts 29 3.43% 
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Central Hawke's Bay 
District 
48 6.02% Hawke's Bay Performance Plan Change 6 to the Hawke's Bay 
Regional Resource Management 
Plan: Tukituki River Catchment 
put into place performance-based 
policy, based on a natural capital 
standard for landownders in the 
catchment. Plan change operative 
October 2015 with performance-
based leaching standards to be met 
by 2020. Measurement and 
budgeting via OVERSEER 
required as of 2013. 
Hawke’s Bay Regional Council. 
(n.d.). Plan Change 6 to Hawke’s 
Bay Regional Resource 
Management Plan: Tukituki River 
Catchment (No. HBRC Report No. 
SD 15-08 – 4767). 
Hastings District 56 3.34% Hawke's Bay No policy As of 2015 there were no other 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Hawke's Bay 
Region.  
Hawke’s Bay Regional Council. 
(2012). Hawke’s Bay Regional 
Resource Management Plan. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.hbrc.govt.nz/document
s-and-forms/rrmp/; Greenhalgh, S., 
& Murphy, L. (2017). Freshwater 
contaminant limit assessment of the 
regions. Motu Economic and Public 
Policy Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
Napier City 6 4.44% 
Waiora District 19 5.07% 
Ruapehu District 14 2.41% Manawatu-
Wanganui 
Practice Manawatu-Wanganui (Horizon's) 
One Plan was operative in 2014. 
Standards in place for priority 
catchments (performance), 
practice-based requirements for 
non-priority catchments. No 
priority catchments in Ruapehu 
District. One small priority 
catchments in Wanganui District 
(Kaitoke Lake) (performance). One 
priority catchments in 
Wanganui District (Northern 
Horizons Regional Council. (2014). 
One Plan: Mo te iti - mo te rahi. The 
Consolidated Regional Policy 
Statement, Regional Plan and 
Regional Coastal Plan for the 
Manawatu-Wanganui Region (No. 
2014/EXT/1338). Retrieved from 
http://www.horizons.govt.nz/publica
tions-feedback/one-plan 
Whanganui District 19 2.95% 
Manawatu District 57 4.33% 
 
Palmerston North 
City 
13 4.61% 
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Manawatu Lake).  No priority 
catchments in Palmerston North 
City. 
Rangitikei District 42 5.20% Manawatu-
Wanganui 
Performance Manawatu-Wanganui (Horizon's) 
One Plan was operative in 2014. 
Standards in place for priority 
catchments (performance), 
practice-based requirments for 
non-priority catchments. Standards 
in place for priority catchments 
(performance). Three priority 
catchments in Rangitikei  District 
(Southern Whanganui Lakes, 
Northern Manawatu Lakes, coastal 
rangitikei).Three priority 
catchments in 
Horowhenua  District (Lake 
Horowhenua, Lake Papaitonga, 
Waikawa). Eight priority 
catchments in Tararua  District 
(Upper Manawatu, Weber-Tamaki, 
Upper Tamaki, Upper Kumeti, 
Tamaki-Hopelands, Hopelands-
Tiraumea, Mangatainoka, Upper 
Gorge). 
Horizons Regional Council. (2014). 
One Plan: Mo te iti - mo te rahi. The 
Consolidated Regional Policy 
Statement, Regional Plan and 
Regional Coastal Plan for the 
Manawatu-Wanganui Region (No. 
2014/EXT/1338). Retrieved from 
http://www.horizons.govt.nz/publica
tions-feedback/one-plan 
Horowhenua District 16 2.79% 
Tararua District 45 3.86% 
Clutha District 59 4.86% Otago Performance Plan change 6a Otago Water Plan; 
threshold for nutrient leaching 
come into effect in April 2020. 
Effects-based approach 
(performance) that allows 
landowners to determine methods 
for managing nutrients and other 
contaminants as long as they meet 
the threshold in the Plan's Schedule 
16 (in 2020). Rules are operative as 
of May 2014, but leaching 
thresholds don't come into effect 
until 2020.  
Otago Regional Council. (2018). 
Regional Plan: Water. Retrieved 
from https://www.orc.govt.nz/plans-
policies-reports/regional-plans-and-
polices/water; Otago Regional 
Council. (2016). Regional Plan: 
Water for Otago. Retrieved from 
https://www.orc.govt.nz/media/1207
/regional-plan-water.pdf 
Duneden City 20 2.71% 
Queenstown Lakes 
District 
5 2.14% 
Central Otago 
District 
37 4.80% 
Buller District 20 7.94% West Coast No policy As of 2015 there were no 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
The West Coast Regional Council. 
(2014). West Coast Regional Land 
and Water Plan. Retrieved from 
Westland District 13 4.25% 
  
 
 
1
6
8
 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in West Coast Region, 
aside from the Lake Bunner 
Catchment in Grey District.  
https://www.wcrc.govt.nz/Documen
ts/Resource%20Management%20Pl
ans/Operative%20Land%20and%20
Water%20Plan%20May%202014.p
df 
Grey District 5 2.78% West Coast Practice Chapter 9 in the West Coast Land 
and Water Plan designates special 
management practice-based rules 
for the Lake Brunner/Kotuku-
Whakaoho catchment. The 
practices include stock exclusion, 
low rates of agricultural effluent 
application to land, resource 
consents for stock crossing in 
water ways, and other restrictions 
on agricultural land use activities. 
The West Coast Land and Water 
Plan was operative as of 2014. 
Stuart, B. (n.d.). Review of the Lake 
Brunner Project 2015. NZ Landcare 
Trust. Retrieved from 
http://www.landcare.org.nz/files/file
/1824/Review%20of%20Lake%20B
runner%20Project%202015_2.pdf; 
The West Coast Regional Council. 
(2014). West Coast Regional Land 
and Water Plan. Retrieved from 
https://www.wcrc.govt.nz/Documen
ts/Resource%20Management%20Pl
ans/Operative%20Land%20and%20
Water%20Plan%20May%202014.p
df 
Waimakariri District 40 2.46% Canterbury Performance  
The Canterbury Land and Water 
Regional Plan (LWRP), operative 
2016, region-wide rules apply to 
all areas, unless otherwise 
specified through plan changes 
(e.g. Selwyn, Ashburton, and 
Hurunui Districts have different 
policy in some areas). Under the 
LWRP regions are divided up into 
nutrient allocation zones, including 
red for those that are more 
vulnerable to nutrient pollution, 
orange which are at risk and blue 
and green which are not currently 
at risk. In each of these nutrient 
allocation zones, farms are 
regulated based on a "baseline" 
nutrient leaching rate assessed 
Environment Canterbury. (2019). 
Canterbury Land and Water 
Regional Plan. Retrieved from 
https://www.ecan.govt.nz/your-
region/plans-strategies-and-
bylaws/canterbury-land-and-water-
regional-plan/ 
Timaru District 37 3.77% 
Mackenzie District 11 4.12% 
Waitaki District 39 4.51% 
Kaikoura District 4 2.90% 
Christchurch City 15 1.95% 
Waimate District 18 3.30% 
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during the years 2009-2013. 
Different leaching rates are 
permitted in each of the zones, but 
an increase above the N baseline is 
not permitted. This operates as a 
performance-based farm-scale cap. 
Some properties, based on location 
and nutrient leaching baseline are 
required to write a Farm 
Environment Plan and propose 
management practices to avoid or 
minimize nutrient loss. All farms 
are expected to be at Good 
Management Practice standard.  
Hurunui District 48 4.83% Canterbury Practice Hurunui and Waiau River Regional 
Plan, operative 2013, requires 
farms to become part of a 
Collective or group  with an 
environmental management 
strategy or apply for a resource 
consent on their own that 
designates practices in place to 
ensure regional water quality 
standards are met.  
Environment Canterbury. (2019). 
Canterbury Land and Water 
Regional Plan. Retrieved from 
https://www.ecan.govt.nz/your-
region/plans-strategies-and-
bylaws/canterbury-land-and-water-
regional-plan/ 
Environment Canterbury. (2019). 
Canterbury Water: What’s Your 
Zone? Retrieved from 
https://www.canterburywater.farm/z
ones 
Selwyn District 62 3.24% Canterbury Performance Selwyn Waihora catchments, 
LWRP Plan Change 1, operative in 
June 2016, is similar to the LWRP 
rule structure. Under Plan Change 
1, farming is a controlled activity if 
the property is location in certain 
high nutrient risk locations, or if 
the property is leaching nitrogen 
above its baseline leaching rate. 
Controlled farms are required to 
produce a Farm Environment Plan, 
propose Good Management 
Practices and could involve 
nutrient reductions. 
Environment Canterbury. (2019). 
Canterbury Land and Water 
Regional Plan. Retrieved from 
https://www.ecan.govt.nz/your-
region/plans-strategies-and-
bylaws/canterbury-land-and-water-
regional-plan/Environment 
Canterbury. (2019). Canterbury 
Water: What’s Your Zone? 
Retrieved from 
https://www.canterburywater.farm/z
ones 
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Ashburton District 46 3.18% Canterbury Performance Hinds catchment, Canterbury 
LWRP Plan Change 2, operative in 
2018, performance-based policy 
that requires a reduction in 
leaching rates for those farm 
operations with leaching rates 
above 20kgN per ha per year to 
reduce by percentages relative to 
baseline. Schedule 24a in the 
LWRP (Good Management 
Practices) required of all farms as 
well.  
Environment Canterbury. (2019). 
Canterbury Land and Water 
Regional Plan. Retrieved from 
https://www.ecan.govt.nz/your-
region/plans-strategies-and-
bylaws/canterbury-land-and-water-
regional-plan/ 
Environment Canterbury. (2019). 
Canterbury Water: What’s Your 
Zone? Retrieved from 
https://www.canterburywater.farm/z
ones 
New Plymouth 
District 
31 2.54% Taranaki Practice Taranaki Regional Council's Draft 
Freshwater and Land Management 
Plan was released in April 2015 is 
practice-based. It requires fencing 
and planting on intensively farmed 
properties (over 20 ha) on ring 
plain and coastal terraces by 2020. 
Taranaki Regional Council. (2015). 
Draft Freshwater and Land 
Management Plan for Taranaki (No. 
Document number 1496392). 
Retrieved from 
https://www.trc.govt.nz/assets/Docu
ments/Plans-
policies/SoilWaterPlanReview/Draft
Plan-April2015W.pdf 
Stratford District 21 3.89% 
 
South Taranaki 
District 
39 2.57% 
Far North District 61 3.21% Northland No policy As of 2015 there were no 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Northland Region.  
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L. 
(2017). Freshwater contaminant 
limit assessment of the regions. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy 
Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
Kaipara District 38 3.27% 
 
Whangarei District 
66 4.10% 
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Gisborne District 39 3.16% Gisborne Practice Proposed Freshwater Plan, 
Gisborne Regional Freshwater Plan 
took effect when the plan was 
notified on October 10, 2015. 
Policy encourages the adoption of 
good management practices and in 
cases where freshwater objectives 
are not met, requires the 
implementation of Good 
Management Practices. 
Gisborne District Council. (2017). 
Gisborne Regional Freshwater Plan. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.gdc.govt.nz/freshwater-
plan-proposed/ 
Kapiti Coast District 17 6.75% Wellington No policy As of 2015 there were no 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Wellington Region. 
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L. 
(2017). Freshwater contaminant 
limit assessment of the regions. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy 
Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
Porirua City 2 2.78% 
Upper Hutt City 7 5.98% 
Hutt City 0 0.00% 
Wellington City 5 8.77% 
Masterton District 27 4.13% 
Carterton District 14 3.99% 
 
South Wairarapa 
District 
13 2.91% 
Marlborough District 51 3.00% Marlborough No policy As of 2015 there were no 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Marborough 
District. 
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L. 
(2017). Freshwater contaminant 
limit assessment of the regions. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy 
Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
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Nelson City 6 6.45% Nelson No policy As of 2015 there were no 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Nelson City. 
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L. 
(2017). Freshwater contaminant 
limit assessment of the regions. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy 
Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
Tasman District 65 4.09% Tasman No policy As of 2015 there were no 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Tasman District. 
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L. 
(2017). Freshwater contaminant 
limit assessment of the regions. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy 
Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
Gore District 21 3.66% Southland No policy As of 2015 there were no 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Southland Region. 
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L. 
(2017). Freshwater contaminant 
limit assessment of the regions. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy 
Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
Southland 
District/Stewart 
Island 
94 3.27% 
 
Invercargill City 
6 2.35% 
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Auckland City 91 2.61% Auckland  No policy As of 2015 there were no 
mandatory water quality policies 
(as relating to the NPS for 
Freshwater) drafted, notified or 
operational in Auckland Region. 
Greenhalgh, S., & Murphy, L. 
(2017). Freshwater contaminant 
limit assessment of the regions. 
Motu Economic and Public Policy 
Research. Retrieved from 
https://motu.nz/our-
work/environment-and-
resources/agricultural-
economics/agricultural-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/freshwater-
contaminant-limit-assessment-of-
the-regions/ 
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Table 5-2. Theory of Planned Behavior related survey questions (plus moral norm related question – environmental stewardship) 
Construct Scale Type Question type on 
survey 
Aggregation type Questions 
perceived 
behavioral 
control 
0-3 Ordinal 
(run as 
categorica
l) 
List of 10 yes/no 
questions of 
which respondent 
could check up to 
3 factors. 
Perceived 
behavioral 
control includes 6 
of the 10 
questions, the 
other 4 did not 
related to 
perceived 
behavioral 
control. 
Simple count variable 
of sum the total 
number of checked 
factors out of the 6. 
More factors (max 3) 
is considered high 
perceived behavioral 
control (score of 3). 
What factors led you to implement a nutrient 
management plan on your farm? [Tick up to 3] 
1) I saw nutrient management plans successfully 
demonstrated on similar farms 
2) Trialing a nutrient management plan on my farm 
was simple 
3) Nutrient management plans are reversible if I 
change my mind 
4) I had the necessary skills/knowledge to do this 
5) I had good sources of advice about how to do this 
6) I had the financial resources necessary to do this 
 
perceived 
behavioral 
control_no 
0-3 Ordinal 
(run as 
categorica
l) 
Binary list of 10 
questions of 
which respondent 
could check up to 
3 factors. 
Perceived 
behavioral 
control_no 
includes 6 of the 
10 questions, the 
other 4 did not 
related to 
perceived 
behavioral 
control.  
Simple count variable 
of sum the total 
number of checked 
factors out of the 6. 
More factors (max 3) 
is considered low 
perceived behavioral 
control (note – this is 
the reverse of 
perceived behavioral 
control above).  
What are the main reasons you have not implemented 
a nutrient management plan on your farm? [Tick up 
to 3] 
1) I haven’t seen nutrient management plans 
successfully demonstrated on similar farms 
2) Trialing a nutrient management plan on my farm is 
not simple 
3) Nutrient management plans are not reversible if I 
change my mind 
4) I don’t have the necessary skills/knowledge to do 
this 
5) I don’t have good sources of advice about how to 
do this 
6) I don’t have the financial resources necessary to do 
this 
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Subjective 
norms 
0-30 Continuou
s 
3 questions, each 
consist of  
10 point Likert 
scale from 
“Strongly 
disagree to 
strongly agree” 
Score for each 
question was added to 
produce aggregate 
norms score 
To what extent do you agree with each of the 
following statements? 
1) My family expects me to manage my farm in an 
environmentally friendly way. 
2) The farming community expects me to manage my 
farm in an environmentally friendly way. 
3) The New Zealand public expects me to manage 
my farm in an environmentally friendly way. 
Attitude 3-9 Continuou
s 
3 questions, each 
consist of 3 point 
scale from 
“Lower/worse” to 
“Higher/better” 
Score for each 
question was added to 
produce aggregate 
norms score 
To the best of your knowledge, how has/would 
implementing a nutrient management plan affect(ed) 
your farm? 
1) Financial performance 
2) Environmental performance 
3) Farming lifestyle 
Stewardship 0/1 Binary 
 
List of 10 yes/no 
questions of 
which respondent 
could check up to 
3 factors. 
Stewardship is 
one of the 
binaries. 
Binary  What factors led you to implement a nutrient 
management plan on your farm? [Tick up to 3] 
 Environmental stewardship 
Stewardship_no 
 
0/1 Binary List of 10 yes/no 
questions of 
which respondent 
could check up to 
3 factors. 
Stewardship_no 
is one of the 
binaries. 
Binary  What are the main reasons you have not implemented 
a nutrient management plan on your farm? [Tick up 
to 3] 
 Few environmental benefits 
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Figure 5-1. Logic of survey structure, featuring sample size (N=) associated with each question 
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Table 5-3. Farmer sample descriptive statistics broken down by policy type 
    No policy   Practice   Performance 
    (n = 1048)    (n = 286)   (n = 583) 
Continuous variables   mean sd   mean sd   mean sd 
farm size (thousand 
hectares)  0.23 0.43  0.34 0.65  0.65 2.1 
age  56.94 11.52  57.52 11.38  55.14 11.74 
attitude (n = 1018)  6.57 1.33  6.35 1.17  6.17 1.28 
norms (n = 1830)  21.34 4.78  21.13 4.4  21.38 5 
nmp_adopt_extent (n = 773)  2.64 1.35  2.41 1.16  2.77 1.41 
          
Categorical variables   count %   count %   count % 
NMP (yes)  448 42.75  112 39.16  217 37.22 
NMP intention to adopt 
(yes, n = 1139)  102 17  25 14.37  118 32.33 
profitable (yes)  489 46.66  134 46.85  312 53.52 
farm type          
farm type: other  279 26.62  47 16.43  131 22.47 
farm type: dairy  265 25.29  70 24.48  90 15.44 
farm type: sheep & beef  445 42.46  155 54.2  320 54.89 
farm type: grazing support  59 5.63  14 4.9  42 7.2 
education          
education: secondary school 
or less  367 35.02  112 39.16  221 37.91 
education: 
certificate/diploma  296 28.24  79 27.62  169 28.99 
education: bachelor’s degree  202 19.27  53 18.53  112 19.21 
education: advanced degree  168 16.03  42 14.69  77 13.21 
education: other  15 1.43  0 0  4 0.69 
          
N (nmp extent adoption 
model only)  242 57.21  59 13.95  122 28.84 
0. perceived behavioral 
control  68 28.1  21 35.59  39 
31.97 
1. perceived behavioral 
control  90 37.19  22 37.29  51 
41.8 
2. perceived behavioral 
control  68 
28.1 
 11 18.64  27 
22.13 
3. perceived behavioral 
control  16 
6.61 
 5 8.47  5 4.1 
stewardship (yes)  122 50.41  26 44.07  72 59.02 
          
n (nmp intention model 
only)  303 50.84  85 14.26  208 34.90 
0. perceived behavioral 
control_no  126 41.58  33 38.82  80 38.46 
1. perceived behavioral 
control_no  107 35.31  32 37.65  68 32.69 
2. perceived behavioral 
control_no  52 17.16  13 15.29  43 20.67 
3. perceived behavioral 
control_no  18 5.94  7 8.24  17 8.17 
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stewardship_no (yes)   56 19.31   11 13.41   29 14.87 
 
Table 5-4. NMP adoption model 
Predictor  Odds Ratio (SE) 
policy type (base = no policy)  
practice 0.91 
 (0.16)   
performance 1.03 
 (0.14)   
farm size 1.01 
 (0.04)   
farm type (base = other farm type)  
dairy 9.03*** 
 (1.58)   
sheep and beef 0.50*** 
 (0.07)   
grazing support 0.52** 
 (0.13)   
age 0.99 
 (0.00)   
profitable 1.35** 
 (0.15)   
education (base = secondary school or 
less)  
education: certificate/diploma 0.86 
 (0.12)   
education: bachelor's 0.92 
 (0.14)   
education: advanced degree 0.91 
 (0.15)   
education: other 0.51 
 (0.32)   
constant (not odds ratio) -0.24 
 (0.33)   
District constant (not odds ratio) 0.02 
 (0.03) 
N 1917 
chi2 350.7 
p 0.00 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
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Table 5-5. Extent of NMP adoption models 
  Full model  
No policy 
group Practice Group 
Performance 
Group 
Predictor  Beta (SE) Beta (SE) Beta (SE) Beta (SE) 
policy type (base = no policy)    
practice -0.19    
 (0.11)         
performance 0.06    
 (0.07)         
perceived behavioral 
control (base = score of 
0)     
1.perceived behavioral 
control 0.11 0.18 0.02 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.29) (0.14)      
2.perceived behavioral 
control 0.21* 0.16 0.19 0.33* 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.30) (0.16)      
3.perceived behavioral 
control 0.31* 0.44* -0.55 0.42 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.57) (0.35)      
attitude 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.06 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.11) (0.05)      
norms 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)      
stewardship 0.21** 0.22* 0.10 0.26 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.23) (0.14) 
     
farm size 0.06* 0.17* 0.04 0.05 
 (0.03) (0.08) (0.19) (0.03)      
farm type (base = other farm type)    
dairy 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.68* 0.28 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.31) (0.17)      
sheep and beef 0.14 0.218 0.11 -0.08 
 (0.09) (0.13) (0.39) (0.17)      
grazing support 0.24 0.42 0.29 -0.19 
 (0.17) (0.24) (0.51) (0.29)      
age -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)      
profitability 0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.11 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.24) (0.12) 
education (base = secondary school or 
less)    
education: 
certificate/diploma -0.02 -0.12 0.11 0.08 
 (0.08) (0.12) (0.30) (0.14)      
education: bachelor's -0.05 -0.13 0.21 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.31) (0.16)      
education: advanced 
degree 0.05 0.07 0.20 -0.25 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.31) (0.23) 
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education: other -0.32 -0.15  -15.79 
 (0.36) (0.37)  (1875.80)      
constant 0.37 0.13 -0.89 0.92 
 (0.31) (0.41) (1.18) (0.55)      
TA constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 401 230 52 119 
chi2 78.68 52.24 11.24 27.08 
p 0.00 0.00 0.735 0.04 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001    
 
 
Table 5-6. Intention to adopt NMP models 
  Full model  
No policy 
group 
Practice 
Group 
Performance 
Group 
Predictor  
Odds Ratio 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
(SE) 
Odds Ratio 
(SE) 
policy type (base = no policy)     
practice 0.91    
 (0.37)         
performance 3.96***    
 (1.07)         
perceived behavioral 
control_no (base = score of 0)     
1.perceived behavioral 
control_no 1.53 1.12 4.80 1.84 
 (0.44) (0.56) (6.45) (0.75)      
2.perceived behavioral 
control_no 1.37 1.00 0.25 1.74 
 (0.45) (0.59) (0.42) (0.82)      
3.perceived behavioral 
control_no 1.25 0.92 0.30 1.35 
 (0.62) (0.87) (0.68) (0.92)      
attitude 1.56*** 1.98** 2.02 1.35* 
 (0.16) (0.41) (0.89) (0.20)      
norms 1.08** 1.14* 1.06 1.06 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.15) (0.04)      
stewardship_no 0.98 1.09 0.34 0.78 
 (0.33) (0.60) (0.50) (0.41)      
farm size 1.00 2.37 114.50** 1.00 
 (0.06) (1.71) (196.90) (0.06)      
farm type (base = other farm 
type)     
dairy 2.89 3.62 0.22 4.20 
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 (1.85) (3.63) (0.45) (5.47)      
sheep and beef 2.21** 5.23* 0.01* 1.76 
 (0.66) (3.36) (0.02) (0.72)      
grazing support 3.04* 2.16 0.20 4.40* 
 (1.42) (2.14) (0.50) (2.88)      
age 0.97** 0.97 0.90* 0.98 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)      
profitability 1.31 1.22 1.20 1.47 
 (0.31) (0.52) (1.24) (0.51)      
education (base = secondary 
school or less)     
education: certificate/diploma 1.71 2.12 0.19 1.59 
 (0.52) (1.25) (0.27) (0.65)      
education: bachelor's 2.19* 3.02 0.65 2.14 
 (0.77) (1.89) (0.93) (1.16)      
education: advanced degree 1.25 0.53 0.22 2.03 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.42) (1.08) 
     
education: other 3.10   8.41 
 (3.67)   (12.75)      
constant (not odds ratio) -5.70*** -9.23*** -0.21 -3.89* 
 (1.21) (2.62) (3.68) (1.67)      
District constant (not odds 
ratio) 0.03 0.27 0.00 0.00 
 (0.15) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 536 271 76 186 
chi2 70.27 31.87 11.90 17.51 
p 0.00 0.01 0.69 0.35 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Note: * p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** 
p<0.001 
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APPENDIX 2 
Table 5-7. Interview protocol question for farmers 
Interview protocol questions 
How long have you or your family been farming in the watershed? 
Could you tell me a bit about your farm system? 
Can you run me through what a week on your farm looks like? 
In the last 5-10 years, have you made any changes to your farm system or the 
management of your farm business? What was the driver for these changes? 
What are the costs of these changes? Benefits? 
Are you planning to make any changes to your farm system in the next 2 years? 
Can you tell me a little about your experience with the water quality policy 
process? 
Has the capping of nutrients changed the face of the watershed? 
How fair do you think the policy is/was?  
Would you have done anything different to manage water quality in the lake? 
 
 
Table 5-8. Full codebook with descriptions and representative quotes 
Nodes Description Example Quote 
drivers     
Actor     
A_economics funding, debt, efficiency, other 
sources of income, 
dependence on farm 
"I think, ultimately, its profitability. 
The most decisions we’ve made are 
on profitability. And so, the smaller, 
environmental changes – well, 
there’s benefits as well. So, applying 
nutrients on lower rates more often, 
if we don’t waste the nutrients, it 
makes more sense. So, most of those 
changes, we hope, eventually, help 
profitability as well." 
A_ethic stewardship or land ethic, love 
of learning, aesthetic, price of 
being a "good farmer" 
"And we did a lot of those things 
because we were under a lot of 
pressure. But that’s not the whole 
story. We are an environmental 
organization. So, it’s sort of part of 
our mission to be good. So, it wasn’t 
like we didn’t want to do them. It’s 
what we’re supposed to do." 
A_flexibility convenience, steady supply, 
lifestyle, flexibility in running 
the farm system 
"Yeah it was about giving us more 
flexibility in our system, and to help 
try and drought proof, yeah to - for 
the lake issue was, it was about 
being capped, effectively capped. 
That is a way of still being able to 
improve and maximize. But it also 
gave us another block of land that is 
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separate if we ever wanted to sell 
something or anything like that." 
A_leadership or 
entrepreneur 
Actor themselves represented 
leadership and entrepreneurial 
spirit to drive change, or actor 
received advice or followed 
path of leader or entrepreneur. 
For personal, the actor should 
mention something about 
trying something new, being 
on the cutting edge, taking a 
risk, taking leadership or being 
an entrepreneur. For receiving 
advice, the actor should 
mention a figure or figures that 
influenced their change. 
"Two and a half years ago we made 
the decision that we were sick of 
dealing with dairy farmers, and that 
we were really really keen to support 
[a new business initiative led by 
local farmers]. So we went and saw 
them to see what they needed and 
how it would work." 
A_lifestyle this includes ease of 
management 
"So really I make the decision based 
on what I want to do, what I think is 
going to be more profitable, what 
suits the way I farm as well and my 
lifestyle." 
A_past experience past experience with 
policy/state/regional 
government 
"So the decision had been made by 
then that they were going to 
benchmark and that we knew.  So I 
knew how the farming system was 
going to work [because of 
experience with the policy process 
and previously owning land in the 
catchment].  I probably knew it 
better than anybody, I’d say.  So 
that’s why I was more comfortable 
in getting back in." 
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A_social attributes family life, succession "Well, I had a son and daughter both 
milking cows for someone else and 
then would come home and crutch 
lambs. So, I was left in the muck and 
getting no time off because there’s 
only one main unit. And so, we 
thought if we could buy the dairy 
unit, we’d employ more staff and 
hopefully be able to get on the roster 
and get some time off." 
 
"No incentive and stuff, but the other 
thing with the lake is it's the taonga 
for the Maori.  So it's their treasure. 
They were very keen to protect it 
anyway, and they'd made decisions 
around the lake to protect it way 
before Environment Waikato 
started." 
A_technology availability of specific 
technology 
"We've modeled land use change [to 
make a farm diversification plan]." 
Governance     
G_gov assistance technical or financial 
assistance from a government 
agency 
"The guy I’ve been working with 
through NRCS, he keeps me pretty 
informed. I’m pretty good friends 
with him, so he keeps me quite 
informed on everything and we go 
over stuff. I had a couple spots that I 
had to change things but other than 
that we’ve been pretty – we pretty 
much knew what was going on." 
G_ngos or other Interactions with non-
governmental entities, these 
include organic, extension, 
watershed programs, land 
trusts, housing and 
conservation board, industry 
group requirements or best 
practices, and research 
organizations/universities 
“As far as the rules for organic are 
so strict that these new laws on the 
water quality and watershed, we’ve 
already been having to follow since 
we went organic. The stream 
setbacks and all that are already in 
there for organic." 
G_other gov policies Central, regional or local 
government policies that 
impact nutrient management, 
such as conservation policies 
"Well, we were up for resource 
consent, so it was – as far as the 
effluent upgrade, it helped us get a 
longer resource consent, and it kept 
us compliant." 
G_farmer group participation in a group 
representing farmer interests 
"I probably got a little bit involved 
in [the farmer group] as to see how 
[the policy] was going to work more 
for my own selfish reasons because 
most of the farms around here are 
managed by farm managers, and I 
thought well if it's going to turn to 
shit I'd really want to be the first one 
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to get out but if I could see some 
opportunities I wanted to stay" 
G_water quality policy cap, state, regional policy "And the interesting thing was that 
when they brought the new rules into 
the catchment, the big businesses 
that owned those farms, sold the 
farms in the catchment straight 
away." 
 
"Some fields flood. Some of my land, 
I’m on the early spreading ban. Do 
with the new [water quality policy]. I 
got to hit them in the midsummer, so 
we’re changing the way we got to do 
things, a little bit. We’ll see in a few 
years. Hopefully, it’ll benefit." 
Resource_system     
RS_ecological erosion, runoff, endowment, 
improve ecosystem, nutrients, 
drought, flooding 
"I bought a manure truck, so I had to 
do it myself, now... Well, doing it 
myself, I’ll do it more times per year, 
less each time, and try to minimalize 
runoff and get on when the land 
needs it. When the land can use it." 
RS_farm production animal needs, 
increase/decrease, quality of 
product, pasture integrity 
"Originally the country that went 
into pines was the lower producing 
areas, but the nitrogen is sort of 
considered to be across the whole 
farm.  So by taking out the lower 
producing areas it meant we could 
farm the better areas a little bit more 
intensively which gave us options, 
but then they sold more nitrogen and 
now we don’t have a lot of options." 
Resource_units     
RU_n p attributes attributes of N & P and the 
movement of these nutrients in 
the landscape and farm system 
"I’m doing it as a cover crop and 
I’m gonna crop it. I’m gonna do it as 
a forage so we’re gonna chop it. 
We’re gonna try it because the soil 
will pull up a lot of phosphorus out 
of the soil. Really, every time you 
plow and see the field, you’re 
releasing that phosphorus that’s 
bound because phosphorus doesn’t 
move in the soil. " 
Social economic and 
political settings 
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S_industry or consultant   "So, we actually did a feasibility 
study. We got consultants to do a 
feasibility study, put the whole thing 
together, talked to the accountant, 
and then went to the bank and the 
regional council on the condition 
that – the last condition for doing it 
for buying the farm was that the 
pond was that we got the consent for 
the whole thing." 
S_ c market Carbon Market as a driver  "[Did you get carbon credits on 
that?] On the pines that they planted 
yes... So when [the farm] sold the 
nitrogen, Mighty River Power 
generate energy out of the lake.  
They’ve got the dams in the river.  
So they put a deal that they wanted 
carbon so they tied the two 
together." 
S_demographic shifts For example, people going out 
of farming without a successor 
"I was renting these places – I had 
my milkers – and, I was renting 
places for my heifers. And, I had my 
heifers over at this farm, over here. 
This [neighbor 1] – that I told you 
he only milked 35 cows – he had 
sold his cows; he had retired from 
farming. And, I had my heifers way 
over at [neighbor 2's], at a different 
farm. And, [neighbor 2] came to me, 
and said, “Do you want to rent my 
pastures?” And so, I rented them, 
and it was a lot of fence, because it 
was a hexagon, so it was a big 
area." 
S_economics and 
markets 
competition, profit, efficiency, 
prices broader than the 
watershed dynamic, carbon 
credit opportunities 
"The main reason why we came back 
in and bought here was location.  
Secondly, different land use in the 
future.  And thirdly, land prices.  
Land prices had dropped by thirty or 
forty percent, so it made it economic 
to get back in again." 
S_n market Nitrogen market as a driver "We planted about 40 hectares of 
pine trees, production pines, but no, 
the size didn’t change at all. And 
that was partly because we’d sold 
some nitrate credits, once we got our 
cap sorted out, we had plenty so we 
sold it down." 
S_social context Neighbor complaints "I tell my friend, I said "Farming is a 
hostile environment right now. It's 
hostile." I mean, the environment 
that we're in is hostile. Not only do 
we have pressure from regulators, 
we have regulations, we have 
pressure from intolerance from the 
community." 
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outcomes     
Individual Outcomes     
IO_negative economic     
IO_Neg_compliance  compliance costs related to 
policy 
"But it’s just got to the point where I 
might actually have to get a little bit 
more involved with it, because they 
just sent me a monitoring bill that 
was huge and I’ve just wrote a letter 
to them and said that I’m not going 
to pay that because that’s 153 
percent increase on last year’s bill." 
IO_Neg_farm viability Reduction in ability for farm 
to remain solvent and 
profitable, survive as a 
business 
"Well, just for the very reason – if 
you can’t grow your business then 
you can’t survive. So, we had to 
shift. So, we decided we would 
reduce our operation in the 
catchment, and increase our 
operation outside of the catchment." 
IO_Neg_financial Reduction in profit, payoff, 
funding, reduced earnings, 
compliance, property value, 
new revenue streams including 
new products, new markets, 
diversification 
"Well, there are direct financial 
costs and there are also social costs, 
I think. The direct cost to you is 
these physical costs like building 
detainment berms and putting 
effluent ponds and buying upgraded 
irrigators and things like that." 
IO_Neg_flexibility Loss of flexibility in farm 
management 
"And before the rules, you could do 
whatever you wanted to do. Now, 
you can probably make changes as 
long as you stay within the rules. So, 
I suppose, yes. We started cropping 
in the summer to develop those 
pellets to improve the quality of 
grass. And that’s not going to 
happen. So, that hasn’t changed in a 
way. Although, I don’t know think 
we expected to do it for long 
anyway, did we? It’s just an option 
that we don’t have anymore." 
IO_negative social     
IO_Neg_distrust in 
regulation 
Frustration or distrust with 
regulation or agency 
implementing the regulation, 
or in the monitoring 
(Overseer) 
"Oh, I just don’t contact [the 
Regional Council]. Because I don’t 
have enough respect or trust in them 
to be able to do that." 
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IO_Neg_fairness Perceived that situation is 
unfair in individual position 
“We planted trees on steep land to 
stop erosion. And we did flood 
control work. And I can show you 
that on the photos that I’ve got. And 
those things all worked really well, 
but the annoying thing is that now 
that doesn’t count towards what 
we’re doing. So, what we’ve done is, 
we’ve harvested the trees, and we 
haven’t replanted. Because we need 
to have more grass to try and keep 
our cow numbers up. It’s stupid. It’s 
stupid that they’re not recognizing 
environmental benefits that were 
done in the ‘90s and the ‘80s." 
IO_Neg_non-financial 
costs 
time, depression, involvement 
with community 
"It was tough, man it was tough.   
Because we were all farming.  We 
used to joke and say man this would 
be great if this was your day job.  
Because A) you are on a salary, B) 
You are really interested, C) you 
haven't got any skin in the game, and 
it’s just really interesting stuff. But 
we were all trying to hold down, I 
had two little babies, trying to hold 
down farms, and businesses, and 
represent people and communicate 
and try and forge our way through 
this process, it was incredibly hard." 
IO_Neg_uncertainty in 
future 
Uncertainty in the future of the 
farm system and what will be 
possible 
"Well, we won’t have a business. 
Because they’re looking for a 30 
percent reduction. So, instead of 
having 230 cows, we’ll have 160 
cows. That just won’t work. Just like 
if you’re salary got cut by a third, it 
would certainly change your 
perspective as well." 
IO_neutral economic     
IO_Neu_compliance Compliance with policy is a 
negligible cost 
"So, you know I mean the RAPs I 
mean definitely yes we’ve had to 
make some adaptations to our 
management here and all, but they 
haven’t really impacted us 
detrimentally. It hasn’t been a big 
burden or impact on us as a farm." 
IO_positive ecological     
IO_Pos_environmental 
quality 
specific resource not specified "No. No benefits. Apart from 
environmental benefits, that’s about 
it. Certainly no financial benefits." 
IO_Pos_soil quality improvements in individual's 
soil and pasture quality 
"And all that where the brook is, it’s 
not mud now, its grass. And going 
over the years, it’s not just grass, it’s 
nice grass – nice, and lush grass; 
and, I only pasture it, maybe, three 
or four times a year." 
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IO_Pos_water quality improvements in water quality 
at the farm-scale level, or due 
to farm-scale level behaviors 
"So, I think we must – so, if water 
quality is improving in [the] Bay… 
Something is happening. Some of 
these practices are – and I don’t 
know whether that has to do with it 
or not. I just think we’ve done so 
much – that it’s useful. It’s proven 
that it works." 
IO_positive economic   "Yeah, so that’s what I’m trying to 
say. If I’d kept running a similar 
number of stock my nitrogen output 
would have dropped but the policy 
changes allowed me to improve the 
farm’s productivity without 
breaching my nitrogen cap." 
IO_Pos_farm viability improvements in ability for 
farm to remain solvent and 
profitable, survive as a 
business 
"Well, the NMP plan is a chance to 
save money, there, because we know 
for over fertilizing. With the first one 
we did, the comprehensive one, we 
found out that we were putting 
almost double manure on the 
grassland than we should’ve been. 
You can put too much. It’s all there 
is to it. You put too much. That’s a 
good thing to save money, if you 
can." 
IO_Pos_financial Improvement in profit, payoff, 
funding, increased earnings, 
compliance, property value, 
new revenue streams including 
new products, new markets, 
diversification 
"Yeah there were benefits. For 
people like me that had very, very 
high NDAs, to have sold a few off the 
top. Like I sold down to a reasonable 
level and that would have been good 
if we hadn't lost the extra 1300. So 
there were benefits in yeah any very, 
very high NDA farms - could get 
part of their capital out. It was like 
selling part of your farm, but 
actually not losing the farm." 
IO_Pos_flexibility Improvement in flexibility in 
farm management 
"Pretty much, like we sold down the 
cattle and replaced those cows with 
trading stock and they were winter 
grazers, so it didn’t really alter the 
figure too much, it just gave us more 
management flexibility." 
IO_Pos_new markets Accessing new markets, 
marketing, pricing, supply 
chain changes 
"We’re certainly producing the 
product, but we haven’t had a decent 
product to sell, which has been the 
biggest issue. We’ve tried cheese 
and yoghurts. We have been 
exporting frozen milk to our cheese 
maker in Aussie for the last few 
years. But the last 18 months we’ve 
taken on a [new] partner and they’re 
powdering it and take it to China. 
That’s been a pretty amazing leap 
forward, and it’s given us a solid 
market with reasonable returns." 
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IO_positive social     
IO_Pos_awareness improved understanding of 
farm system, nutrient 
dynamics 
"So those sort of things, yeah, you’re 
very aware of - we talk a whole new 
language now in terms of nitrogen 
discharge allowance, NDAs and 
things like that. Yeah and we’re 
conscious of those things. We live in 
a different world here now." 
IO_Pos_non-financial 
benefits 
new opportunities,  
involvement with community, 
sense of pride in work, reduces 
burden of work 
"Oh, I sleep easier at night. Yeah, to 
keep compliant with the old pond, I 
did some stuff that I wasn’t very 
proud of. But he had to do it to stay 
compliant really. Yeah, so now all 
that’s gone now. Easier management 
and all that sort of stuff is, yeah." 
IO_Pos_enviro 
recognition 
Received recognition for 
environmental 
stewardship/sustainability of 
farm system 
"Then we won the [environmental 
award], now is the moment when the 
dollars profit per KG of nitrogen 
came together.  We've been testing, 
the [farm system] thing is just a big 
experiment.  We've measured 
ourselves against other farmers 
through the [award]." 
watershed outcomes     
WO_negative ecological     
WO_Neg_environmental 
quality 
specific resource not specified "Well, we’re back again to the 
nitrogen, phosphorus/biodiversity. 
Because if you look at what the 
Regional Council’s job is, it’s not 
only nutrients, its biodiversity. It’s 
protecting native bush. Its pests. 
There are a lot of things. But it’s 
only actually PC 10 hasn’t taken 
into consideration any of those other 
things that actually the Regional 
Council is in charge of 
implementing, or controlling." 
WO_Neg_land use 
patterns 
  "That was all taken out of farm land 
and they were farming 
conservatively anyway.  They were 
having no effect on the lake over 
there at all because they all had 
sheep.  But that’s all in trees now." 
WO_Neg_water quality   "So this trading of nitrogen also 
creates another problem of what 
they call hotspots.  Some people 
don't want to know about it but of 
course it makes a difference.  Put it 
this way; if I put this tea towel on the 
bench and I get two glasses of water, 
one I just sprinkle lightly 
everywhere, it hardly sinks through, 
the other one I just pour it right 
here, you’re going to find a big 
puddle here that’s going to run over 
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here.  In effect this nitrogen cap 
thing has done exactly that." 
WO_negative economic     
WO_Neg_farming 
viability 
Reduction in ability for 
farming in the watershed to 
remain solvent and profitable, 
survive as a business/industry 
"That's just what happens. The – 
yeah, they're a lot of farms that are – 
it's kind of a perfect storm situation 
too, where I think the number of 
farms is like 750 farms left in the 
state... Somebody said the other day 
that they read from the agency that 
they could see 150 to 200 more 
farms go out this year. A lot of that's 
like – milk price, and then 
regulations at the same time." 
WO_Neg_financial 
watershed 
profit, payoff, funding, 
reduced earnings, compliance, 
property value, new revenue 
streams including new 
products, new markets, 
diversification 
"Farmers have made a real stand in 
this catchment to say, 'We can do 
this, what’s required by 2022, 
whatever the percentage top is. But 
what’s required after 2032 is not 
doable. Financially, it’s not 
doable.'" 
WO_negative social     
WO_Neg_well-being community involvement, 
depression, community 
members leaving 
"So, I think – but it’s like grievance; 
this – this phase is the angry phase, 
and then acceptance might come 
because that’s what happened for us 
in the Taupo catchment like I say." 
WO_Neg_fairness perceived fairness of the 
policy process/policy 
outcomes 
"When grandparenting was on the 
table, who was going to miss out? 
[Maori land], big time.  And as 
owners of the lakebed, and 
individually owners of the farms,   a 
lot of farms especially down in the 
Western area, 55% of the 
landholding, they had a really big 
series of interests to try and weigh 
up.   And they had voluntarily retired 
a whole heap of their own land... 
And so when grandparenting came 
out, these guys were severely 
penalized.   There is no recognition 
of those environmental benefits from 
having already given.  So you can 
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understand why they are pretty 
pissed off." 
WO_neutral ecological 
  
WO_Neu_lack of 
changes 
Not sure whether there is a 
positive or negative impact on 
water quality or other 
environmental indicators at the 
watershed scale 
"The land use, land use change, in 
the catchment, has been minor." 
WO_neutral economic     
WO_Neu_economic 
impact 
Perception that policy has had 
neutral economic impacts 
"But actually, well, I’ve personally 
found it pretty easy, it hasn’t been 
too bad at all. Most of the farms 
down here are large Maori owned 
blocks, and when I talk to the other 
managers, they’ve pretty much found 
the same thing. There’s a couple on 
lower benchmarks that sort of get a 
little bit - the farms were probably 
not as developed, so that’s probably 
limited how much they can develop 
their farms. But in general, I don’t 
think it has affected things too 
much." 
WO_neutral social     
WO_Neu_acceptance   "But, you know, it’s something that 
I’ve been involved with for 30 years 
of farming and so it’s been a major 
cost to farms definitely, which 
everybody seems to have just – just 
get on with it." 
WO_Neu_well-being   "Socially, some people who are 
really unhappy have gone. Which is 
good they've sold, probably still not 
happy but they were able to exit.  
Some of the angst around that was 
that the trust stood on the market 
and paid what private valuations, 
but some of those people still say 
that wasn't enough." 
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WO_Neu_fairness Policy is both fair and unfair "Everybody’s got to do their share. 
Are they picking on us? No, I don’t 
think so. Some people think they are, 
but I think everyone’s gotta do their 
part. I think there’s certainly been 
room for improvement; I think it 
runs you know. I only see something 
no one’s – nothing’s gonna change." 
WO_positive ecological     
WO_Pos_land use 
patterns 
  "I think there would be a lot more 
dairy farms [without the policy], 
particularly on Maori lands down 
the bottom of the lake, which is just 
beautiful land. There would have 
been more development, yep. So, it 
met its purpose. I think the lake is 
improving too." 
WO_Pos_management 
changes 
  "I see the bigger farms – a lot of 
them are doing cover crops where 
they never did before." 
WO_Pos_water quality   "So – so, yeah, so, – but we want the 
lake to get – to get better as well and 
we – we – we think we’re seeing that 
so there’s a – we – we do think there 
is a balance in things, but – but then 
the financial imperative sort of 
seasonal; these are making some 
good decisions anyway, 
unfortunately." 
WO_positive economic     
WO_Pos_farming 
viability 
  "And that is one of the best thing that 
has actually happened in this 
catchment, is that we have, we can 
trade effectively. So it doesn’t lock 
someone in forever and gives people 
flexibility and things like that. A lot 
of people wouldn’t actually realize 
that or use that or whatever, but that 
is huge flexibility. You’ve got to have 
that flexibility if you want to go 
ahead." 
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WO_Pos_financial profit, payoff, funding, 
reduced earnings, compliance, 
property value, new revenue 
streams including new 
products, new markets, 
diversification 
"So for the Maori incorporations the 
benefits were huge. They could take 
capital out of land but they can't sell 
it.  So Maori land can't be sold.  So 
if it was me, I owned this land and I 
couldn’t sell it and someone was 
going to give me a whole lot of 
money for that land and I owned it, 
I'd have planted the whole thing in 
trees...So it allowed them to release 
capital out of their land holdings, 
retain their land because they can't 
sell it and then they’ve taken that 
money out and my incorporation 
have treated it as capital." 
WO_positive social     
WO_Pos_awareness awareness of water quality, 
farm dynamics and 
environmental footprint 
"Well, farmers have become aware 
of the environmental impacts that 
farming has on the waterways and 
the lakes." 
WO_Pos_well-being community involvement, 
depression, community 
members leaving 
"So, yeah. Actually, I think that 
probably the biggest plus out of it is 
actually talking to your neighbor, 
and working with your neighbor, 
and seeing what they’re doing." 
WO_Pos_fairness perceived fairness of the 
policy process/policy 
outcomes 
"Yes, I do, absolutely. I think we 
have a workable proposition, a 
workable nitrogen constraint." 
Recent nutrient 
management behavior 
    
Management change     
M_change breed Change in animal stock, part 
of the physical stock of the 
farm, not something that can 
be changed on a day to day 
management basis. 
"Basically, change the breed really. 
As I say, they were very high 
maintenance. We had dry seasons 
and the following year they didn’t 
perform very well. So we got a 
hardier, bit more robust sheep on 
board, but they don’t produce quite 
as much, but they cost - the cost of 
running them has dropped as well, 
so - and that was to fit with putting 
milking on it, sort of changed the 
dynamics of the farm, so just that fit 
with the whole system." 
M_reduced fertilizer changes in the application of 
fertilizer timing and/or 
amount, including manure 
"Just, I suppose, I have changed 
from putting the fertilizer on in the 
autumn to putting it on in the spring. 
Or late spring, probably, more than 
early spring. Due to, probably, a 
bigger loss would occur in the 
autumn." 
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M_grazing off Began or changed grazing off 
of livestock, or wintering off, 
including dairy support 
"What we've done instead of winter 
cropping and wintering on the farm, 
we've taken more animals off the 
farm during the winter. It also 
helped that the grasses that were 
growing now provide feed over a 
wider part of the season. But it's 
both continual productivity 
improvements that has come to help 
in the situation." 
M_increased fertilizer increase in the application of 
fertilizer  
"And then, in the last few years, 
we’ve found that we haven’t really 
had enough manure on the closer 
fields, and it costs a lot more to get it 
to the further fields, so the last few 
years, we’ve been putting more 
commercial fertilizer on the further 
fields, and sometimes no manure, 
and putting more of that manure on 
the grass ground during the summer 
and definitely putting more – or, 
enough – on the corn ground that’s 
close by." 
M_increased stocking 
rate 
  "Yeah, chicken as well, so it's kind of 
a quick background. I guess I'd say 
also we've grown the flock a little bit 
–" 
M_pursue knowledge Actively pursue knowledge to 
better understand nutrient 
dynamics (engage in research) 
"We've actively pursued knowledge 
by engaging in research trials." 
M_manure spreading Changes in the application of 
manure timing, amount or 
pattern, also changes in 
location of manure stacking 
"I bought a manure truck, so I had to 
do it myself, now. I’m gonna do – 
rather than hiring somebody to come 
in and mainly want the pit empty, so 
just put it on as heavy as they can 
put it on because they’re only 
coming in once or twice a year. 
Well, doing it myself, I’ll do it more 
times per year, less each time, and 
try to minimalize runoff and get on 
when the land needs it. When the 
land can use it. That way, absorption 
is better and I’d like to hit it as soon 
after cropping and pray for doing it 
the day before a rain, that way it 
gets incorporated in." 
M_notill Switch to no-till "Then, as for fields, the last few 
years we've been – we've been kind 
of experimenting with no till for 
about 20 years, and probably six or 
seven years ago we went halfway no 
till and four years we got to 100 
percent no till –" 
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M_nutrient management 
plan 
Began or revised a nutrient 
management plan or overseer 
plan 
"That was my first effort at writing 
my NMP, yeah. We had a different 
contractor doing it for us initially 
the first year or two. Even back then, 
we were already at $4,500.00, 
$5,000.00 then and we didn’t have 
the land base that we have now." 
M_reduce feed inputs Changes in purchased feed or 
other inputs (non-fertilizer) 
“Yeah we also bring in palm kernel 
at this stage. Yeah we have cut down 
- well we’re trying to do at the 
moment because it is not worth 
losing money on using it. " 
M_seeding or cropping Began, changed or stopped 
seeding varieties or cropping 
patterns 
"Yeah, yeah. We’re gonna seed 
more, now. We always like our corn 
but we used to plant 300 acres and 
now we’re down to 180." 
M_soil sampling Began or changed soil 
sampling 
"Talking with USDA, I’m trying to 
reseed to improve my pastures and 
so I’ll be doing some soil testing. I 
didn’t do that when I went to the 
[nutrient management class], but I 
will now just so that I better 
understand." 
M_stocking rate Changed number of animal 
units 
"No, there’s no reduction in – well, 
actually it did come with a reduction 
in stocking rate as well. I think I’ve 
mentioned that we reduced from 
about 3.4 down to 2.9." 
Structural change     
St_barn Change or construct barns "Then we're actually building a barn 
to bring these animals home because 
that contract grade is – they're doing 
a nice job raising them, but that's – 
we can more than pay for a barn." 
St_biodigester   "[Q: When did you guys put in the 
biodigester?] 2008... Yup. It was 
something we decided to do." 
St_ buffers Change or construct buffers or 
setbacks on rivers, streams or 
ditches 
"right, yeah, and some ditches and 
with buffers I think was the last 
project we did a while back was 
maybe 30 feet and then they came 
and planted trees and they help even 
compensate us a small amount for 
the land that we lost because our 
fields did go right down to those 
areas." 
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St_detainment bunds Change or build detainment 
berms to control flow of water, 
slow flow of water and runoff 
of nutrients 
"Obviously where we pug ground up 
is another issue, we are always 
conscious of that, but we've also put 
in a lot of detainment berms, if you 
can imagine this farm is elevated it's 
got quite a big catchment and all the 
water eventually is coming down 
into the lake. It's going to get there 
one way or the other.  These 
detainment berms, so far we have 
done about seven with the regional 
Council to reduce or to mitigate the 
flow of water that comes through, 
especially when we have these big 
downpours." 
St_equipment Purchase or change farming 
equipment 
"We have adopted the best 
management practice advice in 
terms of effluent and disposal. We 
put in a new storage system. A 
rubber-lined storage system. It – to 
have best practice for effluent and 
disposal. We brought new land 
application irrigators to meet the 
application requirement." 
St_fencing Change or construct fences "We had to fence up the swamps 
because there are some wetlands on 
the backside of a couple of our fields 
that we had to fence out. Water 
quality. Like I said, it all makes 
sense. It makes you more money in 
the long run. Cows aren’t gonna 
make milk standing in the mud." 
St_leachate system   "The biggest problem I have is we 
have to put a leachate system in. 
Ugh. It’s an $81,000.00 project, 
which I don’t think is even needed 
because our bunker are – well, 
they’re 100 feet from the brook and 
they’re 50 feet from the road." 
St_manure pit or pad Change or construct manure 
pit 
"By getting manure on the land – we 
put in a manure pit – by getting the 
manure on the land, we went – our 
tonnage of feed multiplied by four 
times in two years, per acre. It’s 
huge. That’s all money in your 
pocket because you’re not 
purchasing that extra feed." 
St_milking parlor change or construct milking 
parlor 
"We’ve been going about eight or 
nine years. Eight years, yeah. It 
didn’t actually take that long, built a 
shed, a purpose built milking shed 
and pretty much within 12 months 
we were producing milk." 
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St_stand-off pad Change or construct stand-off 
pad 
"We still have no – on our own, we 
put in a cement pad to feed the cows 
on. We're still dealing with – we kind 
of get a nice bedded pack built that's 
dry, and then we get six inches of 
snow on top of it –" 
St_tree planting Plant trees to restore banks or 
native bush (not pine 
plantation - that is a system 
change) 
"Apart from fencing off gullies and 
planting them in natives, rather than 
productions trees, that’s about it." 
St_water flow control 
structures 
add or change culvert, put in 
drains to divert water 
"Some of our diversion water goes 
through a culvert underneath this 
pushway. I didn’t wanna pour 
concrete there, so what I did is I 
added onto the culvert on both sides 
and just built it up, so now the dirt is 
much higher than our concrete 
pushway, and when she came back, 
she said that was fine." 
System change     
Sy_purchase or lease 
land 
Purchase new land for 
agriculture within the policy 
region 
"Well, we just barely purchased 
some more land. We’re up to 280 
acres. We rent another 100 acres of 
crop land." 
Sy_put land in 
production 
  "Then there was a white pine stand 
that we wanted to cut and reclaim 
for pasture and we wanted to clear 
all that junk wood, and then we 
wanted to drastically thin out the 
hemlock out of the sugar 
bush..."Yep, he gave me approval." I 
said "Can we start?" "Yeah, go 
ahead. Get started." We start. Clear 
cut 20 acres here, and clear cut a 
bunch here, and do a bunch of work, 
and we only did, probably 25 
percent of what we wanted to do –" 
Sy_sale or lease of land Sale of agricultural land "So we decided after a lot of soul-
searching that we would sell." 
Sy_switch to higher 
intensity 
Transition to or from dairy, 
sheep, beef, vegetable, other, 
pine plantation, dairy support. 
Note that many farms can be 
multiple different farm 
systems at once, and may take 
up additional system types, for 
example a dairy may retire 
some land and plant a pine 
plantation. Switch from 
breeding operation to 
purchasing stock included as 
well, or reverse, switch from 
purchasing to breeding 
"Well, one would be put the sheep 
milking unit on...So basically, we’ve 
put that on and it has changed the 
dynamics a little bit. And then we’ve 
sort of intensified that area, the 
sheep milking area, quite a bit. 
Mainly with the sheep, but it hasn’t 
changed our nutrient output a hell of 
a lot, I don’t think." 
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Sy_switch to lower 
intensity 
Transition to or from dairy, 
sheep, beef, vegetable, other, 
pine plantation, dairy support. 
Note that many farms can be 
multiple different farm 
systems at once, and may take 
up additional system types, for 
example a dairy may retire 
some land and plant a pine 
plantation. Switch from 
breeding operation to 
purchasing stock included as 
well, or reverse, switch from 
purchasing to breeding 
"Really, since we went grass fed – 
this is recent – we’ve had to – we’re 
still trying to figure out how this is 
changing our – last summer was the 
first summer we were 100 percent 
grass fed." 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2. Network graph representing group mental model of Taupo farmers’ watershed social-
ecological system.  The arrangement of nodes mimics the structure of the SES Framework in Figure 
4-1 above. Color of node represents the category of node: driver nodes are orange (governance), 
magenta (social, economic and political settings), yellow (resource system), cyan (actor), and pink 
(resource system); behavior nodes are light blue (management), blue (structural) and navy (system); 
watershed (WO) and individual (IO) outcomes nodes are red (negative), grey (neutral) and green 
(positive).  
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Figure 5-3. Taupo SES sub-category group mental model network. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-4. Rotorua SES Category group mental model network 
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Figure 5-5. Rotorua SES sub-category group mental model network 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-6. Vermont SES Category group mental model network 
 
 
 
  
202 
 
 
Figure 5-7. Vermont SES sub-category group mental model network.
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Table 5-9. Driver node statistics by region in Driver-behavior sub-network.  Rank reflects the descending rank of strength (high to low). The data 
driving these ranks is from the Driver-behavior sub-network so ranks do not reflect influence on outcomes.  
  Taupo (n = 11)   Vermont (n = 16)   Rotorua (n = 11) 
Sub-category node rank strength degree 
occurrence 
probability   rank strength degree 
occurrence 
probability   rank strength degree 
occurrence 
probability 
A_economics 2 49 23 91% 
 
5 21 13 50% 
 
2 25 16 64% 
A_ethic 14 2 2 9% 
 
6 17 15 38% 
 
8 5 5 18% 
A_flexibility 10 9 7 18% 
 
9 8 8 13% 
 
- - - - 
A_leadership_or 
     _entrepreneur 
7 17 12 27% 
 
10 4 3 13% 
 
- - - - 
A_lifestyle 8 16 11 27% 
 
11 3 3 6% 
 
6 9 8 36% 
A_past_experience 12 5 5 9% 
 
10 4 3 13% 
 
- - - - 
A_social_attributes 10 9 8 27% 
 
12 2 2 6% 
 
11 1 1 9% 
A_technology - - - - 
 
- - - - 
 
10 2 2 9% 
G_farmer_group 12 5 3 27% 
 
13 1 1 6% 
 
- - - - 
G_gov_assistance 10 9 7 18% 
 
1 74 25 88% 
 
4 14 9 45% 
G_ngos_or_other 11 7 7 9% 
 
3 48 22 75% 
 
6 9 8 36% 
G_other_gov_policies 13 4 3 27% 
 
10 4 4 13% 
 
7 8 5 27% 
G_water_quality_policy 1 88 28 100% 
 
2 58 26 94% 
 
1 42 25 100% 
RS_ecological 5 31 18 45% 
 
4 31 18 44% 
 
3 17 15 55% 
RS_farm_production 6 23 14 64% 
 
6 17 13 31% 
 
10 2 2 9% 
RU_n_p_attributes 8 16 11 27% 
 
12 2 2 6% 
 
5 11 10 27% 
S_c_market 9 11 7 18% 
 
- - - - 
 
- - - - 
S_demographic_shifts - - - - 
 
13 1 1 6% 
 
- - - - 
S_economics_and 
     _markets 
4 40 18 82% 
 
8 9 6 44% 
 
8 5 5 9% 
S_industry_or 
     _consultant 
13 4 4 9% 
 
10 4 4 6% 
 
8 5 5 18% 
S_n_market 3 42 18 82% 
 
- - - - 
 
10 2 2 9% 
S_social_context - - - - 
 
7 15 13 19% 
 
9 3 3 9% 
Note: The one letter prefix of the driver sub-category node name represents the overall driver category that the node belongs to: A = Actor, G = Governance, RS = Resource 
System, RU = Resource Units, S = Social, economic and political setting.
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Table 5-10. Drivers ranked by strength across each region. Note that data driving these ranks is from 
the Driver-behavior sub-network so ranks do not reflect influence on outcomes. The one letter prefix 
of the driver sub-category node name represents the overall driver category that the node belongs to.  
Rank Taupo Vermont 
Rotorua 
1 G_water_quality_policy G_gov_assistance 
G_water_quality_policy 
2 A_economics G_water_quality_policy 
A_economics 
3 S_n_market G_ngos_or_other 
RS_ecological 
4 S_economics_and_markets RS_ecological 
G_gov_assistance 
5 RS_ecological A_economics 
RU_n_p_attributes 
6 RS_farm_production A_ethic 
A_lifestyle 
  RS_farm_production 
G_ngos_or_other 
7 A_leadership_or_entrepreneur S_social_context 
G_other_gov_policies 
8 A_lifestyle S_economics_and_markets 
A_ethic 
 RU_n_p_attributes  
S_economics_and_markets 
   
S_industry_or_consultant 
9 S_c_market A_flexibility 
S_social_context 
10 A_flexibility A_leadership_or_entrepreneur 
A_technology 
 A_social_attributes A_past_experience 
RS_farm_production 
 G_gov_assistance G_other_gov_policies 
S_n_market 
  S_industry_or_consultant 
 
11 G_ngos_or_other A_lifestyle 
A_social_attributes 
12 A_past_experience A_social_attributes 
 
 G_farmer_group RU_n_p_attributes 
 
13 G_other_gov_policies G_farmer_group 
 
 S_industry_or_consultant S_demographic_shifts 
 
14 A_ethic  
 
 
 
 
  
205 
 
 
 
Figure 5-8. Number of individual outcomes by region. Note for Taupo and Rotorua n = 11 and for 
Vermont n = 16. 
 
